Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76470| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 何怡澄 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ho, Yi Cheng | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | 蘇煒琁 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | 蘇煒琁 | zh_TW |
| dc.date | 2015 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-13T03:16:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-13T03:16:57Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-07-13T03:16:57Z | - |
| dc.identifier | G0101255005 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76470 | - |
| dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 101255005 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 103 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | 傳統觀點認為透過租稅規避以節省稅負的行為，可以增加企業價值 (Graham and Tucker, 2006及Frank, Lynch, and Rego, 2009)，有利於股東，可獲得機構法人的支持；然而，避稅行為所伴隨的潛在風險與成本，不利公司之長期利益，促使機構法人抑制公司之避稅行為。本文探討三大機構法人持股期間之長短對公司避稅活動的影響。以台灣上市櫃公司2001至2013年期間之追蹤資料 (panel data)，採用二元固定效果模型(two-way fixed effect model)，分析三大機構法人持股週轉率與企業參與租稅規避程度之關係。實證結果顯示三大機構法人愈傾向短線操作，其持股週轉率愈高，對公司之監督努力較低，公司治理程度較低，公司避稅活動較為活躍；反之，三大機構法人傾向長期持股，其持股週轉率愈低，機構法人著重公司之長期利益，對公司之監督努力程度高，使公司治理趨於良好，進而限制公司之避稅活動。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1\n第一節 研究背景與目的 1\n第二節 研究流程 4\n第二章 文獻探討及假說發展 5\n第二節 外資、投信及自營商之簡介 6\n第三節 租稅規避之定義 10\n第四節 公司治理與租稅規避 11\n第五節 機構法人持股與公司治理 13\n第六節 機構法人長短期持股與租稅規避 15\n第七節 研究假說發展 19\n第三章 研究方法與設計 20\n第一節 實證模型之建構 20\n第二節 變數定義 22\n第三節 樣本篩選與設定 32\n第四節 統計概況 35\n第四章 實證結果與分析 40\n第一節 模型檢定 40\n第二節 迴歸結果與分析 44\n第五章 結論與研究限制 51\n第一節 結論 51\n第二節 研究限制與建議 52\n參考文獻 54\n附錄一 58\n附錄二 62 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 2613029 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101255005 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 租稅規避 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 機構法人 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 持股週轉率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | tax avoidance | en_US |
| dc.subject | institutional shareholder | en_US |
| dc.subject | turnover rate | en_US |
| dc.title | 三大機構法人持股週轉率與公司避稅的關聯性─以台灣上市櫃公司為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Institutional Shareholders` Turnover Rate and Tax Avoidance | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference | 中文參考文獻\n王建煊與吳嘉勳 (2012)，《租稅法》，台北：華泰文化。\n中華民國證券投資信託暨顧問商業公會 (2014)，《中華民國證券投資信託暨顧問商業同業公會三十週年特刊：展翼30》，台北市：證券投資信託公會。\n甘宸鍏 (2014)，《不同產業及持股週轉率對機構法人處分效果比較研究─以台灣上市公司為例》，國立台北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。\n陳明進 (2002)，「營利事業有效稅率決定因素之實證研究」，《會計評論》， 34，57-75。\n陳明進 (2003)，「我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響」，《管理評論》，22(1)，127-151。\n陳明進與蔡麗雯 (2006)，「財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究」，《管理學報》，23(6)，739-763。\n陳清秀 (2012)，《稅法總論》，台北：元照出版有限公司。\n葛克昌 (1977)，「租稅規避之研究」，《國立臺灣大學法學論叢》，6(2)，167-187。\n黃美祝 (2010)，「財稅差異金額大小對國稅局選案查核之影響」，《會計評論》，50，23-55。\n黃美祝與楊佩璇 (2011)，「集團企業與非集團企業避稅程度之比較」，《會計學報》，4(1)，1-22。\n\n\n英文參考文獻\nCheng, C. S. A., H. H. Huang, Y. Li, and J. Stanfield (2012), “The effect of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance.” American Accounting Association, 87(5), 1493-1526.\nChen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. (2010), “Are family firms more aggressive than non-family firms?” Journal of Financial Economics, 95, 41–61.\nChen, X., J. Harford, K. Li. (2007), “Monitoring: Which institutions matter?” Journal of Financial Economics, 86, 279-305.\nChung, R., Firth, M., and Kim, J. B. (2002), “Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earning Management,”Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48.\nDesai, Mihir A., and Dhammika Dharmapala (2006), “Corporate tax avoidance and \nhigh-powered incentives,” Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 145-179.\nDesai, M., and D. Dharmapala (2009a), “Earnings management, corporate tax shelters, and book-tax alignment” National Tax Journal, 72, 169–186.\nDesai, M., and D. Dharmapala. (2009b), “Corporate tax avoidance and firm value” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, 537–546.\nDyreng, Scott, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew (2008), “Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance” The accounting Review, 83, 61-82\nFrank, M., L. Lynch, and S. Rego (2009), “Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting” The Accounting Review, 84, 467–496.\nGaspar, J., M. Massa, and P. Matos (2005), “Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control” Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 135–165.\nGaspar, J., M. Massa, P. Matos, R. Patgiri, and Z. Rehman (2012), “Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons” Review of Finance, 17, 261-320.\nGompers, P., J. Ishii and A. Metrick (2003), “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,”\nQuarterly Journal of Economics, 25, 107-155.\nGraham, J. R., and A. L. Tucker. (2006), “Tax shelters and corporate debt policy” Journal of Financial Economics 81(3): 563-594.\nHanlon, M., and J. Slemrod (2009), “What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax aggressiveness” Journal of Public Economics, 93, 126-141.\nHanlon, M., and S. Heitzman (2010), “A review of tax research” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 127-178.\nKhurana Inder K. and William J. Moser (2013), “Institutional Shareholders’ Investment Horizons and Tax Avoidance” The Journal of the American Accounting Association 35:1, 111-134\nKim, J., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. (2011), “Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis” Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 639–662.\nMichelle Hanlon and Shane M. Heitzman (2010), “ A review of tax research”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 127-178.\nMills, L. (1998), “Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments”\nJournal of Accounting Research 36:2, 343-356.\nMinnick Kristina and Tracy Noga (2010), “Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?” Journal of Corporate Finance, 16, 703–718.\nPetersen, M. A. (2009), “Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches”, The Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1): 435-480.\nShleifer, A., and R. Vishny. (1986), “Large shareholders and corporate control” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461–488.\nShleifer, A., and R. Vishny. (1997), “A survey of corporate governance” Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783.\nWilson, R. (2009), “An examination of corporate tax shelter participants” The Accounting Review, 84, 969–999.\nYan Xuemin, and Zhe Zhang (2009), “Institutional investors and equity returns: Are short-term institutions better informed” Review of financial Studies, 22 (2), 893-924. | zh_TW |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.openairetype | thesis | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
| item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 | |
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| 500501.pdf | 2.55 MB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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