Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34695
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisor翁堃嵐zh_TW
dc.contributor.author洪若雅zh_TW
dc.creator洪若雅zh_TW
dc.date2005en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18T02:57:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-18T02:57:00Z-
dc.date.issued2009-09-18T02:57:00Z-
dc.identifierG0093255003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34695-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description93255003zh_TW
dc.description94zh_TW
dc.description.abstract傳統探討策略性出口貿易政策的文獻忽略了租稅以及租稅逃漏等議題對貿易政策的影響,因此本文主要的目的是探討當政府對廠商課利潤稅,且廠商可藉浮報成本的方式逃漏稅額的情況下,考慮逃漏稅問題對傳統貿易理論所造成的影響。本文第二章發現:在三國兩廠商的出口貿易模型下,最適的出口補貼率與浮報比例、利潤稅稅率呈負相關,所以最適的出口補貼率會較傳統結果低,當浮報比例或是利潤稅稅率相當高的時候,最適的出口貿易政策可能由出口補貼變為課徵出口稅;此外由於本國國內廠商僅有一家,最適的出口貿易政策即為第一優的政策,所以本國的社會福利並不受本國的利潤稅稅率及逃漏稅比例的影響。本文第三章發現:兩國間的最適出口補貼率差距決定於成本差異與租稅逃漏差異兩種效果,傳統低成本高補貼的結論應該視兩種效果的大小而定,特別當租稅逃漏差異效果相當大時,會讓成本較低的國家給予廠商較高的補貼,使得低成本高補貼的結論產生反轉。本文第四章將模型延伸到多家廠商的情況,文中發現:如果本國廠商家數比外國廠商家數多上大於一家的數量,則最適的出口政策仍為對廠商課徵出口稅,且稅率會比傳統的結果高;如果本國廠商的家數少於外國廠商家數加上一家的數量時,此時必須視租稅逃漏的效果大小而定,當租稅逃漏的效果相當大時,最適的出口政策將反轉為課徵出口稅。此外在多家廠商之下,由於利潤稅稅率與逃漏稅比例的增加,會使產業集中度降低,因而讓社會福利下降。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………1 \n第二章 三國兩廠商…………………………………………………………………4\n 第一節 前言………………………………………………………………4\n 第二節 模型的假設與建立………………………………………………5\n 第三節 廠商的最適決策…………………………………………………7\n 第四節 政府的最適決策………………………………………………..10\n 第五節 結論……………………………………………………………..13 \n第三章 成本差異與最適出口貿易政策…………………………………………..15\n 第一節 前言…………………………………………………………..15\n 第二節 廠商的最適決策……………………………………………..17\n 第三節 政府的最適決策……………………………………………..18\n 第四節 結論…………………………………………………………..20\n第四章 廠商家數、成本差異與最適出口貿易政策………………………………22\n 第一節 前言……………………………………………………………..22\n 第二節 基本模型………………………………………………………..23\n 第三節 廠商的最適決策………………………………………………..24\n 第四節 政府的最適決策………………………………………………..27\n 第五節 結論……………………………………………………………..31\n第五章 總結………………………………………………………………………..32\n參考文獻…..................................................................................................................34\n圖次\n圖一 補貼率、利潤稅稅率及逃漏稅對邊際收入及邊際成本的影響.....................9zh_TW
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dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255003en_US
dc.subject逃漏稅zh_TW
dc.subject最適出口貿易政策zh_TW
dc.subject成本差異zh_TW
dc.subject廠商家數zh_TW
dc.title外生的逃漏稅與最適出口貿易政策zh_TW
dc.typethesisen
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