Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125823| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 翁堃嵐 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | 許韶芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Hsu, Shao-Fang | en_US |
| dc.creator | 許韶芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | Hsu, Shao-Fang | en_US |
| dc.date | 2018 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-05T09:12:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-09-05T09:12:04Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-09-05T09:12:04Z | - |
| dc.identifier | G1052550302 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125823 | - |
| dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 105255030 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1\n第二章 模型架構 5\n第三章 消費者決策 6\n第四章 最適商品稅制 9\n第五章 利益團體對政府商品稅制的遊說效果 12\n第六章 結論 18\n參考文獻 19 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 941573 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1052550302 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 消費不可分割性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 商品稅 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 利益團體 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 遊說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 政治失靈 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Consumption Indivisibility | en_US |
| dc.subject | Commodity Taxation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Interest Groups | en_US |
| dc.subject | Lobbying | en_US |
| dc.subject | Government Failure | en_US |
| dc.title | 利益團體、不可分割財與最適商品稅制 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Interest Groups, Indivisible Goods and Optimal Commodity Taxation | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference | 呂俊慧與翁堃嵐，2016，「商品不可分割性與最適所得稅」，經濟論文叢刊，44，475-509。\n呂俊慧，2011，「商品的不可分割性及最適的租稅結構」，國立政治大學財政研究所博士論文。\n彭朋義、顏志達與吳朝欽，2018，「利益團體、民營化與關稅政策」，經濟論文，46，99-132。\n賴育邦，2006，「污染許可交易與利益團體」，經濟論文叢刊，34，261-284。\nAtkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976), “The design of tax structure: direct versus indirect taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 6, 55-75.\nAtkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, New York: McGraw Hill.\nBaumol, W. J. and D. F. Bradford (1970), “Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing,” American Economic Review, 60, 265-283.\nBernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1986). “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.\nCai, D. and J. Li (2014), “Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbing Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms,” Southern Economic Journal, 81, 489-505.\nCorlett, W. J. and D. C. Hague (1953), “Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 21, 21-30.\nCorneo, G. and O. Jeanne (1997), “Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 55-71.\nCremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1995a), “Uncertainty and Optimal Taxation: In Defence of Commodity Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 291-310.\nDiamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirrlees (1971), “Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules,” American Economic Review, 61, 261-278.\nDixit, A. (1973), “The Optimum Factory Town,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4, 637-651.\nDowell, R. (1985), “Risk Preference and the Work-Leisure Trade-Off,” Economic Inquiry, 23, 691-701.\nGrossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.\nKoshevoy, Gleb A. and Dolf Talman (2006), “Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 42, 216-226.\nMagee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: an Application to the Free-Rider Problem,” Journal of International Economics, 57, 449-471.\nMarshall, J. M. (1984), “Gambles and the Shadow Price of Death,” American Economic Review, 74, 73-86.\nMirrlees, James A. (1972), “The Optimum Town,” Swedish Journal of Economics, 74, 114-135.\nMyles, G. D. (1995), Public Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press.\nNg, Y. K. (1965), “Why do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving Risk and the Indivisibility of Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 73, 530-535.\nOlson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.\nRamsey, F. P. (1927), “A contribution to the theory of taxation,” Economic Journal, 37, 47-61.\nRiley, John G. (1973), “Gammaville: An Optimum Town.” Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 471-482.\nRubin, P. H. and C. W. Paul II (1979), “An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk,” Economic Inquiry, 17, 585-596.\nSamuelson, P. A. (1951), Unpublished memorandum for the US Treasury.\nSandmo, A. (1974), “A Note on the Structure of Optimal Taxation,” American Economic Review, 64, 701-706.\nStigler, G. (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2, 3-21.\nStoyanov, A. (2014), “Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying,” Review of International Economics, 22, 561-577.\nStratmann, T. (2017), “The Political Economy of Sales Taxes and Sales Tax Exemptions,” Public Choice, 171, 207-221. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6814/NCCU201900862 | en_US |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
| item.grantfulltext | open | - |
| item.openairetype | thesis | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 | |
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| 030201.pdf | 919.5 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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