Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37434
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dc.contributor.advisor翁堃嵐zh_TW
dc.contributor.author顏志達zh_TW
dc.creator顏志達zh_TW
dc.date2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-19T05:48:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-19T05:48:10Z-
dc.date.issued2009-09-19T05:48:10Z-
dc.identifierG0902555041en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37434-
dc.description博士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description90255504zh_TW
dc.description97zh_TW
dc.description.abstract傳統最適所得稅文獻忽略了勞動市場訊息不完全對租稅設計造成的影響。有鑑於此,本文建立一個勞動市場同時存在逆選擇以及道德冒險的模型來探討最適所得稅制訂。其中雇主採取分紅契約來篩選高、低能力的員工。在本文的架構下,我們發現:當勞動市場存在逆選擇問題時,享有訊息租的是低能力者而非傳統的高能力者,此一性質導致雇主篩選員工的目標與政府所得重分配的目標背道而馳。這項結果將使得最適所得稅制具有以下兩個性質:(1) 在忽略勞動誘因的情況下,最適所得稅制下高能力員工的邊際稅率等於1,換言之,政府將有誘因破壞廠商篩選員工的機制,而達到所得重分配的目標;(2) 在考慮勞動誘因的情況下,最適所得稅制將在所得重分配、勞動誘因與社會保險間取得協調,此時,最適所得稅制下高能力員工的邊際稅率將介於0與1之間。換言之,傳統最適所得稅制下高能力者所面對的邊際稅率為零的性質將不再成立。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents謝辭 \n論文摘要 \n目錄 \n第一章 緒論 1\n第二章 目標不一致、逆選擇與最適所得稅 6\n2.1. 模型與假設 6\n2.2. 勞動市場的均衡工資契約 8\n2.2.1. 勞動市場為訊息充分的情況 9\n2.2.2. 勞動市場存在逆選擇的問題 10\n2.3. 政府租稅政策的訂定 13\n第三章 目標不一致、逆選擇與道德冒險及最適所得稅 21\n3.1. 模型與假設 21\n3.2. 員工努力決策問題與勞動市場的均衡工資契約 22\n3.2.1. 不考慮租稅政策下,勞動市場的均衡工資契約 23\n3.2.1.1. 訊息充分時的均衡工資契約 26\n3.2.1.2. 存在逆選擇問題時的均衡工資契約 27\n3.2.2. 考慮租稅政策下,勞動市場的均衡工資契約 29\n3.2.2.1. 訊息充分時的均衡工資契約 32\n3.2.2.2. 存在逆選擇問題時的均衡工資契約 32\n3.3. 政府租稅政策的訂定 34\n3.3.1. 勞動市場為訊息充分下的租稅政策 34\n3.3.2. 勞動市場存在逆選擇問題下的租稅政策 36\n第四章 數值分析 40\n4.1. 非線性所得稅制的數值分析 40\n4.1.1. 非線性所得稅制的數值分析表 40\n4.1.2. 數值分析探討 42\n4.2. 線性所得稅制的數值分析 44\n4.2.1. 傳統文獻之線性所得稅數值分析 44\n4.2.2. 本文之線性所得稅數值分析 46\n第五章 結論 48\n參考文獻 51zh_TW
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dc.language.isoen_US-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0902555041en_US
dc.subject訊息租zh_TW
dc.subject篩選機制zh_TW
dc.subject最適所得稅制zh_TW
dc.title員工分紅與最適所得稅zh_TW
dc.typethesisen
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