Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38240
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | 經濟學系 | en |
dc.creator | 廖郁萍 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | Yu-Ping Liao | en |
dc.creator | Michelle J. White | en |
dc.creator | Liao, Y-P. | en |
dc.creator | White, M.J. | en |
dc.date | 2002 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-25T01:06:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-25T01:06:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-25T01:06:47Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1465-7252 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38240 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often. | en |
dc.language | en_US | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
dc.relation | American Law and Economics Review 4(2),258-294 | en |
dc.title | No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis | en |
dc.type | article | en |
item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairetype | article | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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aler-reprint.pdf | 172.88 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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