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題名 企業超額現金持有與公司價值之間的關係—來自中國大陸A股上市公司的證據
The relationship between excess cash holding and corporate value--evidence from A-share listed companies in mainland China作者 張秦晉
Zhang, Qin-Jin貢獻者 林宛瑩
Lin, Wan-ying
張秦晉
Zhang, Qin-Jin關鍵詞 超額現金持有
股東財富最大化
公司治理
公司價值
excess cash holding
maximization of shareholder wealth
corporate governance
corporate value日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Jul-2021 17:08:58 (UTC+8) 摘要 2005年以來，中國大陸上市公司現金持有水平不斷攀升，截止2019年末，A股上市公司現金持有水平已達2005年的5倍之多，然而這14年間，物價指數的上升幅度卻不到3倍。雖然現金是企業營運發展不可或缺的資源之一，但若超額持有現金，也會造成資金的閒置和浪費。如果股東財富最大化是企業經營目標之一，那麼企業超額持有現金是否符合股東財富最大化的目標呢？本研究從探討企業現金持有的決定因素為出發點，通過實證檢驗，得到企業未來預期現金持有水平。並以該項實證模型之殘差項作為超額現金持有水平（即未預期現金持有水平)，接著通過檢驗超額現金持有與公司價值之關係來回答超額現金持有是否支持股東財富最大化的假設。實證研究表明，公司特徵、市場環境、公司治理機制都會對公司現金持有水平產生顯著影響。對於大部分產業而言，公司超額現金持有與公司價值呈負向關係，即公司超額現金持有會降低公司價值，因此可以認為大部分產業中公司超額現金持有可能會損害投資人利益。因此投資人在進行投資活動時，確有必要仔細審視公司超額現金持有背後所隱喻的邏輯。
Since 2005, the cash holding level of listed companies in mainland China has been rising. By the end of 2019, the cash holding level of A-share listed companies has reached 5 times that of 2005. However, the price index has increased less than 3 times in the past 14 years. Although cash is one of the important resources for the operation and development of enterprises, excess cash holdings will also result in idle and waste of funds. If the maximization of shareholder wealth is one of the objectives of an enterprise, whether excess cash holdings is in line with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth needed to be examined.Based on the discussion of determinants of corporate cash holdings, this study empirically obtains the expected level of corporate cash holdings. The residuals of the empirical model are used as proxies for the level of excess cash holdings for each company (i.e., the level of unexpected cash holdings). The relationship between excess cash holdings and corporate value is then tested to investigate whether excess cash holdings enhances the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.The empirical results show that corporate characteristics, market environment and corporate governance have significant impacts on corporate cash holdings. Excess cash- holdings of companies in most industries are negatively and significantly associated with corporate value. In specific, the higher the level of excess cash holdings held by companies in most industries the lower the corporate value. The findings thus imply that excess cash- holdings of companies in most industries have a detrimental effect on the interests of investors. Thus, investors need to carefully examine the logic behind the company’s excess cash holdings.參考文獻 黃冰冰與馬元駒， 2018，股權集中度對現金持有的影響路徑——基於大股東占款的仲介效應，經濟與管理研究，39(11): 131-144。梁美蓉與蒙立元，2018， 產品市場競爭、超額現金持有與企業價值，財會通訊，800(36)：52-69。劉井建、 紀丹甯與王健，2017，高管股權激勵計畫、合約特徵與公司現金持有.南開管理評論，20(1): 43-56。羅琦與秦國樓，2009，投資者保護與公司現金持有，金融研究，352:162-178。龐彩招，2020，控股股東股權質押對企業現金持有的影響，吉林大學金融系碩士論文。沈藝峰、況學文與聶亞娟. 2008.終極控股股東超額控制與現金持有量價值的實證研究，南開管理評論，2008(1): 15-23。譚艷艷，劉金偉與楊漢明，2013， 融資約束、超額現金持有與企業價值， 山西財經大學學報，35(1)：95-105。John Maynard Keynes，2009，就業、利息和貨幣通論（高鴻業譯），北京：商務印書館，（原著出版於1937年）。知乎：Fama-Macbeth中的兩步迴歸的原理分別是什麼？檢自https://www.zhihu.com/question/53768802/answer/460969682 (April 5,2013)Almeida, H., Campello, M. and Weisbach, M. S. 2004.The cash flow sensitivity of cash. The Journal of Finance 59(4): 1777-1804.Bates, T., Kahle, M., & Stulz, R. (2009). Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they use to? Journal of Finance 64(5):1985–2021.Benoit, Jean-Pierre.1984. Financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information. Rand Journal of Economics 15(4):490–499.Bolton, P., and Scharfstein, D.S. 1990. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. American Economic Review 80(1): 93–106.Chevalier, J. A., and Scharfstein, D.S. 1996. Capital-market imperfections and counter-cyclical markups: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review 86(4): 703–715.Chung,K., H., and Pruitt, S., W.1994. A Simple Approximation of Tobin`s q. Financial Management 23(3):70-74.Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J. and Servaes, H.2003. International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(1):111-133.Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J.2007. Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 83(3): 599–634.Elyasiani, E. and Zhang, L.2015. CEO Entrenchment and corporate liquidity management. Journal of Banking and Finance 54(5):115-128.Fama, E., French, K. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43(2):153–193.Fama, E., French, K. 1998. Taxes, financing decisions, and firm value. Journal of Finance 53(3): 819–843.Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D. 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81(3):607-636.Faulkender, M., and Wang, R. 2006 Corporate financial policy and the value of cash. The Journal of Finance 61(4): 1957-1990.Foley, C.F., Hartzell, J.C., Titman, S., Twite, G. 2007. Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3): 579-607.Fresard, L. 2010. Financial strength and product market behavior: the real effects of corporate cash holdings. The Journal of Finance 65(3) :1097-1122.Gao, H., Harford, J., Li, K. 2013. Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms. Journal of Financial Economics 109(3): 623-639.Han, S. and Qiu, J. 2007. Corporate precautionary cash holdings. Journal of Corporate Finance 13(1):43–57.Harford, J. 1999 Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 54(6):1969–1997.Harford, J. and Li, K. 2007. Decoupling CEO wealth and firm performance: the case of acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62(2):917–949.Harford, J., Mansi, S., and Maxwell, W. 2008. Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the U.S. Journal of Financial Economics. 87(3): 535–555.Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L. 1997. Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash flow? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112(8):169–215.Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, D.C. and Sherman, A.E. 1998. The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33(3): 305-334.Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R.H.1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance 28(4): 911-922.Jensen, M.C. and Mecking, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior. agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48(3): 831–880.Jiang, Z., Lie, E. 2016. Cash holding adjustments and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 36(2): 190–205.John, T.A. 1993. Accounting measures of corporate liquidity, leverage, and costs of financial distress. Financial Management 22(3): 91-100.Mikkelson, W.H., and Partch, M.M. 2003. Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(2): 275-294.Modigliani, F., Miller, M. 1958. The cost of capital. corporation finance and the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48(3):261–297.Myers, S.C., and Rajan,R.G. 1998. The paradox of liquidity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3): 733–771.Myers, S.C., and Rajan, N.S. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-221.Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate holdings of liquid assets. Journal of Financial Economics 52(1):3–46.Ozkan, A., and Ozkan, N. 2004. Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies, Journal of Banking & Finance 28(9): 2103–2134.Phana, H.V., Nguyen, N.H., Nguyen, H.T. and Hegde, S., Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings. Journal of Business Research 95(2):71-82.Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. and Williamson, R., 2006. Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and Dividends to firm value depend on governance? a cross-country analysis. The Journal of Finance 61(6): 2725-2751.Smith, A., 1937. The wealth of nations. Modern Living, New York.Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461–488.Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52(2): 737–783. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353045資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353045 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林宛瑩 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Wan-ying en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張秦晉 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Zhang, Qin-Jin en_US dc.creator (作者) 張秦晉 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Zhang, Qin-Jin en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2021 17:08:58 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2021 17:08:58 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2021 17:08:58 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353045 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135921 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353045 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 2005年以來，中國大陸上市公司現金持有水平不斷攀升，截止2019年末，A股上市公司現金持有水平已達2005年的5倍之多，然而這14年間，物價指數的上升幅度卻不到3倍。雖然現金是企業營運發展不可或缺的資源之一，但若超額持有現金，也會造成資金的閒置和浪費。如果股東財富最大化是企業經營目標之一，那麼企業超額持有現金是否符合股東財富最大化的目標呢？本研究從探討企業現金持有的決定因素為出發點，通過實證檢驗，得到企業未來預期現金持有水平。並以該項實證模型之殘差項作為超額現金持有水平（即未預期現金持有水平)，接著通過檢驗超額現金持有與公司價值之關係來回答超額現金持有是否支持股東財富最大化的假設。實證研究表明，公司特徵、市場環境、公司治理機制都會對公司現金持有水平產生顯著影響。對於大部分產業而言，公司超額現金持有與公司價值呈負向關係，即公司超額現金持有會降低公司價值，因此可以認為大部分產業中公司超額現金持有可能會損害投資人利益。因此投資人在進行投資活動時，確有必要仔細審視公司超額現金持有背後所隱喻的邏輯。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Since 2005, the cash holding level of listed companies in mainland China has been rising. By the end of 2019, the cash holding level of A-share listed companies has reached 5 times that of 2005. However, the price index has increased less than 3 times in the past 14 years. Although cash is one of the important resources for the operation and development of enterprises, excess cash holdings will also result in idle and waste of funds. If the maximization of shareholder wealth is one of the objectives of an enterprise, whether excess cash holdings is in line with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth needed to be examined.Based on the discussion of determinants of corporate cash holdings, this study empirically obtains the expected level of corporate cash holdings. The residuals of the empirical model are used as proxies for the level of excess cash holdings for each company (i.e., the level of unexpected cash holdings). The relationship between excess cash holdings and corporate value is then tested to investigate whether excess cash holdings enhances the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.The empirical results show that corporate characteristics, market environment and corporate governance have significant impacts on corporate cash holdings. Excess cash- holdings of companies in most industries are negatively and significantly associated with corporate value. In specific, the higher the level of excess cash holdings held by companies in most industries the lower the corporate value. The findings thus imply that excess cash- holdings of companies in most industries have a detrimental effect on the interests of investors. Thus, investors need to carefully examine the logic behind the company’s excess cash holdings. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄 i圖目錄 ii表目錄 ii第壹章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究議題 4第三節 論文架構 6第貳章 文獻探討 7第一節 企業現金持有相關理論及實證研究 7第二節 企業現金持有影響因素的實證研究 12第三節 超額現金持有相關文獻 18第四節 現金持有經濟後果的實證研究 19第叁章 研究方法 21第一節 研究假說 21第二節 實證模型：變數定義及衡量 26第三節 資料來源和樣本選取 34第肆章 實證結果與分析 36第一節 敘述性統計分析 36第二節 OLS迴歸分析 46第伍章 結論與建議 72第一節 研究結論 72第二節 研究限制 75第三節 研究建議 76參考文獻 77 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2122723 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353045 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 超額現金持有 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東財富最大化 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司價值 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) excess cash holding en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) maximization of shareholder wealth en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate governance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate value en_US dc.title (題名) 企業超額現金持有與公司價值之間的關係—來自中國大陸A股上市公司的證據 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The relationship between excess cash holding and corporate value--evidence from A-share listed companies in mainland China en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 黃冰冰與馬元駒， 2018，股權集中度對現金持有的影響路徑——基於大股東占款的仲介效應，經濟與管理研究，39(11): 131-144。梁美蓉與蒙立元，2018， 產品市場競爭、超額現金持有與企業價值，財會通訊，800(36)：52-69。劉井建、 紀丹甯與王健，2017，高管股權激勵計畫、合約特徵與公司現金持有.南開管理評論，20(1): 43-56。羅琦與秦國樓，2009，投資者保護與公司現金持有，金融研究，352:162-178。龐彩招，2020，控股股東股權質押對企業現金持有的影響，吉林大學金融系碩士論文。沈藝峰、況學文與聶亞娟. 2008.終極控股股東超額控制與現金持有量價值的實證研究，南開管理評論，2008(1): 15-23。譚艷艷，劉金偉與楊漢明，2013， 融資約束、超額現金持有與企業價值， 山西財經大學學報，35(1)：95-105。John Maynard Keynes，2009，就業、利息和貨幣通論（高鴻業譯），北京：商務印書館，（原著出版於1937年）。知乎：Fama-Macbeth中的兩步迴歸的原理分別是什麼？檢自https://www.zhihu.com/question/53768802/answer/460969682 (April 5,2013)Almeida, H., Campello, M. and Weisbach, M. S. 2004.The cash flow sensitivity of cash. The Journal of Finance 59(4): 1777-1804.Bates, T., Kahle, M., & Stulz, R. (2009). Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they use to? Journal of Finance 64(5):1985–2021.Benoit, Jean-Pierre.1984. Financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information. Rand Journal of Economics 15(4):490–499.Bolton, P., and Scharfstein, D.S. 1990. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. American Economic Review 80(1): 93–106.Chevalier, J. A., and Scharfstein, D.S. 1996. Capital-market imperfections and counter-cyclical markups: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review 86(4): 703–715.Chung,K., H., and Pruitt, S., W.1994. A Simple Approximation of Tobin`s q. Financial Management 23(3):70-74.Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J. and Servaes, H.2003. International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(1):111-133.Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J.2007. Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 83(3): 599–634.Elyasiani, E. and Zhang, L.2015. CEO Entrenchment and corporate liquidity management. Journal of Banking and Finance 54(5):115-128.Fama, E., French, K. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43(2):153–193.Fama, E., French, K. 1998. Taxes, financing decisions, and firm value. Journal of Finance 53(3): 819–843.Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D. 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81(3):607-636.Faulkender, M., and Wang, R. 2006 Corporate financial policy and the value of cash. The Journal of Finance 61(4): 1957-1990.Foley, C.F., Hartzell, J.C., Titman, S., Twite, G. 2007. Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3): 579-607.Fresard, L. 2010. Financial strength and product market behavior: the real effects of corporate cash holdings. The Journal of Finance 65(3) :1097-1122.Gao, H., Harford, J., Li, K. 2013. Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms. Journal of Financial Economics 109(3): 623-639.Han, S. and Qiu, J. 2007. Corporate precautionary cash holdings. Journal of Corporate Finance 13(1):43–57.Harford, J. 1999 Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 54(6):1969–1997.Harford, J. and Li, K. 2007. Decoupling CEO wealth and firm performance: the case of acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62(2):917–949.Harford, J., Mansi, S., and Maxwell, W. 2008. Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the U.S. Journal of Financial Economics. 87(3): 535–555.Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L. 1997. Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash flow? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112(8):169–215.Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, D.C. and Sherman, A.E. 1998. The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33(3): 305-334.Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R.H.1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance 28(4): 911-922.Jensen, M.C. and Mecking, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior. agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48(3): 831–880.Jiang, Z., Lie, E. 2016. Cash holding adjustments and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 36(2): 190–205.John, T.A. 1993. Accounting measures of corporate liquidity, leverage, and costs of financial distress. Financial Management 22(3): 91-100.Mikkelson, W.H., and Partch, M.M. 2003. Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(2): 275-294.Modigliani, F., Miller, M. 1958. The cost of capital. corporation finance and the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48(3):261–297.Myers, S.C., and Rajan,R.G. 1998. The paradox of liquidity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3): 733–771.Myers, S.C., and Rajan, N.S. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-221.Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate holdings of liquid assets. Journal of Financial Economics 52(1):3–46.Ozkan, A., and Ozkan, N. 2004. Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies, Journal of Banking & Finance 28(9): 2103–2134.Phana, H.V., Nguyen, N.H., Nguyen, H.T. and Hegde, S., Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings. Journal of Business Research 95(2):71-82.Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. and Williamson, R., 2006. Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and Dividends to firm value depend on governance? a cross-country analysis. The Journal of Finance 61(6): 2725-2751.Smith, A., 1937. The wealth of nations. Modern Living, New York.Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461–488.Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52(2): 737–783. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100595 en_US
