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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71045
題名: | The Political Economy of Tariffs and Environmental Standards | 作者: | Lai, Yu-Bong | 貢獻者: | 財政系 | 關鍵詞: | Political behavior; Tariffs; Economic models; Economic theory; Game theory; Interest groups; Lobbying; Environmentalists; Environmental policy | 日期: | 2005 | 上傳時間: | 3-Nov-2014 | 摘要: | This paper highlights the effects of the structures of games on interest groups` lobbying behavior. When policies are determined simultaneously, environmentalists prefer a higher tariff and a stricter environmental product standard, in order to hinder imports of a good that generate negative consumption-type externalities. In a sequential game, where the tariff is determined first, environmentalists will attempt to reduce the tariff. A reduction in the tariff tightens the environmental standard, which has a stronger trade-restrictive effect. To take advantage of the stronger trade-restrictive effect of environmental regulation, environmentalists will strategically lobby for a lower tariff barrier. | 關聯: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161(3), 473-490. | 資料類型: | article |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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