標準制薪資辦法下部屬最佳表現與誠實溝通誘導之權衡

Abstract

實務界常見之標準制薪資辦法存有最佳表現與誠實溝通之間的權衡問題。如讓部屬參與制定標準，則他可藉故意低估預期可達標準，以降低預算指標，為自己留些安全係數。此種偏頗之標準自然損及上級資源配置決策之有效性。分析性研究結果顯示使誠實溝通之薪資辦法會誘導部屬將標準定在其預期續效之中位數。但此種參與式制定出的標準`因程度並非十分嚴格，因而在激勵員工努力表現上，反不如在考量下級真實能力所及，而由上級權威式規定之下所訂出的績效標準來得嚴格。本研究在部屬參與標準制定及上級權威規定標準兩種情形下，檢定使誠實溝通之薪資辦法，為最佳表現與誠實溝通之權衡問題提供實驗性驗證。在參與式情況下，即使在沒有達不到標準的風險下，受試者在自定標準時仍會預留安全係數。因此在自訂標準下之績效較權威式規定個別標準下之續教來得差。本研究還發現，上級權威式規定標準之效果，取決於標準的嚴格程度及標準的對象範圍(也就是個別或團體的標準)，當上級所擁有之資訊只允許其權威式規定團體的標準時，該標準往往無法達到預期之嚴格程度，因而無法獲致較自定標準更高之部屬績效。

Standard-based pay schemes are frequently used in practice. Using such schemes involves a potential trade-off between performance max-imization and truthful subordinate communication. If the standard is participatively set, a subordinate has an incentive to create budgetary slack by biasing downwards his or her reported performance expectation. Such biased reporting may, in turn, reduce the effectiveness of the superior`s resource allocation decisions. Analytical research has suggested truth-inducing pay schemes that can induce subordinate preference for a standard equal to the median of his or her expected performance distribution. However, such a participatively-set standard would be of ＂average＂ tightness, and may motivate lower subordinate performance than an imposed standard that is tighter but reasonably attainable. This study reports experimental evidence on this potential tradeoff between performance maximization and truthful subordinate communication of expected performance. A truth-inducing pay scheme was tested under both participation and standard imposition. In the participation condition, subjects created slack even under the truth inducing pay scheme and the absence of task risk. Performance was lower under the self-set standards than tighter individual-specific imposed standards. It also was found that the effects of imposed standards depended jointly on their tightness and locus (i.e., whether they are individual- or group-based). When the available information only permitted the imposition of group-based tighter standards, such standards did not attain their target tightness and also failed to yield higher performance than self-set standards.