組織層級的最適理論：交易成本的觀點

Abstract

本文試圖藉由「交易成本經濟學」，建構一套組織層級的最適理論，探討組織結構從「階層」到「無政府階層」的轉變，並分析其根據「機會主義預期成本」與「治理成本」而變動的「無政府階層-階層」連續體：機會主義的預期成本愈低，或是治理成本愈高，組織中的行動者愈可能選擇較為無政府階層的關係；機會主義的預期成本愈高，或是治理成本愈低，組織中的行動者愈可能選擇較為階層的關係。

This paper attempts to through TCE theory, construct an exploratory explanation as to the transformation of organizational structure from anarchy to hierarchy. This paper identifies the change of “anarchy-hierarchy” continuum by pointing out two kinds of TCE：expected costs of opportunism and governance costs. Organizational actors may choose more anarchic relations when expected costs of opportunism decreases or governance costs increases, and vice versa, more hierarchic relations when expected costs of opportunism increases or governance costs decreases.