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題名 不完全訊息下,企業產品決策與資本結構之研究
作者 林育秀
LIN, YU-XIU
貢獻者 胡聯國
林育秀
LIN, YU-XIU
日期 1992
1991
上傳時間 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8)
參考文獻 [1] Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry: \" Strategic delay in bargaining.\" Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, 345-364.\r\n[2] Bergman, Yaacov Z. and Jeffery 1. Callen: \" Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, 29, 137-171.\r\n[3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R.Lewis: \" Oligopoly and financial structure :The limited liability effect.\" American Economic Review, 1986, 76 ,956-970.\r\n[4] Chatterjee, Kalyan and Samuelson, Larry: \" Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers.\" Review of Economic Studies, April 1987, 54, 175-192.\r\n[5] Diamond, Douglas W.: \" Reputation acqusition in debt markets.\" Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97, 82`8-862.\r\n[6] Fernandez, Raquel and Jacob Glazer: \" Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents.\" American Economic Review, March 1991, 81 , 240-252.\r\n[7] Friedman, James W. Game Theory with Application to Economics. Oxford University Press. 1991.\r\n[8] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. The MIT Press. 1991.\r\n[9] Grossman, Sanford J.: \" Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information.\" Journal of Economic Tbeory, 1986, 39, 120-154.\r\n[10] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv: \" Capital structure and the information role of debt.\" Journal of Finance, 1990, 45, 321-349.\r\n[11] Harris, Mitlon and Artur Raviv: \" The theory of capital structure.\"Journal of Finance, March 1991, 297-355.\r\n[12] Hart, Oliver and John Moore: \" Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt.\" May 1989, Working p~per, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.\r\n[13] Hirshleifer, David and Anjan V. Thakor: \" Managerial reputation, project choice and debt.\" 1989, working paper 14-89,Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA.\r\n[14] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling: \" Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 , 305-360.\r\n[15] Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. 1990.\r\n[16] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole: \" The dynamics of incentive contracts.\" , Econometrica, 1988, 56, 1153-1175.\r\n[17] Leland, Hayne and Davis Pyle: \" Information asymmetric, financial structure, and financial intermediation.\" Journal of Finance, 1977, 32, 371-388.\r\n[18] Maksimovic, Vojislav: \" Capital structure in repeated oligopolies.\" Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19, 389-407.\r\n[19] Miller, Merton H., \" Taxes and the cost of capital:A correction.\"American Economic Review, June 1963, 433-443.\r\n[20] Miller, Merton H., \" Debt and taxes.\" Journal of Finance, May 1977, 261-275.\r\n[21] Mirrlees, J 0` \" An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation.\" Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38, 175-208.\r\n[22] Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller: \" The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment.\" American Economic Review, 1958, 48, 261-297.\r\n[23] Myers, Stewart C.: \" The capital structure puzzle.\" Journal of Finance, 1984, 39, 575-592.\r\n[24] Myers, Stewart C. and Nichollas S. Majluf: \" Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investdos do not have.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 187-221.\r\n[25] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press ,INC. 1990.\r\n[26] Ross, Stephen: \" The determination of financial structure: The incentive signalling approach.\" Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8, 23-40.\r\n[27] Rubinstein, Ariel: \" Perfect equilibrium in bargaining model.\" Econometrica, 1982, 50, 97-109.\r\n[28] Rubinstein, Ariel: \" A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences.\" Econometrica, September 1984, 52, 1351-1364.\r\n[29] Sarig, Oded H.: \" Bargaining with a corporation and the capital structure of the bargaining firm.\" 1988, Working paper, Tel Aviv University.\r\n[30] Stulz, Rene: \" Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 26, 3-27.\r\n[31] Titmam, Sheridan: \" The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 137-151.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004620
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 胡聯國zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林育秀zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) LIN, YU-XIUen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林育秀zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) LIN, YU-XIUen_US
dc.date (日期) 1992en_US
dc.date (日期) 1991en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002004620en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=101091-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論\r\n第一節 研究動機與目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1\r\n第二節 本文內容與架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3\r\n第二章 文獻回顧\r\n第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5\r\n第二節 Bergman and Callen(1991) 與Brander and Lewis (1986) 之簡介. . . . . . . .7\r\n第三節 由代理成本之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13\r\n第四節 由訊息不對稱之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16\r\n第五節 由產品或要素市場之互動關係的角度探討資本結構. . . .. . . . . . . . .18\r\n第三章 理論模型的建立(一)最適產品決策q地釐定\r\n第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20\r\n第二節 最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23\r\n第三節 一般化最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40\r\n第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46\r\n第四章 理論模型的建立(二)最適資本結構D 的釐定\r\n第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47\r\n第二節 談判理論(bargaining theory) 的簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54\r\n第三節 最適資本結構的釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58\r\n第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64\r\n第五章 結論與建議\r\n第一節 研究結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65\r\n第二節 研究限制與建議. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67\r\n附錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69\r\n參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004620en_US
dc.title (題名) 不完全訊息下,企業產品決策與資本結構之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry: \" Strategic delay in bargaining.\" Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, 345-364.\r\n[2] Bergman, Yaacov Z. and Jeffery 1. Callen: \" Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, 29, 137-171.\r\n[3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R.Lewis: \" Oligopoly and financial structure :The limited liability effect.\" American Economic Review, 1986, 76 ,956-970.\r\n[4] Chatterjee, Kalyan and Samuelson, Larry: \" Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers.\" Review of Economic Studies, April 1987, 54, 175-192.\r\n[5] Diamond, Douglas W.: \" Reputation acqusition in debt markets.\" Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97, 82`8-862.\r\n[6] Fernandez, Raquel and Jacob Glazer: \" Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents.\" American Economic Review, March 1991, 81 , 240-252.\r\n[7] Friedman, James W. Game Theory with Application to Economics. Oxford University Press. 1991.\r\n[8] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. The MIT Press. 1991.\r\n[9] Grossman, Sanford J.: \" Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information.\" Journal of Economic Tbeory, 1986, 39, 120-154.\r\n[10] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv: \" Capital structure and the information role of debt.\" Journal of Finance, 1990, 45, 321-349.\r\n[11] Harris, Mitlon and Artur Raviv: \" The theory of capital structure.\"Journal of Finance, March 1991, 297-355.\r\n[12] Hart, Oliver and John Moore: \" Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt.\" May 1989, Working p~per, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.\r\n[13] Hirshleifer, David and Anjan V. Thakor: \" Managerial reputation, project choice and debt.\" 1989, working paper 14-89,Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA.\r\n[14] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling: \" Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 , 305-360.\r\n[15] Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. 1990.\r\n[16] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole: \" The dynamics of incentive contracts.\" , Econometrica, 1988, 56, 1153-1175.\r\n[17] Leland, Hayne and Davis Pyle: \" Information asymmetric, financial structure, and financial intermediation.\" Journal of Finance, 1977, 32, 371-388.\r\n[18] Maksimovic, Vojislav: \" Capital structure in repeated oligopolies.\" Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19, 389-407.\r\n[19] Miller, Merton H., \" Taxes and the cost of capital:A correction.\"American Economic Review, June 1963, 433-443.\r\n[20] Miller, Merton H., \" Debt and taxes.\" Journal of Finance, May 1977, 261-275.\r\n[21] Mirrlees, J 0` \" An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation.\" Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38, 175-208.\r\n[22] Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller: \" The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment.\" American Economic Review, 1958, 48, 261-297.\r\n[23] Myers, Stewart C.: \" The capital structure puzzle.\" Journal of Finance, 1984, 39, 575-592.\r\n[24] Myers, Stewart C. and Nichollas S. Majluf: \" Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investdos do not have.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 187-221.\r\n[25] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press ,INC. 1990.\r\n[26] Ross, Stephen: \" The determination of financial structure: The incentive signalling approach.\" Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8, 23-40.\r\n[27] Rubinstein, Ariel: \" Perfect equilibrium in bargaining model.\" Econometrica, 1982, 50, 97-109.\r\n[28] Rubinstein, Ariel: \" A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences.\" Econometrica, September 1984, 52, 1351-1364.\r\n[29] Sarig, Oded H.: \" Bargaining with a corporation and the capital structure of the bargaining firm.\" 1988, Working paper, Tel Aviv University.\r\n[30] Stulz, Rene: \" Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 26, 3-27.\r\n[31] Titmam, Sheridan: \" The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision.\" Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 137-151.zh_TW