Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/74839
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor | 財政系 | - |
dc.creator | 鄭竹君;朱巡;Lai, Yu-Bong | - |
dc.date | 2014-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-04-27T07:19:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-04-27T07:19:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015-04-27T07:19:46Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/74839 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The welfare effect of the existence of tax havens on high-tax countries has not been conclusive in the theoretical literature. Some papers show that the existence of tax havens is harmful to high-tax countries, while other studies argue that the opposite could occur. We aim to address a question: Do these welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing properties still hold in the presence of lobbying? We find that the welfare-enhancing property does not hold, provided that the policy-maker attaches a sufficiently large weight to the political contribution received. Moreover, we point out that the cooperation among high-tax countries in restricting the international tax planning activity can lead to a lower level of social welfare in all high-tax countries. | - |
dc.format.extent | 259567 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation | International Tax and Public Finance, 1-20 | - |
dc.subject | Capital mobility;Interest groups;Lobbying;Tax havens;Tax competition;F21;H41;H73 | - |
dc.title | A Political Economy of Tax Havens | - |
dc.type | book/chapter | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8 | - |
dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8 | - |
item.openairetype | book/chapter | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Appears in Collections: | 專書/專書篇章 |
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