Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50004
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisor王智賢<br>Wang, Jue-Shyanzh_TW
dc.contributor.author曾閏瑋zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorTseng, Jun-Weien_US
dc.creator曾閏瑋zh_TW
dc.creatorTseng, Jun-Weien_US
dc.date2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-09T08:01:52Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-09T08:01:52Z-
dc.date.issued2010-12-09T08:01:52Z-
dc.identifierG0097255015en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50004-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description97255015zh_TW
dc.description98zh_TW
dc.description.abstract在全球化趨勢下,擁有較佳技術的跨國廠商開始以不同方式跨足海外市場,面對國際競爭,本國廠商亦會利用政治獻金干預政府的貿易決策。本文藉由政治獻金遊說模型討論跨國廠商、本國廠商與政府三方的互動關係。本國廠商一方面運用政治獻金遊說政府,政府一方面則在政治獻金與人民福祉的抉擇中做出決策,最後跨國廠商就在給定遊說的關稅水準之下,選擇對其最有利的方式進入國內市場。本文發現除了政府制訂的關稅水準、兩國廠商成本差異外,社會福利權數亦是影響跨國廠商進入模式的重要因素。不同的社會福利權數可以對應出不同的政府政策,而不同的政府政策亦會牽動跨國廠商進入模式的選擇。此時,政府必須要相當重視社會福利權數,則跨國廠商才會選擇使政府效用相對較大的進入模式。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn the trend of globalization, the multinational firm with superior technologies intend to employ various strategies for entering the foreign markets. Confronting these international competitions, then the host country firm usually utilize the political contribution to sway the policy. In this paper, we examine the relationships among the multinational firm, host country firm, and the domestic government by the political contribution model. Going with the political contribution from the host country firm, the domestic government usually works out the policy by considering the tradeoff between political contribution and social welfare. Eventually, the multinational firm selects an optimal entry mode with a given tariff to enter the markets which determined by lobby. Our result demonstrates that besides the tariff and cost difference, the social welfare is also crucial to the choice of entry mode. Different social welfare weight brings out various policies which will influence the entry mode of multinational firm. Only when the domestic government takes social welfare seriously, the multinational firm will choose the entry mode which makes the government’s utility larger.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1. 前言...................................1\n2. 模型設定...............................8\n2.1 兩國廠商的生產決策....................10\n2.2 本國政府訂定關稅的決策................15\n2.3 跨國廠商進入模式......................20\n3. 社會福利權數對跨國廠商進入模式之影響...30\n4. 跨國廠商進入模式與本國政府效用.........34\n參考文獻..................................39zh_TW
dc.format.extent1008773 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoen_US-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255015en_US
dc.subject關稅zh_TW
dc.subject遊說zh_TW
dc.subject進入模式zh_TW
dc.subjecttariffen_US
dc.subjectlobbyingen_US
dc.subjectentry modeen_US
dc.title關稅遊說與跨國廠商進入模式zh_TW
dc.titleLobbying for Tariff and the Optimal Entry Mode of the Multinational Firmen_US
dc.typethesisen
dc.relation.reference蔡宜臻、邱俊榮 (2009),「跨國廠商的進入模式-直接投資、出口與授權決策」,經濟論文,第 37 卷 1 期,1-26。zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceAidt, T. S. (1997) “Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy,"Journal of Public Economics, 69, 1-16.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceBelderbos, R. and L. Sleuwaegen (1998), “Tariff Jumping FDI and Export Substitution: Japanese Electronic Firms in Europe,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 601-638.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceBuckley, P. J., Casson M. C., (1998). “Analyzing Foreign Market Entry Strategies: Extending the Internalization Approach,”Journal of International Business Studies, 29, 539-562.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceDixit, A., (1984), “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries,” Economic Journal, 94, 1-16.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceEicher, T. and J. W. Kang (2005), “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment or Acquisition: Optimal Entry Modes for Multinationals,” Journal of Development Economics, 77, 207-228.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceEthier, W. J. (1986), “The Multinational Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 805-833.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceFosfuri, A. (2000), “Patent Protection, Imitation and The Mode of Technology Transfer,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, 1129-1149.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceFosfuri, A., M. Motta and T. Ronde (2001), “Foreign Direct Investment and Spillovers through Workers’ Mobility,” Journal of Development Economics, 53, 205-222.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceGawande, K., P. Krishna and M. J. Robbins (2004), \"Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy\", NBER Working Paper, No. 10205.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceGrossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceHarris, R. and N. Schmitt (2000), “Strategic Export Policy with Foreign Direct Investment and Import Substitution,” Journal of Development Economics, 62, 85-104.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceHorstmann, I. and J. R. Markusen (1987a), “Strategic Investment and the Development of Multinationals,” International Economic Review, 28, 109-121.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceHorstmann, I. and J. R. Markusen (1987b), “Licensing versus Direct Investment: A Modelof Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise,” Canadian Journal of Economics , 20,464-481.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceHorstmann, I. and J. R. Markusen (1992), “Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 10, 361-368.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceKabiraj, T. and S. Marjit (2003), “Protecting Consumers through Protection: The Role of Tariff-Induced Technology Transfer,” European Economic Review, 47, 113-124.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceKonishi, H., K. Saggi and S. Weber (1999), “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Economics, 49, 289-308.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceLudema, R. D. (2001), “Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection,” European Journal of Political Economy, 17(4), 817-833.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMagee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation:An Application to the Free-Rider Problem, "Journal of International Economics, 57, 449-471.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMitra, D. (2002), “Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements, "Journal of International Economics, 57, 473-485.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMotta, M. (1992), “Multinational Firms and the Tariff-Jumping Argument,” European Economic Review, 36, 1557-1571.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMotta, M., J. F. Thisse and A. Cabrales (1997), “On the Persistence of Leadership and Leapfrogging in International Trade,” International Economic Review, 38, 809-824.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMukheriee, A. and P. Enrico (2006), “Tariffs, Licensing and Market Structure,” European Economic Review, 50, 1699–1707.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceMurakami, Y. (2005), “Are Multinational Enterprises more Productive: A Test of The Selection Hypothesis,” Journal of Asian Economics, 16, 327-339.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceQiu, L. D. and Z. Tao (2001), “Export, Foreign Direct Investment, and Local Content Requirement,” Journal of Development Economics, 66, 101-125.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceRob, R. and N. Vettas (2003), “Foreign Direct Investment and Exports with Growing Demand,” Review of Economic Studies , 69, 1-20.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceRostoker, M. (1984), “A Survey of Corporate Licensing,” The Journal of Law and Technology, 24, 59–92.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceRowthorn, R. E. (1992), “Intra-Industry Trade and Investment under Oligopoly: The Role of Market size,” Economic Journal, 102, 402-414.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceSaggi, K. (1996), “Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing,” Review of International Economics, 4, 99-104.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceSaggi, K. (1999), “Foreign Direct Investment, Licensing, and Incentives for Innovation,” Review of international Economics, 7, 699-714.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceSmith, A. (1987), “Strategic Investment, Multinational Corporations and Trade Policy,” European Economic Review, 31, 89-96.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceSong, E. Y. (1996), “Voluntary Export Restraints and Strategic Technology Transfer,” Journal of International Economics, 40, 165-186.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceStähler, F. (2006), “Market Entry and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 335-347.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceTang, M. J. and C. M. J. Yu (1990), “Foreign Market Entry: Production-Related Strategies,” Management Science, 36, 476-489.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceTaylor, C.T. and Z. A. Silberston (1973), The Economic Impact of The Patent System: A Study of The British Experience, Cambridge University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceTeng, J. T., M. S. Chern and K. H. Kim (2001), “Entry Strategies for Multinational Enterprises and Host Countries,” European Journal of Operational Research, 133, 62-68.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceVishwasrao, S. (2007), “Royalties vs. Fees: How Do Firms Pay for Foreign Technology?” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, 741-759.zh_TW
dc.relation.referenceWang, J. S., H. W. Koo and T. J. Chen (2006), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby,” Japan and the World Economy, 18(4), 488-511.zh_TW
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.openairetypethesis-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en_US-
item.grantfulltextopen-
Appears in Collections:學位論文
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
501501.pdf985.13 kBAdobe PDF2View/Open
Show simple item record

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.