Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54703| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | 林玉玫 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | 林玉玫 | zh_TW |
| dc.date | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-30T03:32:34Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-10-30T03:32:34Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-10-30T03:32:34Z | - |
| dc.identifier | G0098255028 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54703 | - |
| dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 98255028 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 100 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文除了以公共選擇理論為分析基礎外，亦將民意取向納入考量，探討當中央政府在考量本身相關收入及消費者福利下，透過不同的委託方式，將某一財貨提供權下放予地方政府時，對地方政府競爭及消費者福利的影響。結果顯示：委託方式不會影響地方政府不誠實的行為決策。此外亦存在著中央政府與消費者偏好一致的決策空間。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1\n第二章 基本模型 5\n 第一節 第四階段：地方政府決定最適財貨配置量 7\n 第二節 第三階段：中央政府監督與地方政府的銷售申報 8\n 第三節 第二階段：中央政府可獲得地方政府的總競租支出 10\n 第四節 第一階段：中央政府決定單位回繳金額 12\n第三章 「競爭類型」之模型 18\n 第一節 第三階段：地方政府決定最適財貨價格 18\n 第二節 第二階段：中央政府監督與地方政府的銷售申報 19\n 第三節 第一階段：中央政府決定單位回繳金額 20\n第四章 比較財貨提供權的兩種釋放方式 25\n 第一節 比較單位回繳金額之差異 26\n 第二節 比較中央政府預期總利益之差異 28\n 第三節 比較最適決策下消費者福利之差異 30\n第五章 結論 32\n參考文獻 34 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255028 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 委託 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 競租 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | 中央政府的委託決策及地方政府競爭 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Delegate-Decision of central government and competition among local governments | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference | Antràs, P. and G. Padró i Miquel (2011), “Foreign Influence and Welfare,” Journal of International Economics, 84(2), 135-148.\nArnold, P. A., Clack G., and P. Malamud ed. (2004), About America: How the United States Is Governed, Virginia: Braddock Communications Inc.\nBecker, G. S. and G. J. Stigler (1974), “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1), 1-18.\nBertrand, J. (1883), “Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale,” Journal des Savants, 67, 499-508. \nBombardini, M. and F. Trebbi (2011), “Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress,” Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8), 587-611.\nBown, C. P., and P. Tovar (2011), “Trade Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Evidence from India`s Tariff Reform,” Journal of Development Economics, 96(1), 115-125.\nBuchanan, J. M. (1972), “Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference,” in R. D. Tollison (ed.), Theory of Public Choice, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.\nDamania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and M. Mani (2004), “The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence,” Public Choice, 121(3), 363–390.\nDrugov, M. (2010), “Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption,” Journal of Development Economics, 92(2), 107-114.\nFriehe, T. (2008), “Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game: Some Theory and an Application to Corruption,” Public Choice, 137(1), 127–143.\nGrossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review, 84(4), 833-850.\nHotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.\nKrueger, A. O. (1974), “The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society,”American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303.\nLaffont, J.-J. and T. N`Guessan (1999), “Competition and Corruption in an Agency Relationship,” Journal of Development Economics, 60(2), 271-295.\nMookherjee, D., and I. P. L. Png (1995), “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated,” Economic Journal, 105(428), 145–159.\nMueller, D. C. (1989), Public Choice II, New York: Cambridge University Press.\nNiskanen, W. A. (1968), “The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy,” American Economic Review, 58(2), 293-305.\nOi, W. Y. (1971), “A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(1), 77-96.\nPosner, R. A. (1975), “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,” Journal of Political Economy, 83(4), 807-827.\nPriks, M. (2011), “Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies,” Economics of Governance, 12(1), 75-88.\nPriks, M. (2012), “Competition among officials and the abuse of power,” Public Choice, 150(3), 425-438. \nRose-Ackerman, S. (1978), Corruption: a study in political economy, New York: Academic Press.\nShleifer, A., and R. Vishny (1993), “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 599–617.\nSwinnen, J. F. M. and T. Vandemoortele (2011), “Trade and the Political Economy of Food Standards,” Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(2), 259-280.\nTovar, P. (2011), “Lobbying Costs and Trade Policy,” Journal of International Economics, 83(2), 126-136.\nTullock, G. (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press.\nTullock, G. (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-232.\nTullock, G. (1980), “Efficient Rent Seeking,” in J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison (ed.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A & M University Press. | zh_TW |
| item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
| item.openairetype | thesis | - |
| item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 | |
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| 502801.pdf | 3.35 MB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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