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題名 Experimental Evidence of the Impact of Increasing Auditors` Legal Liability on Firms` New Investments
作者 俞洪昭
日期 2001
上傳時間 17-Sep-2010 11:31:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 This laboratory market study examines the potential effect of increasing auditors` liability on firms` new investments. The experimental hypotheses are derived from Shibano`s 2000 model, which predicts that an increase in auditors` liability will decrease the frequency of audit failures and may decrease firms` new investments if the liability level is “excessive”. Results from three experimental market settings (with low, medium, and high liability levels) suggest two major conclusions. First, firms` new investments increase significantly when auditors` liability level increases from low to medium, and decrease significantly as the liability level increases from medium to high. This result provides support for the argument that adequate auditor liability is necessary to motivate firms to invest in new projects. Excessive liability, however, may discourage firms from making new investments. Second, the frequency of audit failure decreases insignificantly when auditors` liability increases. These two results have an important policy implication: the benefit of imposing high liability on the auditor (i.e., an insignificant decrease in audit failure) may be more than offset by its cost (i.e., a significant decrease in new investments).
關聯 Contemporary Accounting Research,18(3),495-528
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1506/F3GP-B68E-A5N1-T838
dc.creator (作者) 俞洪昭zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2001-
dc.date.accessioned 17-Sep-2010 11:31:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-Sep-2010 11:31:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-Sep-2010 11:31:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/44076-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This laboratory market study examines the potential effect of increasing auditors` liability on firms` new investments. The experimental hypotheses are derived from Shibano`s 2000 model, which predicts that an increase in auditors` liability will decrease the frequency of audit failures and may decrease firms` new investments if the liability level is “excessive”. Results from three experimental market settings (with low, medium, and high liability levels) suggest two major conclusions. First, firms` new investments increase significantly when auditors` liability level increases from low to medium, and decrease significantly as the liability level increases from medium to high. This result provides support for the argument that adequate auditor liability is necessary to motivate firms to invest in new projects. Excessive liability, however, may discourage firms from making new investments. Second, the frequency of audit failure decreases insignificantly when auditors` liability increases. These two results have an important policy implication: the benefit of imposing high liability on the auditor (i.e., an insignificant decrease in audit failure) may be more than offset by its cost (i.e., a significant decrease in new investments).-
dc.language zh_TWen
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Contemporary Accounting Research,18(3),495-528en
dc.title (題名) Experimental Evidence of the Impact of Increasing Auditors` Legal Liability on Firms` New Investmentsen
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1506/F3GP-B68E-A5N1-T838en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1506/F3GP-B68E-A5N1-T838en_US