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題名 股權結構對公司績效影響之研究
作者 張明峰
貢獻者 陳隆麒
張明峰
日期 1991
1990
上傳時間 2-May-2016 17:00:05 (UTC+8)
摘要 目前多數中、大型企業皆以『經營權與所有權分離』的組織型態來經營，以期達到專業化的目的。然而管程當局與企業股東之間的『代理問題』卻往往導致公司經營績效的降低。由於一般股東的股權過於分散，難以直接有效地監督管理當局，在此情形下，實有必要仰賴董事會來監督、考核企業經營者行為的正當性與決策的品質。因此，本論文的目的即在：
參考文獻 中文部份
1 .呂永正，由代理成本的觀點驗證台灣上市公司所有權變動與融資決策之關係，東海大學企管研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十七年六月。
2. 李俊德，我國企業董事會功能之研究，政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十二年六月。
3. 林秀芬，企業統治類型與高階主管職能角色及企業經營策略關係之研究，政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十九年六月。
4. 林清山，多變量分析統計法，四版，台北，東華書局，民國七十五年。
5. 陳隆麒編譯，現代財務管理，修正版，台北，華泰書局，民國七十七年八月。
6. 黃俊英，多變量分析，三版，台北，華泰書局，民國七十七年。
7. 黃英陶，代理問題對公司資本結構影響之研究，成功大學工業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十六年六月。
8 .戴淵明，公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究一一台灣地區上市公司之實證分析，中興大學企管研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年六月。
9. 顏月珠，商用統計學，三版，台北，三民書局，民國七十六年。

英文部份
1. Alchian,A.A. & H.Demsetz,"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization." American Economic Review, Vol.52 (1972), pp.777-795.
2. Alderfer,C.P. "The Invisible Director on Corporate Board." Harvard Business Review, (Nov/Dec,1985), PP.38-52.
3. Amihud,Y., & B.Lev, "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, "Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.12 (1981),pp.823-837.
4. Barnea,A.,R.A.Haugen & L.W.Senbet, "Market Imperfections, Agency Problems, and Capital Structure: A review." Financial Management (Summer 1981),pp.7-22.
5. ---- , Agency Problems and Finanical Contracting, Prentice Hall Inc. ,Englewood Cliffs, 1985.
6. Baysinger, B., & R. E. Hoskisson, "The Composition of Boards of Di rectors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy."Academy of Management Review, Vol.15 (1990), pp.72-87.
7. Berle, A.A., & C.G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Commerce Clearing House,1932.
8. Brickley,J.A., & C.M. James, "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking." Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.30(1987), pp.161-180.
9. Copeland, T.E., & J.F. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
10. Crutchley, C.E., & R.S. Hansen, "A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends." Financial Management, (winter 1989), pp.36-46.
11. Dalton,D.R., & I.F. Kesner, "Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An International Perspectives." Journal of International Business Studies, (Fall 1987),pp.33-42.
12. Dayton,K.N.,"Corporate Governance: The Other Side of the Coin."Harvard Business Review, (Jan/Feb 1984), pp.34-37.
13. Demsetz H., "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26 (1983) ,pp.375-390.
14. Demsetz H. and K. Lehn, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences . "Journal of Political Economy,Vol.93 (1985), pp.1155-1177.
15. Easterbrook, F.H.,"Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends."American Economic Review, Vol.74 (1984), pp.650-659.
16. Eaton, J., & H. Rosen, "Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration."Journal of Finance,Vol.38 (1983), pp.1489-1505.
17. Eisenhardt, K.M., "Control: Organization and Economic Approaches." Management Science,Vol.31 (1985), pp.134-149.
18. Eisenhardt, K.M., "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. " Academy of Management-Review, Vol.14 (1989), PP.57-74.
19. Fama, E.F., "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. "Journal of Finance, Vol.25 (1970) I pp.327-349.
20. Fama, E.F., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Political Economy,Vol.88 (April 1980), pp.288-307.
21. Fama, E.F., & M.C. Jensen, "Agency Problems and Residual Claims." Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.26 (1983a) ,pp.301-325.
22. Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26 (1983b),pp.327-349.
23. Fosberg, R.H.," Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring."Akron Business & Economic Review, Vol.20 (Summer 1989), pp.24-32.
24. Hill, Charles W.L. and S.A. Snell, "Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity," Academy of Management Journal , Vol.32 (1989), pp.25-46.
25. Holderness, C.G. and D.P. Sheehan, "The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20 (1988),pp.317-346.
26. Jensen, M.C., "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. "American Economic Review,Vol.76 (1986a), pp.323-329.
27. Jensen M.C., & W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3(1976),pp.305-360.
28. Jensen M.C., & R.S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control : Empirical Evidence. "Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.11 (1983), pp.5-50.
29. Kesner, I.F., "Directors` Stock Ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies." Jounral of Management, Vol.3(Fall1987), pp.499-508.
30.----, "Shareholders and the Issue of Corporate Governance: The Silenced Partner."Business Horizons, (Jul /Aug 1989), pp.16-21.
31. Kesner, I.F., & D. R. Dalton, "Board of Directors and the Checks and (Im)Balances of Corporate Governance." Business Horizons, (Sep/Oct 1986), ? pp. 17-23.
32. Knoeber, C.R."Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers."The American Economic Review, Vol76(1) (1986), pp.155-167.
33. Kosnik, R. "Greenmail: A Study in Board Performance in Corporate Governance."Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.32 (1987), pp.163-185.
34. Lambert,R.A., & D.F.Larcker, "Executive Compensation, Corporate Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth: A Review of the Evidence ."Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol.2 (1985), pp.6-22.
35. McEachern, W.A. "Corporate Control and Risk."Economic Inquiry, 1976, pp.270-278.
36. Mikkelson W.H., & M.M. Partch, "Managers` Voting Rights and Corporate Control."Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.25 (1989), pp.263-290.
37. Morck R., A. Shleifer & R.W.Vishny,"Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20(1988), pp.293-315.
38. Murali R., & J.B. Welch, "Agents, Owners, Control and Performance." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.16 (Summer 1989), pp.385-398.
39. Myers, C.S. "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics(November 1977), pp.147-176.
40. Myers, C.S., & N.F. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms Have Information That Investor Do Not Have."Journal of Financial Bconomics, Vol.20 (1984), pp.188-201.
41. Oviat B.M., "Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests. "Academy of Management Journal, Vol.
13 (1988), pp.214-225.
42. Pfeffer, J., "Size and Composition of Boards of Directors." Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.17 (1972), pp.218-228.
43. Ricardo-Campbell, R."Comments on the Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.26 (1983), pp.391-393.
44. Rechner,P.L., "Corporate Governance: Fact or Fiction?" Business Horizons, (Jul/Aug 1989), pp.11-15.
45. Salancik, G.R., & J. Pfeffer, "The Effects of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in U.S. Corporations. " Academy of Management Journal, Vol.23(1980), pp.653-664.
46. Singh, H., & F. Harianto, "Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes."Academy of Management Journal, Vol.32(1989), pp.7-24.
47. Smirlock M., & W. Marshall ,"Monopoly Power and Expense Preference Behavior: Theory and Evidence to the Contrary. "The Bell Journal of Economic, Vol.14(1983) ,pp.166-178.
48. Sorenson R., "The Seperation of Ownership and Control and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis." Southern Economic Journal, Vol.41 (1974). pp.145-148.
49. Walking R.A., & B.Long, "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare,& Takerover Bid Resistance." The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.15 (1984), pp.54-68.
50. Ware, R.F., "Performance of Manager-controlled versus Owner-controlled Firm inthe Food and Beverage Industry." Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,Vol.15 (1975), pp.81-92.
51. Weisbach, M.S., "Outside Directos and CEO Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics Vol.20 (1988), pp.431-460.
52. Williamson, O.E., "The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm," Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall., 1964.
53. Williamson, O.E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.,1975.
54. Wruck K.H., "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.23 (1989) ,pp.3-28.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004867
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳隆麒zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張明峰zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張明峰zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1991en_US
dc.date (日期) 1990en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-May-2016 17:00:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-May-2016 17:00:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-May-2016 17:00:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002004867en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/89573-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 企業管理學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 目前多數中、大型企業皆以『經營權與所有權分離』的組織型態來經營，以期達到專業化的目的。然而管程當局與企業股東之間的『代理問題』卻往往導致公司經營績效的降低。由於一般股東的股權過於分散，難以直接有效地監督管理當局，在此情形下，實有必要仰賴董事會來監督、考核企業經營者行為的正當性與決策的品質。因此，本論文的目的即在：zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第1章 緒論....................1
1.1 研究背景
1.2 研究動機..................... 2
1.3 研究目的. ....................3
1.4 研究範圍與對象. .................... 4
1.5 研究方法....................5
1.6 研究限制. .................... 5
第2章 文獻探討. .................... 7
2.1 前言..................... 7
2.2 代理理論.....................7
2.3 股權結構與公司績效.....................17
2.4 董事會..................... 20
2.5 實證文獻..................... 27
第3章 研究設計.....................4
3.1 抽樣方法與資料蒐集.....................44
3.2 研究假說.....................47
3.3 研究變數的定義與衡量.....................47
3.4 統計分析.....................48
第4章 實證結果與分析....................56
4.1 基本統計資料的分析. .................... 56
4.2 董事會持股比例對公司營運績效影響的驗證.....................61
4.3 董事會組成結構對經營績效、經營策略影響的驗證. ....................64
4.4 企業代理成本型態、董事會股權結與營運績效關係的驗證.....................69
第5章 結論與建議. .................... 76
5.1 研究結論.....................76
5.2 建議. ..................... 79
參考文獻.....................82		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004867en_US
dc.title (題名) 股權結構對公司績效影響之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部份
1 .呂永正，由代理成本的觀點驗證台灣上市公司所有權變動與融資決策之關係，東海大學企管研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十七年六月。
2. 李俊德，我國企業董事會功能之研究，政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十二年六月。
3. 林秀芬，企業統治類型與高階主管職能角色及企業經營策略關係之研究，政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十九年六月。
4. 林清山，多變量分析統計法，四版，台北，東華書局，民國七十五年。
5. 陳隆麒編譯，現代財務管理，修正版，台北，華泰書局，民國七十七年八月。
6. 黃俊英，多變量分析，三版，台北，華泰書局，民國七十七年。
7. 黃英陶，代理問題對公司資本結構影響之研究，成功大學工業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十六年六月。
8 .戴淵明，公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究一一台灣地區上市公司之實證分析，中興大學企管研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年六月。
9. 顏月珠，商用統計學，三版，台北，三民書局，民國七十六年。

英文部份
1. Alchian,A.A. & H.Demsetz,"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization." American Economic Review, Vol.52 (1972), pp.777-795.
2. Alderfer,C.P. "The Invisible Director on Corporate Board." Harvard Business Review, (Nov/Dec,1985), PP.38-52.
3. Amihud,Y., & B.Lev, "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, "Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.12 (1981),pp.823-837.
4. Barnea,A.,R.A.Haugen & L.W.Senbet, "Market Imperfections, Agency Problems, and Capital Structure: A review." Financial Management (Summer 1981),pp.7-22.
5. ---- , Agency Problems and Finanical Contracting, Prentice Hall Inc. ,Englewood Cliffs, 1985.
6. Baysinger, B., & R. E. Hoskisson, "The Composition of Boards of Di rectors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy."Academy of Management Review, Vol.15 (1990), pp.72-87.
7. Berle, A.A., & C.G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Commerce Clearing House,1932.
8. Brickley,J.A., & C.M. James, "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking." Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.30(1987), pp.161-180.
9. Copeland, T.E., & J.F. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
10. Crutchley, C.E., & R.S. Hansen, "A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends." Financial Management, (winter 1989), pp.36-46.
11. Dalton,D.R., & I.F. Kesner, "Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An International Perspectives." Journal of International Business Studies, (Fall 1987),pp.33-42.
12. Dayton,K.N.,"Corporate Governance: The Other Side of the Coin."Harvard Business Review, (Jan/Feb 1984), pp.34-37.
13. Demsetz H., "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26 (1983) ,pp.375-390.
14. Demsetz H. and K. Lehn, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences . "Journal of Political Economy,Vol.93 (1985), pp.1155-1177.
15. Easterbrook, F.H.,"Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends."American Economic Review, Vol.74 (1984), pp.650-659.
16. Eaton, J., & H. Rosen, "Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration."Journal of Finance,Vol.38 (1983), pp.1489-1505.
17. Eisenhardt, K.M., "Control: Organization and Economic Approaches." Management Science,Vol.31 (1985), pp.134-149.
18. Eisenhardt, K.M., "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. " Academy of Management-Review, Vol.14 (1989), PP.57-74.
19. Fama, E.F., "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. "Journal of Finance, Vol.25 (1970) I pp.327-349.
20. Fama, E.F., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Political Economy,Vol.88 (April 1980), pp.288-307.
21. Fama, E.F., & M.C. Jensen, "Agency Problems and Residual Claims." Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.26 (1983a) ,pp.301-325.
22. Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26 (1983b),pp.327-349.
23. Fosberg, R.H.," Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring."Akron Business & Economic Review, Vol.20 (Summer 1989), pp.24-32.
24. Hill, Charles W.L. and S.A. Snell, "Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity," Academy of Management Journal , Vol.32 (1989), pp.25-46.
25. Holderness, C.G. and D.P. Sheehan, "The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20 (1988),pp.317-346.
26. Jensen, M.C., "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. "American Economic Review,Vol.76 (1986a), pp.323-329.
27. Jensen M.C., & W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3(1976),pp.305-360.
28. Jensen M.C., & R.S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control : Empirical Evidence. "Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.11 (1983), pp.5-50.
29. Kesner, I.F., "Directors` Stock Ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies." Jounral of Management, Vol.3(Fall1987), pp.499-508.
30.----, "Shareholders and the Issue of Corporate Governance: The Silenced Partner."Business Horizons, (Jul /Aug 1989), pp.16-21.
31. Kesner, I.F., & D. R. Dalton, "Board of Directors and the Checks and (Im)Balances of Corporate Governance." Business Horizons, (Sep/Oct 1986), ? pp. 17-23.
32. Knoeber, C.R."Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers."The American Economic Review, Vol76(1) (1986), pp.155-167.
33. Kosnik, R. "Greenmail: A Study in Board Performance in Corporate Governance."Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.32 (1987), pp.163-185.
34. Lambert,R.A., & D.F.Larcker, "Executive Compensation, Corporate Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth: A Review of the Evidence ."Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol.2 (1985), pp.6-22.
35. McEachern, W.A. "Corporate Control and Risk."Economic Inquiry, 1976, pp.270-278.
36. Mikkelson W.H., & M.M. Partch, "Managers` Voting Rights and Corporate Control."Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.25 (1989), pp.263-290.
37. Morck R., A. Shleifer & R.W.Vishny,"Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20(1988), pp.293-315.
38. Murali R., & J.B. Welch, "Agents, Owners, Control and Performance." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.16 (Summer 1989), pp.385-398.
39. Myers, C.S. "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics(November 1977), pp.147-176.
40. Myers, C.S., & N.F. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms Have Information That Investor Do Not Have."Journal of Financial Bconomics, Vol.20 (1984), pp.188-201.
41. Oviat B.M., "Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests. "Academy of Management Journal, Vol.
13 (1988), pp.214-225.
42. Pfeffer, J., "Size and Composition of Boards of Directors." Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.17 (1972), pp.218-228.
43. Ricardo-Campbell, R."Comments on the Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm."Journal of Law & Economics, Vol.26 (1983), pp.391-393.
44. Rechner,P.L., "Corporate Governance: Fact or Fiction?" Business Horizons, (Jul/Aug 1989), pp.11-15.
45. Salancik, G.R., & J. Pfeffer, "The Effects of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in U.S. Corporations. " Academy of Management Journal, Vol.23(1980), pp.653-664.
46. Singh, H., & F. Harianto, "Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes."Academy of Management Journal, Vol.32(1989), pp.7-24.
47. Smirlock M., & W. Marshall ,"Monopoly Power and Expense Preference Behavior: Theory and Evidence to the Contrary. "The Bell Journal of Economic, Vol.14(1983) ,pp.166-178.
48. Sorenson R., "The Seperation of Ownership and Control and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis." Southern Economic Journal, Vol.41 (1974). pp.145-148.
49. Walking R.A., & B.Long, "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare,& Takerover Bid Resistance." The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.15 (1984), pp.54-68.
50. Ware, R.F., "Performance of Manager-controlled versus Owner-controlled Firm inthe Food and Beverage Industry." Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,Vol.15 (1975), pp.81-92.
51. Weisbach, M.S., "Outside Directos and CEO Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics Vol.20 (1988), pp.431-460.
52. Williamson, O.E., "The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm," Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall., 1964.
53. Williamson, O.E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.,1975.
54. Wruck K.H., "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.23 (1989) ,pp.3-28.		zh_TW