Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112442
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | 財政系 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | 張勝文 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | Chang, Sheng Wen | en_US |
dc.creator | Coulson, N. Edward | en_US |
dc.creator | Wang, Ping | en_US |
dc.date | 2016-10 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-31T05:48:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-31T05:48:08Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017-08-31T05:48:08Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112442 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The control of drug activity currently favors supply-side policies: drug suppliers in the United States face a higher arrest rate and longer sentences than demanders. We construct a simple model of drug activity with search and entry frictions in labor and drug markets. Our calibration analysis suggests a strong “dealer replacement effect.” As a result, given a variety of community objectives, it is beneficial to lower supplier arrests and raise the demand arrest rate from current values. A 10% shift from supply-side to demand-side arrests can reduce the population of potential drug dealers by 22–25,000 and raise aggregate local income by $380–$400 million, at 2002 prices. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 340893 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(5), 726-751 | en_US |
dc.title | Optimal Drug Policy in Low-Income Neighborhoods | en_US |
dc.type | article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jpet.12147 | |
dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12147 | |
item.openairetype | article | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.