中國大陸下市緩衝機制與盈餘管理

Abstract

本文探討中國大陸下市緩衝機制對於虧損公司盈餘管理之影響. 下市緩衝機制係針對一年, 二年, 三年虧損公司次年分別實施特別處理, 特別轉讓, 與下市之管制, 由於特別處理與特別轉讓僅管制漲跌幅度與交易時間, 加上該類管制股票具資產重組轉機題材, 因此本文假設一年與二年虧損的公司在虧損年度會策略性調降盈餘, 儲備未來扭虧空間與獲取潛在之重組效益; 至於連續三年虧損的公司, 次年為了規避下市危機策略性美化盈餘. 另外, 本文假設各群虧損公司次年扭虧時, 會策略性調控盈餘至略高於零損失門檻. 實證結果支持上述各項假說, 顯示下市緩衝機制連續虧損門檻引發虧損公司數年報導盈餘失真, 未能在下市淘汰過程中發揮實質成效.

This study investigates the impact of Chinese delisting buffer mechanism on firms` earnings management. The delisting buffer mechanism requires that firms with one, two, and three-year losses be subject to special treatment, particular transfer and delisting regulations in the following year. Although firms subject to special treatment and particular transfer regulations have price limits and trading time sanctions, the market still expects corporate restructuring news. Therefore, I hypothesize that firms with one or two-year losses strategically manage earnings downwards to save future earnings and gain potential restructure benefits. Firms with three-year losses strategically manage earnings upwards in the following year to avoid a delisting crisis. Furthermore, I hypothesize that earnings distribution of loss firms reporting profits in the following year heavily clusters slightly above the zero-loss threshold. Empirical results support the hypotheses described above, which indicate that Chinese delisting buffer mechanism`s consecutive loss thresholds induce loss firms to report unreliable earnings and do not play a real role in the delisting selection process.