Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115826
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 徐麗振 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | 李孟庭 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, MengTing | en_US |
dc.creator | 李孟庭 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | Lee, MengTing | en_US |
dc.date | 2017 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-05T08:01:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-02-05T08:01:09Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-02-05T08:01:09Z | - |
dc.identifier | G1042550051 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115826 | - |
dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 104255005 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究進行公共財捐獻實驗,共分為三個組別進行,分別給定受試者不同的每人邊際報酬 (marginal per capita returns, i.e., MPCR),觀察受試者的捐獻決策與最終實驗結果會有何差異。而在實驗中受試者彼此處於組內競爭的關係,在每回合的捐獻決策後,組員彼此以多數決投票的方式決定一位組員出局,因此最終能獲得共同帳戶點數者僅有最後的贏家一人。本實驗共有四個發現,第一:α相同組中所有組員MPCR皆為0.5,實驗結果顯示每位組員的平均捐獻率並無顯著差異。第二:在受試者α不同的組別中,受試者的MPCR不盡相同,而具有高MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較低,而具有低MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較高。第三:在組員的投票決策方面,在α皆異組中六位組員的MPCR皆不相同,而每個階段的實驗中,組員的出局順序呈現由MPCR最高至低,最後反而是MPCR低的組員獲勝的機會最高。α兩同組中則是六位組員MPCR兩兩相同,實驗結果顯示MPCR處於整組中間的組員佔據較高勝率。第四:不論是哪個組別的實驗,都顯示隨著實驗的進行,受試者的平均捐獻率皆呈現逐漸下降的趨勢,此結果和未競爭的公共財實驗相同。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1\n第二章 研究動機與研究目的 3\n第三章 文獻回顧 5\n3.1 公共財實驗的合作 5\n3.2 公共財實驗中影響合作的原因 8\n3.3 組員反應對公共財提供之影響 9\n第四章 實驗設計 12\n4.1 實驗設計 12\n4.2 受試者α值的設定 14\n4.3 執行過程 15\n4.4 預期結果 17\n第五章 實驗結果 22\n5.1 捐獻結果 22\n5.2 不同MPCR與捐獻率的關係 30\n5.3 投票策略與最終贏家 35\n5.4 為共同帳戶帶來的點數與最終報酬 43\n第六章 結論 50\n參考文獻 53\n附錄1:實驗說明 56\n附錄2:例題 63 | zh_TW |
dc.format.extent | 1420897 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550051 | en_US |
dc.subject | 公共財實驗 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 每人邊際報酬 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 組內競爭 | zh_TW |
dc.title | 公共財實驗的合作與競爭 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Cooperation and Competition in Public Goods Experiment | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
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item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
item.openairetype | thesis | - |
Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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