1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Social Science
  4. Periodical Articles
  5. Item

學術產出-Periodical Articles

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 Positive- versus Zero-Sum Majoritarian Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study
作者 Hsu, Li-Chen;Yang, C.C;Yang, Chun-Lei
貢獻者 政大財政系
關鍵詞 Majoritarian bargaining;Minimum winning coalition;Experiment
日期 2008-12
上傳時間 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 Politics can involve a movement from a position off the Pareto frontier to a point on it (a positive-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor] work), or a movement along the Pareto frontier (a zero-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Riker, W., 1962. The theory of political coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven] work). In this paper we shed light on their differentiation experimentally by making a comparison between a positive-sum and a zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum game. Our main findings include (i) the fraction of subjects who adopted minimum winning rather than oversized coalitions increases significantly as the game form varies from positive-sum to zero-sum, (ii) oversized coalitions are attributable to non-strategic considerations, and (iii) subjects who choose to adopt the minimum winning coalition have a tendency to seek cheaper responders as their partners in the zero-sum game, but there is no evidence of such a tendency in the positive-sum game. Overall, the weight of the evidence revealed by our experimental data indicates that relative scarcity (embodied in the zero-sum game) promotes behavior more in line with the predictions of economics.
關聯 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68(3-4), 498-510
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004
dc.contributor 政大財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Hsu, Li-Chen;Yang, C.C;Yang, Chun-Leien_US
dc.date (日期) 2008-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59142-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Politics can involve a movement from a position off the Pareto frontier to a point on it (a positive-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor] work), or a movement along the Pareto frontier (a zero-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Riker, W., 1962. The theory of political coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven] work). In this paper we shed light on their differentiation experimentally by making a comparison between a positive-sum and a zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum game. Our main findings include (i) the fraction of subjects who adopted minimum winning rather than oversized coalitions increases significantly as the game form varies from positive-sum to zero-sum, (ii) oversized coalitions are attributable to non-strategic considerations, and (iii) subjects who choose to adopt the minimum winning coalition have a tendency to seek cheaper responders as their partners in the zero-sum game, but there is no evidence of such a tendency in the positive-sum game. Overall, the weight of the evidence revealed by our experimental data indicates that relative scarcity (embodied in the zero-sum game) promotes behavior more in line with the predictions of economics.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68(3-4), 498-510en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Majoritarian bargaining;Minimum winning coalition;Experimenten_US
dc.title (題名) Positive- versus Zero-Sum Majoritarian Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Studyen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004en_US