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題名 不完全訊息下,企業產品決策與資本結構之研究 作者 林育秀
LIN, YU-XIU貢獻者 胡聯國
林育秀
LIN, YU-XIU日期 1992
1991上傳時間 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8) 參考文獻 [1] Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry: " Strategic delay in bargaining." Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, 345-364. [2] Bergman, Yaacov Z. and Jeffery 1. Callen: " Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure." Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, 29, 137-171. [3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R.Lewis: " Oligopoly and financial structure :The limited liability effect." American Economic Review, 1986, 76 ,956-970. [4] Chatterjee, Kalyan and Samuelson, Larry: " Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers." Review of Economic Studies, April 1987, 54, 175-192. [5] Diamond, Douglas W.: " Reputation acqusition in debt markets." Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97, 82`8-862. [6] Fernandez, Raquel and Jacob Glazer: " Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents." American Economic Review, March 1991, 81 , 240-252. [7] Friedman, James W. Game Theory with Application to Economics. Oxford University Press. 1991. [8] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. The MIT Press. 1991. [9] Grossman, Sanford J.: " Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Tbeory, 1986, 39, 120-154. [10] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv: " Capital structure and the information role of debt." Journal of Finance, 1990, 45, 321-349. [11] Harris, Mitlon and Artur Raviv: " The theory of capital structure."Journal of Finance, March 1991, 297-355. [12] Hart, Oliver and John Moore: " Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt." May 1989, Working p~per, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [13] Hirshleifer, David and Anjan V. Thakor: " Managerial reputation, project choice and debt." 1989, working paper 14-89,Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA. [14] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling: " Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure." Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 , 305-360. [15] Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. 1990. [16] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole: " The dynamics of incentive contracts." , Econometrica, 1988, 56, 1153-1175. [17] Leland, Hayne and Davis Pyle: " Information asymmetric, financial structure, and financial intermediation." Journal of Finance, 1977, 32, 371-388. [18] Maksimovic, Vojislav: " Capital structure in repeated oligopolies." Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19, 389-407. [19] Miller, Merton H., " Taxes and the cost of capital:A correction."American Economic Review, June 1963, 433-443. [20] Miller, Merton H., " Debt and taxes." Journal of Finance, May 1977, 261-275. [21] Mirrlees, J 0` " An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation." Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38, 175-208. [22] Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller: " The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment." American Economic Review, 1958, 48, 261-297. [23] Myers, Stewart C.: " The capital structure puzzle." Journal of Finance, 1984, 39, 575-592. [24] Myers, Stewart C. and Nichollas S. Majluf: " Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investdos do not have." Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 187-221. [25] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press ,INC. 1990. [26] Ross, Stephen: " The determination of financial structure: The incentive signalling approach." Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8, 23-40. [27] Rubinstein, Ariel: " Perfect equilibrium in bargaining model." Econometrica, 1982, 50, 97-109. [28] Rubinstein, Ariel: " A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences." Econometrica, September 1984, 52, 1351-1364. [29] Sarig, Oded H.: " Bargaining with a corporation and the capital structure of the bargaining firm." 1988, Working paper, Tel Aviv University. [30] Stulz, Rene: " Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies." Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 26, 3-27. [31] Titmam, Sheridan: " The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision." Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 137-151. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004620 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 胡聯國 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林育秀 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) LIN, YU-XIU en_US dc.creator (作者) 林育秀 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) LIN, YU-XIU en_US dc.date (日期) 1992 en_US dc.date (日期) 1991 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-May-2016 15:14:50 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002004620 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/89174 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 第二節 本文內容與架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 第二章 文獻回顧 第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 第二節 Bergman and Callen(1991) 與Brander and Lewis (1986) 之簡介. . . . . . . .7 第三節 由代理成本之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 第四節 由訊息不對稱之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 第五節 由產品或要素市場之互動關係的角度探討資本結構. . . .. . . . . . . . .18 第三章 理論模型的建立(一)最適產品決策q地釐定 第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 第二節 最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 第三節 一般化最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 第四章 理論模型的建立(二)最適資本結構D 的釐定 第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 第二節 談判理論(bargaining theory) 的簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 第三節 最適資本結構的釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 第五章 結論與建議 第一節 研究結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 第二節 研究限制與建議. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 附錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004620 en_US dc.title (題名) 不完全訊息下,企業產品決策與資本結構之研究 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry: " Strategic delay in bargaining." Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, 345-364. [2] Bergman, Yaacov Z. and Jeffery 1. Callen: " Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure." Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, 29, 137-171. [3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R.Lewis: " Oligopoly and financial structure :The limited liability effect." American Economic Review, 1986, 76 ,956-970. [4] Chatterjee, Kalyan and Samuelson, Larry: " Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers." Review of Economic Studies, April 1987, 54, 175-192. [5] Diamond, Douglas W.: " Reputation acqusition in debt markets." Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97, 82`8-862. [6] Fernandez, Raquel and Jacob Glazer: " Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents." American Economic Review, March 1991, 81 , 240-252. [7] Friedman, James W. Game Theory with Application to Economics. Oxford University Press. 1991. [8] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. The MIT Press. 1991. [9] Grossman, Sanford J.: " Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Tbeory, 1986, 39, 120-154. [10] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv: " Capital structure and the information role of debt." Journal of Finance, 1990, 45, 321-349. [11] Harris, Mitlon and Artur Raviv: " The theory of capital structure."Journal of Finance, March 1991, 297-355. [12] Hart, Oliver and John Moore: " Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt." May 1989, Working p~per, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [13] Hirshleifer, David and Anjan V. Thakor: " Managerial reputation, project choice and debt." 1989, working paper 14-89,Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA. [14] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling: " Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure." Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 , 305-360. [15] Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. 1990. [16] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole: " The dynamics of incentive contracts." , Econometrica, 1988, 56, 1153-1175. [17] Leland, Hayne and Davis Pyle: " Information asymmetric, financial structure, and financial intermediation." Journal of Finance, 1977, 32, 371-388. [18] Maksimovic, Vojislav: " Capital structure in repeated oligopolies." Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19, 389-407. [19] Miller, Merton H., " Taxes and the cost of capital:A correction."American Economic Review, June 1963, 433-443. [20] Miller, Merton H., " Debt and taxes." Journal of Finance, May 1977, 261-275. [21] Mirrlees, J 0` " An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation." Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38, 175-208. [22] Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller: " The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment." American Economic Review, 1958, 48, 261-297. [23] Myers, Stewart C.: " The capital structure puzzle." Journal of Finance, 1984, 39, 575-592. [24] Myers, Stewart C. and Nichollas S. Majluf: " Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investdos do not have." Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 187-221. [25] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press ,INC. 1990. [26] Ross, Stephen: " The determination of financial structure: The incentive signalling approach." Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8, 23-40. [27] Rubinstein, Ariel: " Perfect equilibrium in bargaining model." Econometrica, 1982, 50, 97-109. [28] Rubinstein, Ariel: " A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences." Econometrica, September 1984, 52, 1351-1364. [29] Sarig, Oded H.: " Bargaining with a corporation and the capital structure of the bargaining firm." 1988, Working paper, Tel Aviv University. [30] Stulz, Rene: " Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies." Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 26, 3-27. [31] Titmam, Sheridan: " The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision." Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13, 137-151. zh_TW
