再平衡vs.核心利益─美國重返亞洲對中國南海政策之影響

Abstract

隨著綜合國力之躍升，中國業已更具實力與自信處理關乎核心利益的爭端。2011年發表的《中國和平發展白皮書》明確羅列核心利益要件，益加具體化中國核心利益的底線。面對中國政治、經濟、軍事的全面崛起，身為霸權國的美國仍力圖確保東亞區域秩序之穩定，亦即所謂「美國治下的和平」（Pax Americana）。然而儘管美國在2009年7月宣布重返亞洲，中國和鄰國在南海領土主權問題上依舊衝突頻仍。本文的問題意識是，美國重返亞洲是否對於中國南海政策產生制約效果。\n 本文分就軍事、外交、經濟等層面分析美國重返亞洲政策。軍事上美國一方面強化軍事存在、提升嚇阻力量，另一方面調整軍事部署、因應國防預算削減；外交上美國推行前沿部署外交（forward-deployed diplomacy）政策，旨在鞏固其在亞太地區存在的承諾，同時尋求更多國家支持美國，以稀釋中國與日俱增的區域影響力並爭取話語權；經濟上美國「對外開拓市場，對內創造工作機會」，致力加強與亞太國家之經貿合作。短期而言，除了外交上有所斬獲之外，美國軍事和經濟重返亞洲的政策效果尚不顯著。\n 反觀中國，儘管其獨立自主的和平外交政策致力建構和平穩定的國際環境，為迄今仍自我定位為發展中大國的中國爭取戰略機遇期，以利國內經濟發展。然而隨著國力的提升，中國在關乎核心利益的問題上益加強硬專斷，前國務委員戴秉國「堅持走和平發展道路」一文直指「任何發展道路的選擇都不可能以犧牲國家重要利益特別是核心利益為代價」，中國在南海爭端中亦展現「積極有所作為」的一面。\n 除了證實美國重返亞洲係以外交重返為主軸，其象徵意義遠大於實質意義之外，研究發現中美國力差距的急遽縮小實係中國南海政策轉趨強硬之主因，然美國重返亞洲政策之成敗則主要端視於中國決策者的認知（perception）及其因應對策。簡言之，本文認為不主動將危機升高為軍事衝突、改行更加有所作為的強勢執法，「有限專斷」可謂美國重返亞洲後中國處理南海爭端的最適策略，與其「務實競合」策略並行不悖，美國重返亞洲政策在該情境下對於中國南海政策制約效果甚微。

As China`s comprehensive national power rises with its rapid economic growth, it becomes more capable of protecting its core interests. In addition, China published the white paper on China`s peaceful development in 2011, which officially defined the concept of “core interests”. As a global hegemon, the U.S. strives to secure regional stability in East Asia, which is so-called Pax Americana. Although the U.S. proposed “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy in July 2009, confrontation in the South China Sea between China and other claimants still continues. This thesis discusses the impact of the U.S. return to Asia on China`s South China Sea policy.\n The thesis analyzes “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy from military, diplomatic, and economic perspectives. In terms of defense, the U.S. not only strengthens military presence and reinforces deterrence capability, but also adjusts military posture to comply with military budget cuts. With respect to diplomacy, the U.S. launches “forward-deployed diplomacy” strategy, aiming at consolidating its commitment to East Asian countries and gaining support from them. When it comes to economic development, the U.S. strategy focuses on opening new markets and stimulating exports by boosting economic cooperation with East Asian countries. However, in the short run, “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy has no significant policy impact except diplomatic efforts.\n In spite of pursuing for a peaceful international environment and favorable external conditions in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, China`s attitude toward core interest issues has become much tougher in recent years. For example, China has taken a proactive role in the South China Sea disputes since 2009.\n On the one hand, the thesis verifies that the core underpinning of “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy is on diplomacy. On the other hand, the thesis contends that rapidly shrinking U.S.-China GDP gap is the major determinant of China`s assertive South China Sea policy. Furthermore, the impact of “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy depends on Chinese policymakers` perceptions of the strategy. In short, “limited assertiveness” (i.e. not dispatching navy but using non-military means such as assertive law enforcement) is not only the optimal strategy for China to resolve disputes in the South China Sea after the U.S. return to Asia, but also part of its “pragmatic coopetition” strategy. As such, the impact of the U.S. return to Asia on China`s South China Sea policy is examined insignificant.