The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78875

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor	財政系
dc.creator	Wang, Jue-Shyan;Hung, Hsiao-Yin
dc.creator	王智賢;洪曉吟	zh_TW
dc.date	2008-07
dc.date.accessioned	2015-10-06T08:33:42Z	-
dc.date.available	2015-10-06T08:33:42Z	-
dc.date.issued	2015-10-06T08:33:42Z	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78875	-
dc.description.abstract	Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager`s mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects.
dc.format.extent	159 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	text/html	-
dc.relation	Journal of Economics and Management, 4(2), 125-143
dc.subject	Asymmetric Information;Employment;Equilibrium;Information;Principal Agent;Promotion
dc.title	The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information
dc.type	article	en
item.grantfulltext	restricted	-
item.openairecristype	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf	-
item.cerifentitytype	Publications	-
item.openairetype	article	-
item.fulltext	With Fulltext	-
Appears in Collections:	期刊論文

File	Description	Size	Format
index.html		159 B	HTML2	View/Open

Check