Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59077
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | - |
dc.creator | Wang,Jue-Shyan; Lin, Mei-Yin | en_US |
dc.date | 2012-09 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-22T05:44:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-08-22T05:44:09Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013-08-22T05:44:09Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59077 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
dc.relation | Modern Economy, 3(5), 653-657 | en_US |
dc.subject | Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;Sequential Equilibrium | en_US |
dc.title | Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy | en_US |
dc.type | article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.4236/me.2012.35084 | en_US |
dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2012.35084 | en_US |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.openairetype | article | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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653657.pdf | 160.98 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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