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題名 不完全資訊下對局的探討
作者 張光華
Chang, K.H.
貢獻者 李子壩
張光華
Chang,K.H.
關鍵詞 資訊
信念
型式
共識
共有p-信念
Information
Belief
Type
Common Knowledge
Common p-belief
日期 1994
1993
上傳時間 29-Apr-2016 15:30:46 (UTC+8)
摘要 對局理論的發展中，以往都著重於合作對局的探討與應用，且有相當的成
參考文獻 [1] Aumann,Rober J.(1976)” Agreeing to Disagree.” ,Annals of Statistics,4,1236-1239.
[2]Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel,Joel. (1987)” Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.”,Econometrica, Vol.55,No.3,647-661.
[3]Binmore,Kenneth. & Brandenberger,Adam. (1987)” Common Knowledge and Game Theory.” ,Disscussion Paper TE/88/167,STICERD,London Shool of Economics.
[4]Brandenburger, A. & Dekel,E.(1987)” Common Knowledge with Probability 1.”, J.Math. Econ,16, 237-245.
[5]Brandenburger, Adam.(1992)”Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol .6,No.4,83-101.
[6]Cho,In-Koo. & Sobel,Joel.(1990)”Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games.” ,Journal of Economic Theory,50,381-413.
[7]Cho,In-Koo. & Kreps, David M.(1987)”Signaling Games and Stable Equilibrium.”, The Quarierly Journal of Economics,102,179-221.
[8]Friedman, James.(1991) Game Theory with Application to Economics ,Second Edition, Oxford University Press.
[9]Fudenberg,Drew.& Tirole,Jean.(1991)”Perfect Baysian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium.”, Journal of Economic Theory,53:236-260.
[10]Fudenberg,Drew. & Tirole,Jean.(1993)Game Theory, Third Printing,The MIT Press.
[11]Geanakopls,John.(1992)J” Common Knowledge.”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.6, No.4,43-82.
[12]Gibbons,Robert.(1992) A Primer in Game Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[13]Glicksberg,I.L.(1952)” A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point the-orem with application to Nash equilibrium points.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38, 170-174.
[14]Harsanyi,John.(1967)”Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Baysian’ Players 1,2,3.”, Management Science, 14,159-182, 320-334, and 486-502.
]15]Harsanyi,John.(1973)” Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points.”, International Journal of Game Theory,2,1-23.
[16]Kohlberg,Elon.&Mertens,J.F. (1986)” On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium. “ Econometrica, Vol.54, No.5, 1003-1037.
[17]Kreps,David M.(1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[18]Krep,D. & Wilson, R.(1982)” Sequential Equilibrium.”, Econometrica,50;863-894
[19]Milgrom, P, & Weber, R.(1985)” Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information.”Mathematics of Operations Research,10,619-631.
[20]Monderer,Dov. & Samet, Dov.(1989)”Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs.”, Games and Economic Beheavior, 1,170-190.
[21]Myer, S & Majluf, N.(1984)” Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Invsestors Do Not Have.”,Jouranl of Financial Economics,13:187-221.
[22]Nash,J.(1950)”Equilibrium points in n-person games.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,36,48-49.
[23]Rasmusen, Eric.(1992) Games and Information, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press.
[24]Rubinstein, A.(1989)”The Electronic Mail Game:Strategic Behavior under “Al-most Common Knowledge”.”,American Economic Review 79,385-391.
[25]Selten,R.(1975)” Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.”.International Journal of Game Theory,4:25-55.
[26]Spence,A.M. (1973)” Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87,355-374.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
統計學系
81354002
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003819
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 李子壩zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張光華zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chang,K.H.en_US
dc.creator (作者) 張光華zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chang, K.H.en_US
dc.date (日期) 1994en_US
dc.date (日期) 1993en_US
dc.date.accessioned 29-Apr-2016 15:30:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 29-Apr-2016 15:30:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-Apr-2016 15:30:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002003819en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/88351-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 統計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 81354002zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 對局理論的發展中，以往都著重於合作對局的探討與應用，且有相當的成zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前 言…………………………………………………………………………………………………1
第二章 古典對局…………………………………………………………………………………………………3
第一節 對局發展…………………………………………………………………………………………3
第二節 正規型式對局與擴展形式對局之求解方法…………………..………………6
第三節 混合策略Nash均衡之存在………………………………………………….………14
第三章 不完全資訊下的靜態對局……………………………………………………………………16
第一節 貝氏對局之均衡觀念……………………………………………………………………17
第二節 拍賣對局…………………………………………………………………………….…………19
第三節 貝氏均衡與Nash均衡………………………………………….………………………23
第四章 不完全資訊下的動態對局……………………………………………………………………28
第一節 完全貝氏均衡…………………………………………………………………….…………28
第二節 一般對局的精簡………………………………………………………………...…………29
第五章 不完全資訊下的動態對局－訊息對局…………………..……………………………39
第一節 訊息對局之均衡觀念……………………………………………………………………39
第二節 訊息對局精簡之方法……………………………………………………………………44
第三節 工會－廠商訊息對局……………………………………………………………………50
第六章 共 識(Common knowledge) ………………….…………………………………………55
第一節 共識的意義……………………………………..……………………………………………55
第二節 實例探討－電子郵件系統策略之選擇……………………..…………………62
第七章 共有p –信念(Common p-belief) ….………………………………………………………66
第一節 共有p-信念的意義………………………………………………………………………66
第二節 共有p-信念在貝氏對局的探討……………………..……………………………72
第八章 結 論…………………………………………………………………………….………….………78
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………79		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003819en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 信念zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 型式zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 共識zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 共有p-信念zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Informationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Beliefen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Typeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Common Knowledgeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Common p-beliefen_US
dc.title (題名) 不完全資訊下對局的探討zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] Aumann,Rober J.(1976)” Agreeing to Disagree.” ,Annals of Statistics,4,1236-1239.
[2]Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel,Joel. (1987)” Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.”,Econometrica, Vol.55,No.3,647-661.
[3]Binmore,Kenneth. & Brandenberger,Adam. (1987)” Common Knowledge and Game Theory.” ,Disscussion Paper TE/88/167,STICERD,London Shool of Economics.
[4]Brandenburger, A. & Dekel,E.(1987)” Common Knowledge with Probability 1.”, J.Math. Econ,16, 237-245.
[5]Brandenburger, Adam.(1992)”Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol .6,No.4,83-101.
[6]Cho,In-Koo. & Sobel,Joel.(1990)”Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games.” ,Journal of Economic Theory,50,381-413.
[7]Cho,In-Koo. & Kreps, David M.(1987)”Signaling Games and Stable Equilibrium.”, The Quarierly Journal of Economics,102,179-221.
[8]Friedman, James.(1991) Game Theory with Application to Economics ,Second Edition, Oxford University Press.
[9]Fudenberg,Drew.& Tirole,Jean.(1991)”Perfect Baysian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium.”, Journal of Economic Theory,53:236-260.
[10]Fudenberg,Drew. & Tirole,Jean.(1993)Game Theory, Third Printing,The MIT Press.
[11]Geanakopls,John.(1992)J” Common Knowledge.”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.6, No.4,43-82.
[12]Gibbons,Robert.(1992) A Primer in Game Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[13]Glicksberg,I.L.(1952)” A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point the-orem with application to Nash equilibrium points.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38, 170-174.
[14]Harsanyi,John.(1967)”Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Baysian’ Players 1,2,3.”, Management Science, 14,159-182, 320-334, and 486-502.
]15]Harsanyi,John.(1973)” Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points.”, International Journal of Game Theory,2,1-23.
[16]Kohlberg,Elon.&Mertens,J.F. (1986)” On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium. “ Econometrica, Vol.54, No.5, 1003-1037.
[17]Kreps,David M.(1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
[18]Krep,D. & Wilson, R.(1982)” Sequential Equilibrium.”, Econometrica,50;863-894
[19]Milgrom, P, & Weber, R.(1985)” Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information.”Mathematics of Operations Research,10,619-631.
[20]Monderer,Dov. & Samet, Dov.(1989)”Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs.”, Games and Economic Beheavior, 1,170-190.
[21]Myer, S & Majluf, N.(1984)” Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Invsestors Do Not Have.”,Jouranl of Financial Economics,13:187-221.
[22]Nash,J.(1950)”Equilibrium points in n-person games.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,36,48-49.
[23]Rasmusen, Eric.(1992) Games and Information, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press.
[24]Rubinstein, A.(1989)”The Electronic Mail Game:Strategic Behavior under “Al-most Common Knowledge”.”,American Economic Review 79,385-391.
[25]Selten,R.(1975)” Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.”.International Journal of Game Theory,4:25-55.
[26]Spence,A.M. (1973)” Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87,355-374.		zh_TW