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題名 投資抵減與其他經濟誘因污染防治政策之比較 作者 徐麗振 貢獻者 林全
徐麗振日期 1989 上傳時間 4-五月-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8) 摘要 摘要 控制生產性汚染行為之政策主要有四種:課稅、補貼、管制(含懲罰)，與可轉讓汚染權等。其中補貼被認為是控制汚染的有效手段，原因在於廠商會將補貼視為一種機會成本，與課稅一樣使邊際成本提高，因而減少汚染。但此種說法受到許多經濟學家質疑，其原因有二:1.由於以廠商目前的汚染水準作為計算補貼之汙染基準，補貼會使廠商提高它目前的污染水準,以獲取更多的補貼;2.對接受補貼的產業而言，補貼將形成超額利潤，誘使其他廠商加入該行業，結果產業總污染增加。一般理論研究，多假設補貼金額大小係按生產者汙染量之減少程度而定;但實務上，各國對污染控制之補貼方式，卻未必與上述理論假設一致。例如，對防治污染機器設備給予投資抵減，便是我國與許多國家常採用的一種補貼政策。由於補貼方式不同，故對污染量之控制效果也就不同。而本文之目的，即在比較採行投資抵減政策，與採行其他主要污染控制政策，對污染性生產行為的不同影響。 本文除第一章為緒論外，第二章旨在整理及說明過去學者們討論過的不同補貼方法，對個別廠商，以及整體社會之汙染水準的影響效果。第三章利用個別廠商之極大化行為假設，建立有關模型，並比較投資抵減與一般性補貼政策，以及投資抵減與課稅政策，對個別廠商產出及汙染水準的不同影響。第四章則就總體產業面，分析前述不同汙染控制政策的影響效果。第五章為結論。 參考文獻 參考文獻一、 中文部分:侯繼明等，鼓勵污染防治，獎勵投資條例之經濟效益評估分項報告(6)，經濟部工業局委託研究計劃，中華經濟研究院，民國76年8月。二、英文部份:1. Baumol,W. J., and W. E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life, N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979.2. ─── and ─── , The Theory of Environmental Policy,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988.3. Bramhall,D. F., and E. S. Mil1s, "A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments" Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.3, 1966, pp.615-616.4. Burrows,P., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluters Subsidies,Regulation and the Size of a Polluting Industry, "Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.3, 1979,pp.494-501.5. Car1ton,D. W., and G. C. Loury, "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No.3, 1980,pp.559-566.6. Coase,R. H., "The Problem of Social Cost, " Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp.1-44.7. Dewees,D. N., C. K. Everson, and W. A. Sims, Economic Analysis of environmental Policies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.8. Fisher,A. C., Resources and Environmental Economics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.9. Freeman,A. M.,III, "Bribes and Charges: Some Comments, "Water Resources Research, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967, pp.287-289.10. Gould,J. R., "Total Conditions in the Analysis of External Effects, " Economic Journal, Vol.87, No. 347,1977, pp.558-563.11. Kamien,M. I., N. L. Schwartz, and F. T. Dolbear, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.1, 1966a, pp.147~157.12. ───, ─── and ───, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges: Reply," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No.4, 1966b, pp.856-857.13. Kneese,A.V., The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.14. ─── and B. T. Bower, Managing Water Quality, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.15. Mestelman,S., "Some Conditions for the Failure of Corrective Production Subsidies, " International Economic Review, Vol.13, No.3, 1972, pp.476-487.16. ───, "Corrective Production Subsidies in an Increasing Cost Industry: a Note on a Baumol-Oates Proposition, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No.1, 1981, pp.124-130.17. Mills,E. S., "Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, " In Ecology and Economics, ed. M. I. Goldman,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972, pp.145-146.18. O`Hagan,C., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluter Subsidies,Regulation, and the Size of a Polluting Industry: a Note, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 17,No. 3, 1984, pp.588-592.19. Plott,C. R., and S. Mestelman, "A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 4, No.1, 1968, pp.195-197.20. Polinsky,A. M., "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.1, 1979, pp.75-83.21. Porter,R. C., "The Long-Run Asymmetry of Subsidies and Taxes as Antipollution Policies," Water Resources Research, Vol. 10, No.3, 1974, pp.415-417.22. Rose-Ackerman,s., "Effluent Charges: a Critique,"Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No.4, 1973,pp. 512-528.23. Sims,W. A., "The Short-Run Asymmetry of Pollution Subsidies and Charges: Note, " Journal of Environment Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No.4, 1981, pp.395-399.24. Tullock,G., "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges:a Comment," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1966, pp.854-855.25. Wender,J. T., "Methods of Pollution Control and the Rate of Charge in Pollution Abatement Technology,"Water Resources Research, Vol. 11, No.3, 1975, pp.393-396.26. Whipple,W. Jr., "Economic Basis for Effluent Charges and Subsidies," Water Resources Research, vol. 2,No.1, 1966, pp.159-164.27. Yohe,G. W., "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Control-Some Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium, "Journal of Environment Economics and Management,Vol. 6, No.3, 1979, 187-198. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005672 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林全 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) 徐麗振 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 徐麗振 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 1989 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-五月-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-五月-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-五月-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) B2002005672 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90511 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 摘要 控制生產性汚染行為之政策主要有四種:課稅、補貼、管制(含懲罰)，與可轉讓汚染權等。其中補貼被認為是控制汚染的有效手段，原因在於廠商會將補貼視為一種機會成本，與課稅一樣使邊際成本提高，因而減少汚染。但此種說法受到許多經濟學家質疑，其原因有二:1.由於以廠商目前的汚染水準作為計算補貼之汙染基準，補貼會使廠商提高它目前的污染水準,以獲取更多的補貼;2.對接受補貼的產業而言，補貼將形成超額利潤，誘使其他廠商加入該行業，結果產業總污染增加。一般理論研究，多假設補貼金額大小係按生產者汙染量之減少程度而定;但實務上，各國對污染控制之補貼方式，卻未必與上述理論假設一致。例如，對防治污染機器設備給予投資抵減，便是我國與許多國家常採用的一種補貼政策。由於補貼方式不同，故對污染量之控制效果也就不同。而本文之目的，即在比較採行投資抵減政策，與採行其他主要污染控制政策，對污染性生產行為的不同影響。 本文除第一章為緒論外，第二章旨在整理及說明過去學者們討論過的不同補貼方法，對個別廠商，以及整體社會之汙染水準的影響效果。第三章利用個別廠商之極大化行為假設，建立有關模型，並比較投資抵減與一般性補貼政策，以及投資抵減與課稅政策，對個別廠商產出及汙染水準的不同影響。第四章則就總體產業面，分析前述不同汙染控制政策的影響效果。第五章為結論。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄第一章 緒論………1第一節 研究動機………1第二節 研究範圍………4第二章 文獻回顧………8第一節 前言………8第二節 補貼的方法………10第三節 補貼與課稅之間是否對稱的爭論………13第四節 本章結論………22第三章 個別廠商的產出及汙染效果分析………26第一節 前言………26第二節 基本模型………28第三節 課稅政策………31第四節 一般性補貼政策………34第五節 投資抵減………36第六節 政策效果比較………38第四章 整體產業的產出及汙染效果分析………46第一節 基本模型………46第二節 課稅政策………50第三節 一般性補接政策………53第四節 投資抵減………56第五節 政策效果比較………59第五章 結論………68參考文獻………71 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005672 en_US dc.title (題名) 投資抵減與其他經濟誘因污染防治政策之比較 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻一、 中文部分:侯繼明等，鼓勵污染防治，獎勵投資條例之經濟效益評估分項報告(6)，經濟部工業局委託研究計劃，中華經濟研究院，民國76年8月。二、英文部份:1. Baumol,W. J., and W. E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life, N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979.2. ─── and ─── , The Theory of Environmental Policy,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988.3. Bramhall,D. F., and E. S. Mil1s, "A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments" Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.3, 1966, pp.615-616.4. Burrows,P., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluters Subsidies,Regulation and the Size of a Polluting Industry, "Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.3, 1979,pp.494-501.5. Car1ton,D. W., and G. C. Loury, "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No.3, 1980,pp.559-566.6. Coase,R. H., "The Problem of Social Cost, " Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp.1-44.7. Dewees,D. N., C. K. Everson, and W. A. Sims, Economic Analysis of environmental Policies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.8. Fisher,A. C., Resources and Environmental Economics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.9. Freeman,A. M.,III, "Bribes and Charges: Some Comments, "Water Resources Research, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967, pp.287-289.10. Gould,J. R., "Total Conditions in the Analysis of External Effects, " Economic Journal, Vol.87, No. 347,1977, pp.558-563.11. Kamien,M. I., N. L. Schwartz, and F. T. Dolbear, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.1, 1966a, pp.147~157.12. ───, ─── and ───, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges: Reply," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No.4, 1966b, pp.856-857.13. Kneese,A.V., The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.14. ─── and B. T. Bower, Managing Water Quality, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.15. Mestelman,S., "Some Conditions for the Failure of Corrective Production Subsidies, " International Economic Review, Vol.13, No.3, 1972, pp.476-487.16. ───, "Corrective Production Subsidies in an Increasing Cost Industry: a Note on a Baumol-Oates Proposition, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No.1, 1981, pp.124-130.17. Mills,E. S., "Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, " In Ecology and Economics, ed. M. I. Goldman,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972, pp.145-146.18. O`Hagan,C., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluter Subsidies,Regulation, and the Size of a Polluting Industry: a Note, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 17,No. 3, 1984, pp.588-592.19. Plott,C. R., and S. Mestelman, "A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 4, No.1, 1968, pp.195-197.20. Polinsky,A. M., "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.1, 1979, pp.75-83.21. Porter,R. C., "The Long-Run Asymmetry of Subsidies and Taxes as Antipollution Policies," Water Resources Research, Vol. 10, No.3, 1974, pp.415-417.22. Rose-Ackerman,s., "Effluent Charges: a Critique,"Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No.4, 1973,pp. 512-528.23. Sims,W. A., "The Short-Run Asymmetry of Pollution Subsidies and Charges: Note, " Journal of Environment Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No.4, 1981, pp.395-399.24. Tullock,G., "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges:a Comment," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1966, pp.854-855.25. Wender,J. T., "Methods of Pollution Control and the Rate of Charge in Pollution Abatement Technology,"Water Resources Research, Vol. 11, No.3, 1975, pp.393-396.26. Whipple,W. Jr., "Economic Basis for Effluent Charges and Subsidies," Water Resources Research, vol. 2,No.1, 1966, pp.159-164.27. Yohe,G. W., "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Control-Some Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium, "Journal of Environment Economics and Management,Vol. 6, No.3, 1979, 187-198. zh_TW
