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題名 運用代理理論在審計契約行為上之研究
作者 張裕銘
貢獻者 鄭丁旺
張裕銘
日期 1988
上傳時間 4-May-2016 14:23:23 (UTC+8)
摘要 論文提要內容:
參考文獻 參考書目\n一、中文書籍\n1.石齊平著:當代個體經濟學理論與應用，自行出版，民國74年元月。\n2.Robert Albanese; David D. Van Fleet: Organizational Behavior: A Managerial Viewpoint, CBS College Publishing，1983，吳定等譯，天一出版。\n3.Meigs W. B.; O. R. Whittington; R. F. Meigs : Principles of Auditing(1985)8ed，馮拙人譯(台北:大中國圖書公司，民國74年7月)。\n4.ALPHA C. Chiang: Fundamenta1 Methods of Mathematical Economics 2ed李嘉淦譯:基礎經濟數學，上下冊，(國立編譯館主編，東華書局出版，民國72年1月3版。)\n5.馬忠芳著:一般財務審計報告之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國64年1月。\n6.陳耀連著:現代審計成長與專業會計制度之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國66年7月。\n7.王金來著:應用代理理論建立均衡參與預算模式之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國74年6月。\n8.陳惠玲著:資訊不對稱情況下之轉撥計價。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國74年6月。\n9.李長聯著:會計師對財務報表使用者法律責任之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國75年6月。\n\n二、英文書籍:\n1. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. A.(台北，天一出版，民國74.年)。\n2. Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet: Agency Problems and Financial Contracting, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, U.S.A. 1985.\n\n3. Antle Ricky Lee: Moral Hazard and Auditor Contracts: An Approach to Auditors` Legal Liability and Independence. Ph.D. dissertation, Standford University, 1981.\n4. Carmichael D.R. and John J. Willingham: Perspectives in Auditing 4 ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985.\n5. Evans J. : Economic Models of Auditors‘ in the Accountability Environment, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornegie-Mellon, University, 1979.\n6. John J. Willinghan, and D.R. Camichael: Auditing Concepts and Methods, 2ed McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.\n7. Ko Wansuk Matthew: Auditors` Incentive, Legal Liability and Reputation Under Information Asymmetry, Ph.D, dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985.\n8. Magee R. : Employment Contracts and Accounting: The Auditor as an Economic Agent, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1977.\n9. Noel J . C. : Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Auditing , Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1981.\n10. Richard E.J. , Darrell L.M. and A. Schmitz: Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy , (台北，華泰翻印，民國72年)。\n三、英文期刊：\n1. Akerlot J. "The Market for `Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics , August, 1970, PP. 488-500.\n2. Alchion Armem A., and Demsetz Harold: "Production, Information Costs, and Economics Organization", American Economic Review LX11, NO. 5, Dec. 1972, PP. 777-795.\n3, Anthony A. Atkinson: "Standard Setting In An Agency" Management Science, Vol. 24, No. 13, Sept. 1978, PP. 1350-1361.\n4. Bengt Holmstrom: "Moral hazard and observability" The Bell Journal of Economics , Spring 1979, PP. 74-91.\n5. Brown, J. "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability", Journal of Legal Studies, June 1973, PP. 323-349.\n6, Dana Simunic: "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring, 1980, PP. 161-189.\n7, David S. Ng: "An Information Economics Analysis of Financial Reporting and External Auditing", The Accounting Review. Vol. L111, No. 4, Oct. 1978, PP. 910-920.\n8. David S. Ng and Jan Stoeckenius "Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17, Supplement 1979 PP. 1-29.\n9, Donald M. Roberts: "Discussion of Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17,Supplement 1979, PP. 30-32.\n10. Douglas V. Dejong and John H. Smith: "The Determination of Audit Responsibilities: An Application of Agency Theory". Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1984.\n11. Eugene F. Fama: "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" Journal of Political Economy, April 1980, PP. 288-307.\n12. Froystein Gjesdal: "Accounting for Stewardship" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 208-231..\n13. Furubotn E.G. and S. Pejovich "Property rights and Economics theory: A survey of recent literature", Journal of Economic Literature X, Dec. 1972, PP. 1137-1162.\n14. Harris M. and A. Raviv: "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory 20(1979), PP- 231-259.\n15. Joel S. Demski and-R.J. Swieringa “A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem" The Accounting Review, July 1974, PP. 506-513.\n16. Joel S. Demski and Gerald A. Feltham: "Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems" The Accounting Review Vol. L111, No. 2, April 1978 PP. 336-359.\n17. John H. Evans III: "Optimal Contracts. with Costly Conditional Auditing" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, Supplement 1980, PP. 108-128.\n18. Joseph E. Stiglitz: "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes towards a Theory of Hierarchy" The Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1975, PP.552-579.\n19. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Size and Audit Quality" Journal of Accounting & Economics, 3(1981) PP. 183-199.\n20. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Independence, Low Balling" and Disclosure Regulation" Journal of Accounting & Economics 3(1981) PP. 113-127.\n21. Michael C. Knapp: "Audit Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Press" The Accounting Review, Vol. LX, No. 2, April 1985, PP. 202-211.\n22. Michael C.J. and W.M. Mekling: "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3(1976) PP. 305-360.\n23. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling: "Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of financial Economics\n3(1976) PP. 305-360.\n24. Ng, David S. "Supply and Demand of Auditing Services and the Nature of Regulations in Auditing", Arthur Young Professors` Roundtable Conference Proceedinfs, 1978, PP. 99-124.\n25. Ordover, J. "Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents", The Journal of Legal Studies, June 1978, PP. 243-261,\n26. Richard P. Brief "The Accountants` Responsibility in Historical Perspective" The Accounting Review, April 1975, PP. 285-297.\n27. Robert Wilson: "The Theory of Syndicates" Econometrica,\nVol. 36, No. 1, January 1968, PP. 119-133.\n28. Robert Wilson: "Auditing: Perspectives from Multiperson Decision Theory", The Accounting Review, Vol. LV111m No. 2, April 1983, PP. 303-318.\n29. Robert S. Kaplan: "The Evolution of Management Accounting", The Accounting Review. Vol. LIX No. 3 July 1984, PP. 390-418.\n30. Scott W., "Auditors` Loss Functions Implicit in Consumption-Imvestment Models," Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 1975, PP.98-117.\n31. Simon, M. "Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and Product Quality", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 171-184.\n32. Simon Elliot B. : "Can the auditor be truly independent?” Accountancy (June 1980) PP. 105-106.\n33. Stanley Baiman, "Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey", Journal of Accounting Literature, Spring 1982, PP. 155-213.\n34. Stephen A. Ross: "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals` Problem", American Economic Association, May 1973, Vol. 63, No. 2, PP. 134-139.\n35. Steven Shavell: "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, PP. 55-73.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005793
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 鄭丁旺zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張裕銘zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張裕銘zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1988en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-May-2016 14:23:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-May-2016 14:23:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-May-2016 14:23:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002005793en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=102403-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 論文提要內容:zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄\n第一章 緒論………1\n第一節 研究動機與目的………1\n第二節 研究範圍………2\n第三節 研究方法與限制………3\n第四節 論文架構………3\n第二章 代理理論………5\n第一節 財產權理論………5\n第二節 代理問題………9\n第三節 基本代理模型………15\n第四節 代理模型之缺失與代理理論的限制………20\n第五節 本章彙述………25\n第三章 審計需求………30\n第一節 審計的發生………30\n第二節 審計需求與財務資訊之重要性………41\n第三節 審計價值、審計努力與事務所規模之分析………51\n第四節 本章彙述………64\n第四章 審計人員之誘因及其法律責任………73\n第一節 有關法律責任之研究………74\n第二節 模型之建立與假設………78\n第三節 個別決策行為………83\n第四節 行為分析………92\n第五章 結論………115\n第一節 結論與建議………115\n第二節 未來研究方向之建議………118\n參考書目………120\n\n圖表目次\n圖表3-1 審計機率樹………54\n圖表3-2 審計努力之需求曲?………55\n圖表3-3 P_m(P_A2)曲?………60\n圖表3-4 事務所規模對管理說謊之影響………61\n圖表4-1 法律責任制………76\n圖表4-2 f(z/x)之三度間圖………81\n圖表4-3 本人之決策樹………87\n圖表4-4 制式與混合均衡………97zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005793en_US
dc.title (題名) 運用代理理論在審計契約行為上之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考書目\n一、中文書籍\n1.石齊平著:當代個體經濟學理論與應用，自行出版，民國74年元月。\n2.Robert Albanese; David D. Van Fleet: Organizational Behavior: A Managerial Viewpoint, CBS College Publishing，1983，吳定等譯，天一出版。\n3.Meigs W. B.; O. R. Whittington; R. F. Meigs : Principles of Auditing(1985)8ed，馮拙人譯(台北:大中國圖書公司，民國74年7月)。\n4.ALPHA C. Chiang: Fundamenta1 Methods of Mathematical Economics 2ed李嘉淦譯:基礎經濟數學，上下冊，(國立編譯館主編，東華書局出版，民國72年1月3版。)\n5.馬忠芳著:一般財務審計報告之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國64年1月。\n6.陳耀連著:現代審計成長與專業會計制度之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國66年7月。\n7.王金來著:應用代理理論建立均衡參與預算模式之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國74年6月。\n8.陳惠玲著:資訊不對稱情況下之轉撥計價。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國74年6月。\n9.李長聯著:會計師對財務報表使用者法律責任之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國75年6月。\n\n二、英文書籍:\n1. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. A.(台北，天一出版，民國74.年)。\n2. Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet: Agency Problems and Financial Contracting, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, U.S.A. 1985.\n\n3. Antle Ricky Lee: Moral Hazard and Auditor Contracts: An Approach to Auditors` Legal Liability and Independence. Ph.D. dissertation, Standford University, 1981.\n4. Carmichael D.R. and John J. Willingham: Perspectives in Auditing 4 ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985.\n5. Evans J. : Economic Models of Auditors‘ in the Accountability Environment, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornegie-Mellon, University, 1979.\n6. John J. Willinghan, and D.R. Camichael: Auditing Concepts and Methods, 2ed McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.\n7. Ko Wansuk Matthew: Auditors` Incentive, Legal Liability and Reputation Under Information Asymmetry, Ph.D, dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985.\n8. Magee R. : Employment Contracts and Accounting: The Auditor as an Economic Agent, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1977.\n9. Noel J . C. : Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Auditing , Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1981.\n10. Richard E.J. , Darrell L.M. and A. Schmitz: Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy , (台北，華泰翻印，民國72年)。\n三、英文期刊：\n1. Akerlot J. "The Market for `Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics , August, 1970, PP. 488-500.\n2. Alchion Armem A., and Demsetz Harold: "Production, Information Costs, and Economics Organization", American Economic Review LX11, NO. 5, Dec. 1972, PP. 777-795.\n3, Anthony A. Atkinson: "Standard Setting In An Agency" Management Science, Vol. 24, No. 13, Sept. 1978, PP. 1350-1361.\n4. Bengt Holmstrom: "Moral hazard and observability" The Bell Journal of Economics , Spring 1979, PP. 74-91.\n5. Brown, J. "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability", Journal of Legal Studies, June 1973, PP. 323-349.\n6, Dana Simunic: "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring, 1980, PP. 161-189.\n7, David S. Ng: "An Information Economics Analysis of Financial Reporting and External Auditing", The Accounting Review. Vol. L111, No. 4, Oct. 1978, PP. 910-920.\n8. David S. Ng and Jan Stoeckenius "Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17, Supplement 1979 PP. 1-29.\n9, Donald M. Roberts: "Discussion of Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17,Supplement 1979, PP. 30-32.\n10. Douglas V. Dejong and John H. Smith: "The Determination of Audit Responsibilities: An Application of Agency Theory". Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1984.\n11. Eugene F. Fama: "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" Journal of Political Economy, April 1980, PP. 288-307.\n12. Froystein Gjesdal: "Accounting for Stewardship" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 208-231..\n13. Furubotn E.G. and S. Pejovich "Property rights and Economics theory: A survey of recent literature", Journal of Economic Literature X, Dec. 1972, PP. 1137-1162.\n14. Harris M. and A. Raviv: "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory 20(1979), PP- 231-259.\n15. Joel S. Demski and-R.J. Swieringa “A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem" The Accounting Review, July 1974, PP. 506-513.\n16. Joel S. Demski and Gerald A. Feltham: "Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems" The Accounting Review Vol. L111, No. 2, April 1978 PP. 336-359.\n17. John H. Evans III: "Optimal Contracts. with Costly Conditional Auditing" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, Supplement 1980, PP. 108-128.\n18. Joseph E. Stiglitz: "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes towards a Theory of Hierarchy" The Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1975, PP.552-579.\n19. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Size and Audit Quality" Journal of Accounting & Economics, 3(1981) PP. 183-199.\n20. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Independence, Low Balling" and Disclosure Regulation" Journal of Accounting & Economics 3(1981) PP. 113-127.\n21. Michael C. Knapp: "Audit Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Press" The Accounting Review, Vol. LX, No. 2, April 1985, PP. 202-211.\n22. Michael C.J. and W.M. Mekling: "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3(1976) PP. 305-360.\n23. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling: "Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of financial Economics\n3(1976) PP. 305-360.\n24. Ng, David S. "Supply and Demand of Auditing Services and the Nature of Regulations in Auditing", Arthur Young Professors` Roundtable Conference Proceedinfs, 1978, PP. 99-124.\n25. Ordover, J. "Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents", The Journal of Legal Studies, June 1978, PP. 243-261,\n26. Richard P. Brief "The Accountants` Responsibility in Historical Perspective" The Accounting Review, April 1975, PP. 285-297.\n27. Robert Wilson: "The Theory of Syndicates" Econometrica,\nVol. 36, No. 1, January 1968, PP. 119-133.\n28. Robert Wilson: "Auditing: Perspectives from Multiperson Decision Theory", The Accounting Review, Vol. LV111m No. 2, April 1983, PP. 303-318.\n29. Robert S. Kaplan: "The Evolution of Management Accounting", The Accounting Review. Vol. LIX No. 3 July 1984, PP. 390-418.\n30. Scott W., "Auditors` Loss Functions Implicit in Consumption-Imvestment Models," Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 1975, PP.98-117.\n31. Simon, M. "Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and Product Quality", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 171-184.\n32. Simon Elliot B. : "Can the auditor be truly independent?” Accountancy (June 1980) PP. 105-106.\n33. Stanley Baiman, "Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey", Journal of Accounting Literature, Spring 1982, PP. 155-213.\n34. Stephen A. Ross: "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals` Problem", American Economic Association, May 1973, Vol. 63, No. 2, PP. 134-139.\n35. Steven Shavell: "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, PP. 55-73.zh_TW