Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71127| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator | Lin, Chung-cheng;Chang, Juin-jen;Lai, Ching-chong | en_US |
| dc.date | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-11-04T10:12:06Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-11-04T10:12:06Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-11-04T10:12:06Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71127 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | A synthesis of profit-sharing and efficiency wage models is constructed to provide a preliminary account of how a firm determines its pay parameters, and why it chooses to be a profit-sharing or a fixed-wage firm. The properties of the worker`s effort function crucially influence the firm`s choices between different compensation systems, and that the adoption of a profit-sharing scheme cannot guarantee the attainment of full mployment. Other findings of the paper also seem to be very different from those of Weitzman`s share model. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 101810 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | Economic Modelling, 19(5), 815-828 | en_US |
| dc.subject | Studies; Economic models; Profit sharing plans; Terminations; Unemployment; Wages & salaries | en_US |
| dc.title | Profit Sharing as a Worker Discipline Device | en_US |
| dc.type | article | en |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
| item.openairetype | article | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 815828.pdf | 99.42 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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