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題名 具降低成本誘因的電價政策之研究
作者 李怡宗
貢獻者 劉維琪
李怡宗
日期 1989
1988
上傳時間 3-May-2016 14:12:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 論文摘要
基於電力事業的獨佔特性及對國計民生有重大之影響力，乃需為電價費率之制定，設計一妥適之管制政策，以鼓勵電力事業降低成本、接高效率，進而達成消費者剩餘最大之目標。本研究依代理理論，探討政府如何擬訂電價政策，誘使電力事業努力於降低成本，以避免道德危驗發生。經探討單期、多期、及蒐集成本資訊的情況後，所得之重要結論如下:
一、在單期下，政府可藉由實際變動成本的多寡，來推論電力事業有否努力於降低成本，並透過次佳訂價政策加以懲處。
二、在多期模式中，次佳訂價政策將以後期的利潤作為獎懲工具，以強化電力事業於前期提昇降低成本投資水準的誘因。此時，會產生成本平滑化及分散效果之現象，這對穩定電價和物價、以及緩和道億危險均具有良好的效果。
三、加入蒐集成本資訊之考慮後，次佳訂價政策將需論及更多的因素，方能緩和道德危臉問題。這些因素包括了:變動成本的分配型態、未來原料成本資訊的分配型態、電力事業蒐集資訊之系統類型、法定盈餘水準等等。
具降低成本誘因的電價政策之研究
參考文獻 參考文獻
中文部分:
1、丘駿飛，道德危險最適尖峰訂價之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
2、丘毅與孫克難，"資訊不對稱下公用事業與管制法則"七十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月，(台北:中華民國能源經濟學會),pp~191-203。
3、連文杰，最適尖峰定價與誘因問題之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
4、張四立，"兼顧效率與公平的能源訂價法則─福利經濟取向”，七十五年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十五年十二月(台北:中華民國能游說經濟學會),pp.91-104。
5、陳澤義，獨佔管制廠商行為分析─台灣電力事業實證研究。私立東吳大學經濟學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十二年七月。
6、劉維琪著，資訊不對稱情況下公用事業訂價模式，七十五年三月初版，中國經濟企業研究所出版。
7、劉維琪，"中華民國電力事業訂價也之商榷"，七t十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月(台北：中華民國能源話經濟學會),PP.174-184。
8、;鄭瓊英，成本遞減產業訂價問題之研究，國立政治大學財政學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十三年七月。
9、經濟日報出版，民國77年中華民國經濟年鑑。
英文部分:
1、張國平，”Nonlinear Pricing with Rate-of-Return Regulation."七十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月，(台北：中華民國能源經濟學會),pp.185-190.
2 劉維琪與連文杰，"Public Utility Pricing and Investment Under Cost Uncertainty." Proceedings of the" First International Conference on Comparative Management. Taipei. 1988.
3 Albon. Robert P. and Kirby. Michael G., “Cost-Padding in Profit-Regulated Firms.” the Economic Record, March 1983. PP. 16-27.
4 Averch. "H. and Johnson. L., Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraints." American Economic Review, 1962, pp. 1052-1069.
5 Baron, D.P., "Regulatory Strategies Under Asymmetric Information," in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom (ed.). Bayesian Models in Economic Theery. North-Holland, 1982.
6 Baron, D.P. and Besanko, D., "Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship." Information Economics and Policy, 1984, pp.267-302.
7 Baron, D.P. and DeBondt, R.R., "Fuel Adjustment Mechanisms and Economic Efficiency." Journal of Industrial Economics, 1979, pp. 243-261.
8 Baron, David and Myerson, Roger, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.” Econometrica. July 1982, pp. 911-930.
9 Baron, D.P. arid Taggart, R.Jr., “Regulatory Pricing Procedures and Economic Incentives,” in M.A. Crew (ed.), "Issues in Public Utility Prcing and Regulation. Lexington" Books, Lexington. Massachusetts (1980), pp. 27-49.
10 Baumol W.J. and Bradford, D.F., "Peak-Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint." Journal of Political Economy, Vol 80, 1970, pp. 662~679.
11" Besanko, David, "On the Use of Revenue Requirements Regulation under Imperfect Information," in M. A. Crew (ed.), "Analyzing the Impact of Regulatory Change in Public Utilities, Lexington. Massachusetts, pp. 39-58.
12, Chi-Yuan Liang. `"Energy Demand Management in the Republic of China, "Monograph Series, No. 32. June 1987.
13, Crew. M.A. and Kleinderfer. Paul R., Public Unility Pricing, St. Martin`s Press. 1979, New York.
14, Demski, Joel S. and Sappington. David E., "Delegated Expertise. "working Paper, Yale University, August 1985.
15 Fama. E., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of Political Economy, April 1980, pp. 288-307.
16, Gravelle. H.S.E., "Incentives Efficiency and Control in Public Firms." Seitschrift filr Nationalo Konomie, 42, supplement 2 (1982). pp. 79-104.
17, Holmstrom. B., `"Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, pp. 74-91.
18 Jewitt, Ian, "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problem." Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 56. No.5, September 1988, pp. 1177-1190.
19, Joskow, Paul L. and Schmalensee, R., "Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities" Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 4, No.1. Fall 1986. pp. 1-49.
20 Lambert. Richard A., "Long-Term Contracts and Moral -Hazard." Bell Journal of Economics. 1982. pp.441-452.
21, Lambert. R. A. `"Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium Behavior. The Accounting Review. Vol. LIX. No.4. October 1984. pp. 608-619.
22 Lambert, R.A., "Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects." Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 17, No. 1, September 1986. Pp. 77-88.
23 Lee. Wayne Y. and Thakor. Anjan V., "Regulatory Pricing and Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information about Cost, 其餘不詳
24 Lewis. Tracy and Sappington. • David. "Regulating with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Rand Journal of Economics. Winter 1988.
25 Lewis. Tracy R. and Sappington. David E.M., "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand." American Economic Review, Vol. 78. No.5. 1988. pp. 986-998.
. 26 Malcomson. James M. and Spinnewyn, Frans, "The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem." Review of Economic Studies. Vol. LV. 1988. pp. 391-408.
27 Maurice Marchand. Pierre Pestiteau and Henry Tulkens, The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concept and Measurement. (North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B.
V, 1984. pp. 3-42.
28 Radner. R., "Does Decentralization Promote Wasteful Conflict ?" Bell Laboratories Economic Discussion Paper. 1980.
29 Ramsey. F., "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation." • Economic Journal, Vol. 37, 1927. pp. 47-61.
30 Rees. R., Op. cit., pp. 22.
31 Rogerson. William P., "The Role of Reputation in a Repeated Agency Problem Involving Information Transmission." IMSS Techical Report. No. 377. 1982.
32 Rogerson. William P., "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems." Economica, Vol.53, No.6, Nov. 1985. pp. 1357-1367.
33 Ross. Stephen A., "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals` Problem," American Economic Association, Vol. 63. No.2. May 1973, pp. 134-139.
34 Rubinstein. A. and Yaari, M., "Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard." Journal of Economic Theory, 1984.
35 Sappington. David E. M. and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Information and Regulation," Working paper, Bell Communication Research. Jan. 1986.
36 Silverberg, E., "The Le Chatelier Principle as a Corollary to a Generalized Envelop Theory." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, June 1971, pp. 146-155.
37 Vogelsang, Land Finsing, J., "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firm." Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. pp. 157-171.
38 Weitzman, M.L., "Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation" American Economic Review. 1978, PP. 683-691.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005566
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 劉維琪zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李怡宗zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 李怡宗zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1989en_US
dc.date (日期) 1988en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-May-2016 14:12:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-May-2016 14:12:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-May-2016 14:12:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002005566en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90057-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 企業管理學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 論文摘要
基於電力事業的獨佔特性及對國計民生有重大之影響力，乃需為電價費率之制定，設計一妥適之管制政策，以鼓勵電力事業降低成本、接高效率，進而達成消費者剩餘最大之目標。本研究依代理理論，探討政府如何擬訂電價政策，誘使電力事業努力於降低成本，以避免道德危驗發生。經探討單期、多期、及蒐集成本資訊的情況後，所得之重要結論如下:
一、在單期下，政府可藉由實際變動成本的多寡，來推論電力事業有否努力於降低成本，並透過次佳訂價政策加以懲處。
二、在多期模式中，次佳訂價政策將以後期的利潤作為獎懲工具，以強化電力事業於前期提昇降低成本投資水準的誘因。此時，會產生成本平滑化及分散效果之現象，這對穩定電價和物價、以及緩和道億危險均具有良好的效果。
三、加入蒐集成本資訊之考慮後，次佳訂價政策將需論及更多的因素，方能緩和道德危臉問題。這些因素包括了:變動成本的分配型態、未來原料成本資訊的分配型態、電力事業蒐集資訊之系統類型、法定盈餘水準等等。
具降低成本誘因的電價政策之研究		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄…………IV
圖表目錄………VI
第一章 導論………1
第二章 第一節 研究動機………1
第二節 研究目的及研究方法………3
第三節 問題陳述`………3
第四節 研究設計………5
第五節 本研究之架構………8
本章附註………10
第二章 文獻探討………13
第一節 電力事業的訂價政策………13
第二節 本研究探討之問題………20
本章附註………24
第三章 降低成本投資資訊不對稱下之單期電價政策………29
第一節 基本模式與假設前提………29
第二節 完全資訊下之最適訂價………34
第三節 道德危險下之次佳訂價………40
本章附註………47
第四章 理論模式之引申………52
第一節 多期下具降低成本誘因的訂價………52
第二節 授權蒐集資訊下的訂價………66
本章附註………79
第五章 結論………82
第一節 結論與建議………82
第二節 未來研究方向………83
本章附註………87
附錄A………88
附錄B………91
附錄C………92
附錄D………95
參考文獻………97
圖表目錄
表1-1 歷年來台電公司的營運成本佔營業收入之出率………2
表1-2 台電公司歷年來會計年度別發電燃料成本佔絕成本之比率………2
圖1-1 具降低成本誘因之最適電價政策整體研究架構………6
圖1-2 道德危險模式結合降低成本訂價政策架構圖………7
圖1-3 道德危臉模式、專家知識模式結合降低成本訂價制度架構………8
圖2-1 各有關電力事業研究主題間的關條架構………13
表2-1 本研究與相關文獻研究之比較………23
圖3-1 完全資訊及道德危險訂價模式………30
圖3-2 當e變動時，變動成本C之機率密度函數ƒ(cle)與累積分配函數F(cle)的變動情形………31
圖3-3 完全資訊下，降低成本訂價政策架構圖………34
圖4-1 在第t期中，變動成本c^t的機率密度函數ƒ (c^t/e^t)與累積分配函數F(c^t/e^t)之型態………53
圖4-2 完全資訊及道德危險下的兩期訂價模式………56
圖4-3 當q變動時，ƒ (cle，y，7)的變動情形………67
圖4-4 需蒐集成本資訊下的訂價模式………68		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005566en_US
dc.title (題名) 具降低成本誘因的電價政策之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
中文部分:
1、丘駿飛，道德危險最適尖峰訂價之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
2、丘毅與孫克難，"資訊不對稱下公用事業與管制法則"七十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月，(台北:中華民國能源經濟學會),pp~191-203。
3、連文杰，最適尖峰定價與誘因問題之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
4、張四立，"兼顧效率與公平的能源訂價法則─福利經濟取向”，七十五年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十五年十二月(台北:中華民國能游說經濟學會),pp.91-104。
5、陳澤義，獨佔管制廠商行為分析─台灣電力事業實證研究。私立東吳大學經濟學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十二年七月。
6、劉維琪著，資訊不對稱情況下公用事業訂價模式，七十五年三月初版，中國經濟企業研究所出版。
7、劉維琪，"中華民國電力事業訂價也之商榷"，七t十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月(台北：中華民國能源話經濟學會),PP.174-184。
8、;鄭瓊英，成本遞減產業訂價問題之研究，國立政治大學財政學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十三年七月。
9、經濟日報出版，民國77年中華民國經濟年鑑。
英文部分:
1、張國平，”Nonlinear Pricing with Rate-of-Return Regulation."七十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月，(台北：中華民國能源經濟學會),pp.185-190.
2 劉維琪與連文杰，"Public Utility Pricing and Investment Under Cost Uncertainty." Proceedings of the" First International Conference on Comparative Management. Taipei. 1988.
3 Albon. Robert P. and Kirby. Michael G., “Cost-Padding in Profit-Regulated Firms.” the Economic Record, March 1983. PP. 16-27.
4 Averch. "H. and Johnson. L., Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraints." American Economic Review, 1962, pp. 1052-1069.
5 Baron, D.P., "Regulatory Strategies Under Asymmetric Information," in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom (ed.). Bayesian Models in Economic Theery. North-Holland, 1982.
6 Baron, D.P. and Besanko, D., "Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship." Information Economics and Policy, 1984, pp.267-302.
7 Baron, D.P. and DeBondt, R.R., "Fuel Adjustment Mechanisms and Economic Efficiency." Journal of Industrial Economics, 1979, pp. 243-261.
8 Baron, David and Myerson, Roger, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.” Econometrica. July 1982, pp. 911-930.
9 Baron, D.P. arid Taggart, R.Jr., “Regulatory Pricing Procedures and Economic Incentives,” in M.A. Crew (ed.), "Issues in Public Utility Prcing and Regulation. Lexington" Books, Lexington. Massachusetts (1980), pp. 27-49.
10 Baumol W.J. and Bradford, D.F., "Peak-Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint." Journal of Political Economy, Vol 80, 1970, pp. 662~679.
11" Besanko, David, "On the Use of Revenue Requirements Regulation under Imperfect Information," in M. A. Crew (ed.), "Analyzing the Impact of Regulatory Change in Public Utilities, Lexington. Massachusetts, pp. 39-58.
12, Chi-Yuan Liang. `"Energy Demand Management in the Republic of China, "Monograph Series, No. 32. June 1987.
13, Crew. M.A. and Kleinderfer. Paul R., Public Unility Pricing, St. Martin`s Press. 1979, New York.
14, Demski, Joel S. and Sappington. David E., "Delegated Expertise. "working Paper, Yale University, August 1985.
15 Fama. E., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of Political Economy, April 1980, pp. 288-307.
16, Gravelle. H.S.E., "Incentives Efficiency and Control in Public Firms." Seitschrift filr Nationalo Konomie, 42, supplement 2 (1982). pp. 79-104.
17, Holmstrom. B., `"Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, pp. 74-91.
18 Jewitt, Ian, "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problem." Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 56. No.5, September 1988, pp. 1177-1190.
19, Joskow, Paul L. and Schmalensee, R., "Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities" Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 4, No.1. Fall 1986. pp. 1-49.
20 Lambert. Richard A., "Long-Term Contracts and Moral -Hazard." Bell Journal of Economics. 1982. pp.441-452.
21, Lambert. R. A. `"Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium Behavior. The Accounting Review. Vol. LIX. No.4. October 1984. pp. 608-619.
22 Lambert, R.A., "Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects." Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 17, No. 1, September 1986. Pp. 77-88.
23 Lee. Wayne Y. and Thakor. Anjan V., "Regulatory Pricing and Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information about Cost, 其餘不詳
24 Lewis. Tracy and Sappington. • David. "Regulating with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Rand Journal of Economics. Winter 1988.
25 Lewis. Tracy R. and Sappington. David E.M., "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand." American Economic Review, Vol. 78. No.5. 1988. pp. 986-998.
. 26 Malcomson. James M. and Spinnewyn, Frans, "The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem." Review of Economic Studies. Vol. LV. 1988. pp. 391-408.
27 Maurice Marchand. Pierre Pestiteau and Henry Tulkens, The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concept and Measurement. (North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B.
V, 1984. pp. 3-42.
28 Radner. R., "Does Decentralization Promote Wasteful Conflict ?" Bell Laboratories Economic Discussion Paper. 1980.
29 Ramsey. F., "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation." • Economic Journal, Vol. 37, 1927. pp. 47-61.
30 Rees. R., Op. cit., pp. 22.
31 Rogerson. William P., "The Role of Reputation in a Repeated Agency Problem Involving Information Transmission." IMSS Techical Report. No. 377. 1982.
32 Rogerson. William P., "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems." Economica, Vol.53, No.6, Nov. 1985. pp. 1357-1367.
33 Ross. Stephen A., "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals` Problem," American Economic Association, Vol. 63. No.2. May 1973, pp. 134-139.
34 Rubinstein. A. and Yaari, M., "Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard." Journal of Economic Theory, 1984.
35 Sappington. David E. M. and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Information and Regulation," Working paper, Bell Communication Research. Jan. 1986.
36 Silverberg, E., "The Le Chatelier Principle as a Corollary to a Generalized Envelop Theory." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, June 1971, pp. 146-155.
37 Vogelsang, Land Finsing, J., "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firm." Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. pp. 157-171.
38 Weitzman, M.L., "Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation" American Economic Review. 1978, PP. 683-691.		zh_TW