Publications-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

NCCU Library

Citation Infomation

Related Publications in TAIR

題名 投資抵減與其他經濟誘因污染防治政策之比較
作者 徐麗振
貢獻者 林全
徐麗振
日期 1989
上傳時間 4-May-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8)
摘要 摘要
控制生產性汚染行為之政策主要有四種:課稅、補貼、管制(含懲罰),與可轉讓汚染權等。其中補貼被認為是控制汚染的有效手段,原因在於廠商會將補貼視為一種機會成本,與課稅一樣使邊際成本提高,因而減少汚染。但此種說法受到許多經濟學家質疑,其原因有二:1.由於以廠商目前的汚染水準作為計算補貼之汙染基準,補貼會使廠商提高它目前的污染水準,以獲取更多的補貼;2.對接受補貼的產業而言,補貼將形成超額利潤,誘使其他廠商加入該行業,結果產業總污染增加。一般理論研究,多假設補貼金額大小係按生產者汙染量之減少程度而定;但實務上,各國對污染控制之補貼方式,卻未必與上述理論假設一致。例如,對防治污染機器設備給予投資抵減,便是我國與許多國家常採用的一種補貼政策。由於補貼方式不同,故對污染量之控制效果也就不同。而本文之目的,即在比較採行投資抵減政策,與採行其他主要污染控制政策,對污染性生產行為的不同影響。
本文除第一章為緒論外,第二章旨在整理及說明過去學者們討論過的不同補貼方法,對個別廠商,以及整體社會之汙染水準的影響效果。第三章利用個別廠商之極大化行為假設,建立有關模型,並比較投資抵減與一般性補貼政策,以及投資抵減與課稅政策,對個別廠商產出及汙染水準的不同影響。第四章則就總體產業面,分析前述不同汙染控制政策的影響效果。第五章為結論。
參考文獻 參考文獻
一、 中文部分:
侯繼明等,鼓勵污染防治,獎勵投資條例之經濟效益評估分項報告(6),經濟部工業局委託研究計劃,中華經濟研究院,民國76年8月。

二、英文部份:
1. Baumol,W. J., and W. E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life, N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979.
2. ─── and ─── , The Theory of Environmental Policy,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988.
3. Bramhall,D. F., and E. S. Mil1s, "A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments" Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.3, 1966, pp.615-616.
4. Burrows,P., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluters Subsidies,Regulation and the Size of a Polluting Industry, "Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.3, 1979,pp.494-501.
5. Car1ton,D. W., and G. C. Loury, "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No.3, 1980,pp.559-566.
6. Coase,R. H., "The Problem of Social Cost, " Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp.1-44.
7. Dewees,D. N., C. K. Everson, and W. A. Sims, Economic Analysis of environmental Policies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
8. Fisher,A. C., Resources and Environmental Economics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
9. Freeman,A. M.,III, "Bribes and Charges: Some Comments, "Water Resources Research, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967, pp.287-289.
10. Gould,J. R., "Total Conditions in the Analysis of External Effects, " Economic Journal, Vol.87, No. 347,1977, pp.558-563.
11. Kamien,M. I., N. L. Schwartz, and F. T. Dolbear, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.1, 1966a, pp.147~157.
12. ───, ─── and ───, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges: Reply," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No.4, 1966b, pp.856-857.
13. Kneese,A.V., The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.
14. ─── and B. T. Bower, Managing Water Quality, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
15. Mestelman,S., "Some Conditions for the Failure of Corrective Production Subsidies, " International Economic Review, Vol.13, No.3, 1972, pp.476-487.
16. ───, "Corrective Production Subsidies in an Increasing Cost Industry: a Note on a Baumol-Oates Proposition, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No.1, 1981, pp.124-130.
17. Mills,E. S., "Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, " In Ecology and Economics, ed. M. I. Goldman,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972, pp.145-146.
18. O`Hagan,C., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluter Subsidies,Regulation, and the Size of a Polluting Industry: a Note, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 17,No. 3, 1984, pp.588-592.
19. Plott,C. R., and S. Mestelman, "A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 4, No.1, 1968, pp.195-197.
20. Polinsky,A. M., "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.1, 1979, pp.75-83.
21. Porter,R. C., "The Long-Run Asymmetry of Subsidies and Taxes as Antipollution Policies," Water Resources Research, Vol. 10, No.3, 1974, pp.415-417.
22. Rose-Ackerman,s., "Effluent Charges: a Critique,"Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No.4, 1973,pp. 512-528.
23. Sims,W. A., "The Short-Run Asymmetry of Pollution Subsidies and Charges: Note, " Journal of Environment Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No.4, 1981, pp.395-399.
24. Tullock,G., "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges:a Comment," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1966, pp.854-855.
25. Wender,J. T., "Methods of Pollution Control and the Rate of Charge in Pollution Abatement Technology,"Water Resources Research, Vol. 11, No.3, 1975, pp.393-396.
26. Whipple,W. Jr., "Economic Basis for Effluent Charges and Subsidies," Water Resources Research, vol. 2,No.1, 1966, pp.159-164.
27. Yohe,G. W., "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Control-Some Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium, "Journal of Environment Economics and Management,Vol. 6, No.3, 1979, 187-198.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005672
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林全zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 徐麗振zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 徐麗振zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1989en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-May-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-May-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-May-2016 14:25:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002005672en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90511-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 摘要
控制生產性汚染行為之政策主要有四種:課稅、補貼、管制(含懲罰),與可轉讓汚染權等。其中補貼被認為是控制汚染的有效手段,原因在於廠商會將補貼視為一種機會成本,與課稅一樣使邊際成本提高,因而減少汚染。但此種說法受到許多經濟學家質疑,其原因有二:1.由於以廠商目前的汚染水準作為計算補貼之汙染基準,補貼會使廠商提高它目前的污染水準,以獲取更多的補貼;2.對接受補貼的產業而言,補貼將形成超額利潤,誘使其他廠商加入該行業,結果產業總污染增加。一般理論研究,多假設補貼金額大小係按生產者汙染量之減少程度而定;但實務上,各國對污染控制之補貼方式,卻未必與上述理論假設一致。例如,對防治污染機器設備給予投資抵減,便是我國與許多國家常採用的一種補貼政策。由於補貼方式不同,故對污染量之控制效果也就不同。而本文之目的,即在比較採行投資抵減政策,與採行其他主要污染控制政策,對污染性生產行為的不同影響。
本文除第一章為緒論外,第二章旨在整理及說明過去學者們討論過的不同補貼方法,對個別廠商,以及整體社會之汙染水準的影響效果。第三章利用個別廠商之極大化行為假設,建立有關模型,並比較投資抵減與一般性補貼政策,以及投資抵減與課稅政策,對個別廠商產出及汙染水準的不同影響。第四章則就總體產業面,分析前述不同汙染控制政策的影響效果。第五章為結論。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄
第一章 緒論………1
第一節 研究動機………1
第二節 研究範圍………4
第二章 文獻回顧………8
第一節 前言………8
第二節 補貼的方法………10
第三節 補貼與課稅之間是否對稱的爭論………13
第四節 本章結論………22
第三章 個別廠商的產出及汙染效果分析………26
第一節 前言………26
第二節 基本模型………28
第三節 課稅政策………31
第四節 一般性補貼政策………34
第五節 投資抵減………36
第六節 政策效果比較………38
第四章 整體產業的產出及汙染效果分析………46
第一節 基本模型………46
第二節 課稅政策………50
第三節 一般性補接政策………53
第四節 投資抵減………56
第五節 政策效果比較………59
第五章 結論………68
參考文獻………71
zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005672en_US
dc.title (題名) 投資抵減與其他經濟誘因污染防治政策之比較zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
一、 中文部分:
侯繼明等,鼓勵污染防治,獎勵投資條例之經濟效益評估分項報告(6),經濟部工業局委託研究計劃,中華經濟研究院,民國76年8月。

二、英文部份:
1. Baumol,W. J., and W. E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life, N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979.
2. ─── and ─── , The Theory of Environmental Policy,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1988.
3. Bramhall,D. F., and E. S. Mil1s, "A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments" Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.3, 1966, pp.615-616.
4. Burrows,P., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluters Subsidies,Regulation and the Size of a Polluting Industry, "Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.3, 1979,pp.494-501.
5. Car1ton,D. W., and G. C. Loury, "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No.3, 1980,pp.559-566.
6. Coase,R. H., "The Problem of Social Cost, " Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp.1-44.
7. Dewees,D. N., C. K. Everson, and W. A. Sims, Economic Analysis of environmental Policies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
8. Fisher,A. C., Resources and Environmental Economics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
9. Freeman,A. M.,III, "Bribes and Charges: Some Comments, "Water Resources Research, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967, pp.287-289.
10. Gould,J. R., "Total Conditions in the Analysis of External Effects, " Economic Journal, Vol.87, No. 347,1977, pp.558-563.
11. Kamien,M. I., N. L. Schwartz, and F. T. Dolbear, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 2, No.1, 1966a, pp.147~157.
12. ───, ─── and ───, "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges: Reply," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No.4, 1966b, pp.856-857.
13. Kneese,A.V., The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.
14. ─── and B. T. Bower, Managing Water Quality, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
15. Mestelman,S., "Some Conditions for the Failure of Corrective Production Subsidies, " International Economic Review, Vol.13, No.3, 1972, pp.476-487.
16. ───, "Corrective Production Subsidies in an Increasing Cost Industry: a Note on a Baumol-Oates Proposition, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No.1, 1981, pp.124-130.
17. Mills,E. S., "Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, " In Ecology and Economics, ed. M. I. Goldman,N. J. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972, pp.145-146.
18. O`Hagan,C., "Pigovian Taxes, Polluter Subsidies,Regulation, and the Size of a Polluting Industry: a Note, " Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 17,No. 3, 1984, pp.588-592.
19. Plott,C. R., and S. Mestelman, "A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges, " Water Resources Research,Vol. 4, No.1, 1968, pp.195-197.
20. Polinsky,A. M., "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No.1, 1979, pp.75-83.
21. Porter,R. C., "The Long-Run Asymmetry of Subsidies and Taxes as Antipollution Policies," Water Resources Research, Vol. 10, No.3, 1974, pp.415-417.
22. Rose-Ackerman,s., "Effluent Charges: a Critique,"Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No.4, 1973,pp. 512-528.
23. Sims,W. A., "The Short-Run Asymmetry of Pollution Subsidies and Charges: Note, " Journal of Environment Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No.4, 1981, pp.395-399.
24. Tullock,G., "Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges:a Comment," Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1966, pp.854-855.
25. Wender,J. T., "Methods of Pollution Control and the Rate of Charge in Pollution Abatement Technology,"Water Resources Research, Vol. 11, No.3, 1975, pp.393-396.
26. Whipple,W. Jr., "Economic Basis for Effluent Charges and Subsidies," Water Resources Research, vol. 2,No.1, 1966, pp.159-164.
27. Yohe,G. W., "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Control-Some Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium, "Journal of Environment Economics and Management,Vol. 6, No.3, 1979, 187-198.
zh_TW