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Title: 以Bianconi-Barabasi網路模型模擬風險準備金對P2P借貸體系的系統性影響
A simulation on the impacts of the collateral system on the Peer-to-Peer platform by using the Bianconi-Barabasi model
Authors: 李昱緯
Contributors: 陳樹衡
Keywords: P2P借貸
P2P lending
Risk reservation fund
Bianconi-Barabasi model
Date: 2017
Issue Date: 2017-08-10 10:06:46 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 因為Peer-to-Peer(以下簡稱P2P)貸款是借貸雙方經由平台媒合直接交易,所以相對於傳統借貸,不僅省去了交易所需的時間,更降低了交易成本,這對於中小型企業與個人尤其受益良多。




In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending, both lenders and borrowers deal directly via Internet matchmaking. Hence, compared to the traditional financial institutes, P2P lending reduces not only the time required for transaction, but also the costs of transaction. This is particularly beneficial for small and medium companies and individual borrowers.

However, P2P lending also has some risks. This is because the platform, the lenders and the borrowers do not fully understand what to expect from the involved parties. Meanwhile, governmental legislation and regulatory measures are not perfect. As a result, the investors may not enjoy the convenience of P2P lending, but instead suffering from losses, which is a source of social problems.

In order to mitigate the risks, it is important to identify potential problems early and to take preventive measures before the problems create systemic risk. How to find out where the problem is in a timely manner so that the problem can be taken care of before the involvement of governmental regulations is of crucial importance to the success of a P2P lending platform.

In this thesis, we developed a P2P landing theoretical model based on the expected return of lenders and borrowers. We then analyzed lenders’ and borrowers’ behaviors to identify the risks. After that, we introduced collateral to the model and compared the credit risks. The results show that under collateral, lenders are more willing to loan the money with lower interest rates while borrowers are more likely to payback the loans, hence leads to more successful transactions.

This thesis also introduces a new methodology, using the Bianconi-Barabasi network model to simulate the P2P lending. We compare the results from the simulations under different situations and found that P2P lending network with collateral has a more balanced degree distribution. In other words, the transactions are not dominated by a few big players but spread among many lenders and borrowers. This indicates P2P with collateral benefit more customers in satisfying their financial and investment goals
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