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題名 訊息不對稱下企業薪資結構之探討
The study about enterprise`s wage structure in the asymmetric information
作者 鄧英華
Teng, Ying Hung
貢獻者 胡聯國
Hu, Len Kuo
鄧英華
Teng, Ying Hung
關鍵詞 薪資談判
訊息不對稱
承諾均衡
非承諾均衡(完全貝氏均衡)
wage bargaining
asymmetric information
commitment equilibrium
nocommitment equilibrium
日期 1994
1993
上傳時間 29-Apr-2016 15:17:29 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的，
     或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非
     常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經
     營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工
     資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假
     設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工
     資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提
     議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之
     因素做進一步之探討。
參考文獻 [1] Alpern Steve and Snower Dennis J. : "High-low search
     in product aod labor markets." AEA Pappers and
     Proceedings,1988 ,356-362
     [2] Ausubel Lawrence M. and Deneckere Raymond J. : "A
     direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining
     with one-sided incomplete information." Journal of Economic
     Theory, 1989,18-46
     [3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R. Lewis : "Oligopoly and financial
     structure: The limited liability effect." American EcCJ"nomic
     Review, 1986,76,956-970
     [4] Cheung Francis K. and Davidson Carl: «Bargaining structure
     and strike activity." Canadian Journal of Economics,1991,345-
     371
     [5] Fernandez Raquel and Glazer Jacob: «(Striking for a bargain
     between two completely information agents." American Economic
     Review,1991,240-252
     [6] Fundenberg Drew and Tirole Jean : "Sequential bargaining
     with incomplete information."Review of Economic
     St udies ,1983,221-247
     [7]Gibbons, Robert: “Game Theory for Applied Economists.” Princeton University Press.
     [8]Grossman Sanford J. and Perry Motty: Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information “ Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 120-154.
     [9]Haller Hans and Holden Steinar: “A letter on the Editor on wage Bargaining” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,232-236
     [10]Horn Henrick and Wolinsky Asher:”Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger.”Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, 408-419.
     [11]Mercuro Nicholas and Sourbis Haralambos and Whitney Gerald:”Ownership Structure value of the firm , and the bargaining power of the manager.”
     [12]Nash, J.F. : The bargaining problem.” Econometrica, 1950, 155-162
     [13]Reyniers Diane J.:”Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage modle.” Economic Letters, 1992, 38, 479-486
     [14]Rubinsten Ariel:”Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. “Econometrica, 1982,97-109.
     [15]Sobel Joel and Takahashi Ichiro: “A multistage model of bargaining.” Review of Economics Studies, 1983, 411-426.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
81351013
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003780
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 胡聯國zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Hu, Len Kuoen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鄧英華zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Teng, Ying Hungen_US
dc.creator (作者) 鄧英華zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Teng, Ying Hungen_US
dc.date (日期) 1994en_US
dc.date (日期) 1993en_US
dc.date.accessioned 29-Apr-2016 15:17:29 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 29-Apr-2016 15:17:29 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-Apr-2016 15:17:29 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002003780en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/88305-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 81351013zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的，
     或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非
     常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經
     營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工
     資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假
     設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工
     資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提
     議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之
     因素做進一步之探討。		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 序論
     第一節 研究動機與目的 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
     第二節 本文內容與架構 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
     
     第二章 文獻回顧
     第一節 前言 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
     第二節 Nash談判均衡解及相關文獻 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
     第三節 Rubinstein子賽局完全均衡及相關文獻- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
     第四節 完全貝氏均衡及相關文獻- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
     本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -15
     
     第三章 理論模型
     第一節 前言- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16
     第二節 基本假設與定義- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -20
     第三節 承諾均衡與非承諾均衡 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22
     第四節 工會談判架構之選擇- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -35
     本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -37
     
     第四章 影響均衡之因素
     第一節 影響均衡之因素（一）- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39
     第二節 影響均衡之因素（二）- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 51
     第三節 小結- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 61
     　　本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 62
     
     第五章 結論- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -65
     
     參考文獻		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003780en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪資談判zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 訊息不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 承諾均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 非承諾均衡(完全貝氏均衡)zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) wage bargainingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) asymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) commitment equilibriumen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) nocommitment equilibriumen_US
dc.title (題名) 訊息不對稱下企業薪資結構之探討zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The study about enterprise`s wage structure in the asymmetric informationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] Alpern Steve and Snower Dennis J. : "High-low search
     in product aod labor markets." AEA Pappers and
     Proceedings,1988 ,356-362
     [2] Ausubel Lawrence M. and Deneckere Raymond J. : "A
     direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining
     with one-sided incomplete information." Journal of Economic
     Theory, 1989,18-46
     [3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R. Lewis : "Oligopoly and financial
     structure: The limited liability effect." American EcCJ"nomic
     Review, 1986,76,956-970
     [4] Cheung Francis K. and Davidson Carl: «Bargaining structure
     and strike activity." Canadian Journal of Economics,1991,345-
     371
     [5] Fernandez Raquel and Glazer Jacob: «(Striking for a bargain
     between two completely information agents." American Economic
     Review,1991,240-252
     [6] Fundenberg Drew and Tirole Jean : "Sequential bargaining
     with incomplete information."Review of Economic
     St udies ,1983,221-247
     [7]Gibbons, Robert: “Game Theory for Applied Economists.” Princeton University Press.
     [8]Grossman Sanford J. and Perry Motty: Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information “ Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 120-154.
     [9]Haller Hans and Holden Steinar: “A letter on the Editor on wage Bargaining” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,232-236
     [10]Horn Henrick and Wolinsky Asher:”Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger.”Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, 408-419.
     [11]Mercuro Nicholas and Sourbis Haralambos and Whitney Gerald:”Ownership Structure value of the firm , and the bargaining power of the manager.”
     [12]Nash, J.F. : The bargaining problem.” Econometrica, 1950, 155-162
     [13]Reyniers Diane J.:”Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage modle.” Economic Letters, 1992, 38, 479-486
     [14]Rubinsten Ariel:”Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. “Econometrica, 1982,97-109.
     [15]Sobel Joel and Takahashi Ichiro: “A multistage model of bargaining.” Review of Economics Studies, 1983, 411-426.		zh_TW