強制設置獨立董監事與新股折價關聯性之研究

Abstract

我國上市(櫃)審查準則規定公司至少需設立二位獨立董事及一位獨立監察人，且至少有一位獨立董事和獨立監察人必須具有財務或會計背景。過去文獻甚少從「獨立性」角度探討公司治理與新股折價之關聯性。本研究將以此議題為中心，運用代理理論與資訊不對稱理論，探討獨立董監事之設置、會計師背景獨立董事與獨立監察人多寡等公司治理因素與承銷價被低估情形之關係。本研究以2000至2003年期間上市櫃之IPOs公司共405家為研究樣本。實證結果顯示：（一）獨立董事佔董事會席位比率與IPOs公司承銷價被低估情形有顯著負向關係，獨立監察人人數與折價幅度之關係則較不確定；（二）會計師背景獨立董事佔董事會比率與IPOs公司折價幅度，並無顯著關聯性存在；（三）會計師背景之獨立監察人人數與IPOs公司承銷價被低估情形，並無顯著關係。

With a sample of 405 initial public offerings (IPOs) in Taiwan Stock Exchange, this paper empirically investigates whether the mandatory set-up of independent directors and supervisors help explain the magnitude of IPOs underpricing. The results show that there is a negative and significant correlation between the engagement of independent directors and the underpricing of IPOs. However, the relation between the engagement of independent supervisors and the underpricing of IPOs is uncertain. In addition, the proportion of independent directors with CPA background to all directors and the number of independent supervisors having CPA backgrounds do not significantly affect the underpricing of IPOs.