Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52110| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.contributor | 政治大學財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.date | 2006 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-16T07:10:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2011-11-16T07:10:51Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-11-16T07:10:51Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52110 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 觀察台灣的政黨競選情形，特別是在黨內初選階段時，常會發生有黨內高層勸退新進參選人的現象。本計畫將建立一賽局模型，利用序列均衡 (sequential equilibrium) 的概念，嘗試將此政黨高層的政治手腕，提供理論的研究基礎，並預測出黨內競選的職位或當選利益愈高時，黨內高層愈不容易有勸退成功的情況。 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | 基礎研究 | en_US |
| dc.relation | 學術補助 | en_US |
| dc.relation | 研究期間:9508 ~ 9607 | en_US |
| dc.relation | 研究經費:508仟元 | en_US |
| dc.source.uri | http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB/result.jsp?id=983210&plan_no=NSC95-2415-H004-010&plan_year=95&projkey=PF9506-1087&target=plan&highStr=*&check=0&pnchDesc=%E5%8B%B8%E9%80%80%E5%8F%83%E9%81%B8%E7%9A%84%E8%B3%BD%E5%B1%80%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 經濟學 | en_US |
| dc.title | 勸退參選的賽局分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative | Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dissuading Candidates from Running for Elections | en_US |
| dc.type | report | en |
| item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_93fc | - |
| item.grantfulltext | open | - |
| item.openairetype | report | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 國科會研究計畫 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| report9.pdf | 179.59 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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