Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Performance Consequences of Pay Dispersion within Top Management Teams: The Impact of Firm Collaboration Needs
Authors: Lee, Chia-Ling
Lin, Y. C. George
Chuang, Ya-Hsueh
Keywords: CEO compensation;Top management team;Pay dispersion;Firm performance
Date: 2007-05
Issue Date: 2017-11-15 15:59:28 (UTC+8)
Abstract: According to tournament theory, the compensation gap between CEO and the top management team members provides incentives for lower-level executives to strive for promotion. However, equity theory argues that large pay dispersion leads to perceptions of inequity and has negative side effects on the firm's cooperative atmosphere and organizational performance. These two contradicting theories motivate us to investigate whether the incentive effect of pay dispersion among top management teams will be dependent on the degree of firm collaboration needs. In this paper, we employ two methods to measure pay dispersions among top management teams. One measure of pay dispersion is the coefficient of variation in compensation of top management teams, and the other is overpayment and underpayment of executives. Both measures show that the degree of firm collaboration needs has a negative impact on the incentive effect of pay dispersion. This result suggests that firms with higher collaboration needs should cautiously consider the negative impact of pay dispersion.
Relation: 會計評論, 45_s, 1
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[會計評論] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
45_s-5.pdf736KbAdobe PDF252View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing