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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59156
題名: | On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information | 作者: | Tsai,Tsung-Sheng ; Yang,C. C. | 貢獻者: | 政大財政系 | 日期: | 十一月-2010 | 上傳時間: | 26-八月-2013 | 摘要: | This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn`s (American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence`s signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay. | 關聯: | International Economic Review, 51(4), 959-979 | 資料類型: | article | DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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