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題名 利益團體與關稅政策形成之研究
作者 陳順義
貢獻者 黃世鑫
陳順義
日期 1989
上傳時間 4-May-2016 14:25:23 (UTC+8)
參考文獻 參考文獻
     一、中文部份
     l.黃世鑫(民國75年),「公共投資政策的形成」，△中國經濟學會公共投資政策研討會論文集△。
     2.莊水吉(民國74年),「關稅之經濟功能與經濟發展──從自由化、國際化、制度化談關稅政策」，△財稅研究△,17卷3期，頁99~116。
     3.莊春發(民國77年),「獨佔福利損失的理論與衡量」，△台北市銀月刊△,19卷8期，頁1~28。
     4.陳正倉(民國71年),「台灣地區產業結構之研究」，△企銀季刊△,5卷3期，頁75~97。
     5.陳正倉(民國73年),「台灣地區產業集中度之研究」，△企銀季刊△,8卷2期，頁35~57。
     6.張志才(民國75年)，△我國產業保護成長及結構之轉變△，台大經研所碩士論文。
     7.張芳蓮(民國77年)，△我國與美國預算政策形成之比較和發展趨勢分析△，政大財研所碩士論文。
     8.郭建志(民國75年)，△關稅保護、產業發展與對外貿易之研究──台灣實證分析△，政大財研所碩士論文。
     9.賴英照(民國78年)，△關稅政策與經濟發展△，未發表。
     10.蕭峯雄(民國71年),「我國產業集中率之測定與分析」，△台北市銀月刊△,13卷5期，頁43~56。
     
     二、英文部份
     l. Allard, R. J. (1988), "Rent-seeking with non-identical players,"Public Choice 57, PP. 3~14.
     2. Anam , M. (1982), "Distortion-triggered lobbying and welfare:a contribution to the theory of directly -unproductive profitseeking activities, "Journal of International Economics. 13, PP.15~32
     3. Anam , M. and Katz, E(1988), "Rent-seeking and second best economics", Public Choice 59, PP. 215~224.
     4. Baldwin, R. E. (1986), "Trade policies in developed countries", in R. W. Jones, ed., International Trade:Surveys of Theory and Policy, North-Holland:Elsevier Science Pulishers B. V., PP.183~231.
     5. Becker, G. S. (1983), "A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics XCVII, PP. 371~400.
     6. Becker , G. S. (1985), "Public policies, pressure groups , and dead weight costs ", Journal of Public Economics 28, PP. 329~347.
     7. Benson, B. L. and Mitchell, J, M. (1988), "Rent seekers who demand government production: bureaucratic output and the price of complements", Public Choice 56, PP. 3~16.
     8. Bhagwat;, J. N. (1980), "Lobbying and welfare", Journal of Public Economics 14, PP. 335~ 363.
     9. Bhagwati, J. N. and Srinivasan, T. N. (1980)", Revenue seeking:a generalization of the theory of tariffs, "Journal of Political Economy 88, PP. 1069~1087.
     10.Brock, w. A. and Magee, S. P. (1978), "The economics of special interest politics :the case of the tariffs", American Economic Review 68, PP. 246~ 250.
     11. Buchanan, J. M. (1980 a), "Rent seeking and profit seeking", in J. M. Buchanan R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Taxas A & M University Press, PP. 3~15.
     12. Buchanan, J. M. (1980 b), "Rent seeking under external diseconomies", in J. M. Buchanan, r. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:Taxas A & M University Press, PP. 183~194.
     13.Buchanan, J. M. (1983), "Rent-seeking , noncompensated transfers,and laws of succession, Journal of Law and Economics, PP.71 ~86.
     14.Buchanan, J. M. and Flowers, M. R. (1987), The Public Finances-An Introductory Textbook, 6th ed., Illinois: Homewood.
     15.Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (1980)(eds. ),Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society College Station:Texas A & M University Press.
     16. Capie, F. (1983), Depression and Protectionism:Britain between the wars, London: george Allen & Unwin.
     17. Caves, R. E. (1976), "Economic models of political choice: Canada`s tariff structure" Canadian Journal of Economics, 9, PP. 278~300.
     18. Colander, D. C. (1984), "Introduction" to D. C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy:The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, PP. 1~13.
     19. Corcoran, W. J, (1984), "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking", Public Choice 43, PP. 89~93.
     20. Cowling, K. and Mueller , D. C. (1978), "The social costs of monopoly power",Economic Journal 88, PP. 727~784.
     21. Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. D. (1984), "Regulators as an Interest group, " in J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison, eds., The Theory of Public Choice- II the University of Michigan, PP. 287~304.
     22.DiLorenzo, T. J. (1984), "The domain of rent -seeking behavior :private or public choice", International Review of Law and Economics 4, PP. 131~135.
     23. Faith, R. L(1980), "Rent-seeking aspect of bureaucratic competition", in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward the Theory of Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:A & M University Press, PP. 332-343.
     24. Findlay, R. and wellisz, s. (1984), "Toward a model of endogenous rent-seeking ", in D. C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy-The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activites,Cambridges, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Campany,PP. 89-100.
     25. Foster, E. (1981), "The treatment of rents in cost –benefit analysis", American Economic Review 71, PP. 171-178.
     26. Frey, B. S. (1984), International Political Economics, Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
     27. Goetz, M. L. (1978), "tax avoidance, horizontal equity, and tax reform: a proposed synthesis", Southern Economic Journal 44,PP. 789-812.
     28. Harberger, A. C. (1954), "Monopoly and resource allocation" American Economic Review, 44, PP. 77 -87.
     29. Higgins, R., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1985), "Free entry and efficient rent-seeking ", Public Choice 46, PP. 247-258.
     30. Hillman, A. L. and Katz, E. (1984), "Risk-averse rent-seekers and the social cost of monopoly power", Economic Journal 94,PP. 104 -110.
     31.Kreuger, A. O. (1974), "the political economy of the rent-seeking society, "American Economic Review 64, PP. 291 - 303.
     32. Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1975), "The independent judiciary in an interest -group perspective", Journal of Law and Economics 66, PP. 875~901.
     33. Leibenstein, H. (1966), "Allocative efficiency VS. X-efficiency", American Economic Review 66, pp. 392 ~ 415.
     34. Magee, S. P. and Brock, W. A. (1983), " A model of politics,tariffs and rent-seeking in general equilibrium", in B. Weisbrod and H. Hughes, ed., The Problems of Developed Countries and the International Economy, Vol. 3, London: MacMillan, PP. 497~523.
     35. McCormick , R. E., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1984)"The disinterest in deregulation", American Economic Review 74, PP. 1075~ 1079.
     36. Mccormick, r. E. and Tollison, R. D. (1981), Politicians, Legislation and the Economy, Boston: Masrtinus Nijhoff.
     37. Mckenzie, R. B. (1988), "The relative restrictiveness of tariffs and quotas: a reinterpretation from a rent-seeking perspective,Public Choice PP. 85~90.
     38. Mundell, R. A. (1962), Review of L. H. Janssen, "Free trade,protection and customs unions ", American Economic Review 52, PP. 622.
     39. North, D. C. (1987), "Rent-seeking and the new institutional economies", in C. K. Rowley , ed., Democracy and Public Choice Basil Black well, PP. 163~ 167.
     40. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press.
     41. Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven and London:Yale University Press.
     42. Peltzman, S. (1976), "Toward a more general theory of regulation", Journal of Law and Economics 19, PP. 211~240.
     43. Pincus, J. J (1975), "Pressure groups and the pattern of tariffs",Journal of Political Economy 83, PP. 757 ~778.
     44. Posner, R. A. (1975), "The social costs of monopoly and regulation", Journal of Political Economy 83, PP. 807~827.
     45. Rogerson, W. P. (1982), "The social costs of monopoly and regulation": a game-theoretic analysis", Bell Journal of Economics 13, PP. 391 ~401.
     46. Rowley, C. K. and Tollison R. D. (1986), "Rent-seeking and trade protection", in H. Hauser, ed., Protectionism and structural Adjustment Verlag Ruegger, PP. 141 ~ 166.
     47. Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D. and Tullock, G. (1988)(eds.),The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     48. Stigler, H. J. (1971), "The theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, PP. 3~21,Reprinted in G. J. Stigler, The Citizen and the state, Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1975, PP. 115 ~136.
     49.Stigler, G. J. (1976), "the sizes of Legislatures", Journal of Legal Studies 5, PP. 17 ~ 34.
     50. Tollison, R. D. (1982), "Rent seeking: a survey", Kyklos 35, PP.575~602.
     51. Tollison, R. D. (1987), "Is the theory of rent-seeking here to stay?", in C. K. Rowley, ed., Democracy and Public Choice,Basil blackwell, PP. 143~ 157.
     52. Tullock, G. (1967), "The welfare costs of tariffs , monopolies,and theft" , Western Economic Journal 5, PP. 224 ~ 232.
     53. Tullock, G. (1975), "Competing for aid", Public Choice XXI, PP.41 ~52.
     54. Tullock, G. (1980 a), "Efficient rent-seeking ", in J. M. Buchanan,R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A & M University Press, PP. 97 ~ 112.
     55. Tullock, G. (1980 b), "Rent-seeking as a negative-sum game", in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:Texas A & M University Press, PP. 16~ 36.
     56. Tullock, G, (1988), "Rents and rent-seeking", in C. K. Rowley,R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston: Kluwer Acadamic Publisher, PP. 51 ~62.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005678
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 黃世鑫zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳順義zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳順義zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1989en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-May-2016 14:25:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-May-2016 14:25:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-May-2016 14:25:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002005678en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90516-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論………1
     第一節 研究動機與目的………1
     第二節 研究方法與限制………2
     第三節 本文架構………3
     第二章 競租理論………4
     第一節 競租的意義………5
     第二節 競租理論的基本論點………8
     第三節 競租成本的衡量及估計………12
     第四節 競租理論與政府政策形成………18
     第三章 利益團體與關稅政策形成………28
     第一節 利益團體理論模型………28
     第二節 實證文獻回顧………42
     第四章 我國利益團體與關稅政策形成之實証研究………48
     第一節 我國關稅政策形成過程………48
     第二節 實証模型之建立………52
     第三節 實証結果分析及展望………57
     第五章 結論………61
     參考文獻………63		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005678en_US
dc.title (題名) 利益團體與關稅政策形成之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
     一、中文部份
     l.黃世鑫(民國75年),「公共投資政策的形成」，△中國經濟學會公共投資政策研討會論文集△。
     2.莊水吉(民國74年),「關稅之經濟功能與經濟發展──從自由化、國際化、制度化談關稅政策」，△財稅研究△,17卷3期，頁99~116。
     3.莊春發(民國77年),「獨佔福利損失的理論與衡量」，△台北市銀月刊△,19卷8期，頁1~28。
     4.陳正倉(民國71年),「台灣地區產業結構之研究」，△企銀季刊△,5卷3期，頁75~97。
     5.陳正倉(民國73年),「台灣地區產業集中度之研究」，△企銀季刊△,8卷2期，頁35~57。
     6.張志才(民國75年)，△我國產業保護成長及結構之轉變△，台大經研所碩士論文。
     7.張芳蓮(民國77年)，△我國與美國預算政策形成之比較和發展趨勢分析△，政大財研所碩士論文。
     8.郭建志(民國75年)，△關稅保護、產業發展與對外貿易之研究──台灣實證分析△，政大財研所碩士論文。
     9.賴英照(民國78年)，△關稅政策與經濟發展△，未發表。
     10.蕭峯雄(民國71年),「我國產業集中率之測定與分析」，△台北市銀月刊△,13卷5期，頁43~56。
     
     二、英文部份
     l. Allard, R. J. (1988), "Rent-seeking with non-identical players,"Public Choice 57, PP. 3~14.
     2. Anam , M. (1982), "Distortion-triggered lobbying and welfare:a contribution to the theory of directly -unproductive profitseeking activities, "Journal of International Economics. 13, PP.15~32
     3. Anam , M. and Katz, E(1988), "Rent-seeking and second best economics", Public Choice 59, PP. 215~224.
     4. Baldwin, R. E. (1986), "Trade policies in developed countries", in R. W. Jones, ed., International Trade:Surveys of Theory and Policy, North-Holland:Elsevier Science Pulishers B. V., PP.183~231.
     5. Becker, G. S. (1983), "A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics XCVII, PP. 371~400.
     6. Becker , G. S. (1985), "Public policies, pressure groups , and dead weight costs ", Journal of Public Economics 28, PP. 329~347.
     7. Benson, B. L. and Mitchell, J, M. (1988), "Rent seekers who demand government production: bureaucratic output and the price of complements", Public Choice 56, PP. 3~16.
     8. Bhagwat;, J. N. (1980), "Lobbying and welfare", Journal of Public Economics 14, PP. 335~ 363.
     9. Bhagwati, J. N. and Srinivasan, T. N. (1980)", Revenue seeking:a generalization of the theory of tariffs, "Journal of Political Economy 88, PP. 1069~1087.
     10.Brock, w. A. and Magee, S. P. (1978), "The economics of special interest politics :the case of the tariffs", American Economic Review 68, PP. 246~ 250.
     11. Buchanan, J. M. (1980 a), "Rent seeking and profit seeking", in J. M. Buchanan R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Taxas A & M University Press, PP. 3~15.
     12. Buchanan, J. M. (1980 b), "Rent seeking under external diseconomies", in J. M. Buchanan, r. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:Taxas A & M University Press, PP. 183~194.
     13.Buchanan, J. M. (1983), "Rent-seeking , noncompensated transfers,and laws of succession, Journal of Law and Economics, PP.71 ~86.
     14.Buchanan, J. M. and Flowers, M. R. (1987), The Public Finances-An Introductory Textbook, 6th ed., Illinois: Homewood.
     15.Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (1980)(eds. ),Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society College Station:Texas A & M University Press.
     16. Capie, F. (1983), Depression and Protectionism:Britain between the wars, London: george Allen & Unwin.
     17. Caves, R. E. (1976), "Economic models of political choice: Canada`s tariff structure" Canadian Journal of Economics, 9, PP. 278~300.
     18. Colander, D. C. (1984), "Introduction" to D. C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy:The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, PP. 1~13.
     19. Corcoran, W. J, (1984), "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking", Public Choice 43, PP. 89~93.
     20. Cowling, K. and Mueller , D. C. (1978), "The social costs of monopoly power",Economic Journal 88, PP. 727~784.
     21. Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. D. (1984), "Regulators as an Interest group, " in J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison, eds., The Theory of Public Choice- II the University of Michigan, PP. 287~304.
     22.DiLorenzo, T. J. (1984), "The domain of rent -seeking behavior :private or public choice", International Review of Law and Economics 4, PP. 131~135.
     23. Faith, R. L(1980), "Rent-seeking aspect of bureaucratic competition", in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward the Theory of Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:A & M University Press, PP. 332-343.
     24. Findlay, R. and wellisz, s. (1984), "Toward a model of endogenous rent-seeking ", in D. C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy-The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activites,Cambridges, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Campany,PP. 89-100.
     25. Foster, E. (1981), "The treatment of rents in cost –benefit analysis", American Economic Review 71, PP. 171-178.
     26. Frey, B. S. (1984), International Political Economics, Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
     27. Goetz, M. L. (1978), "tax avoidance, horizontal equity, and tax reform: a proposed synthesis", Southern Economic Journal 44,PP. 789-812.
     28. Harberger, A. C. (1954), "Monopoly and resource allocation" American Economic Review, 44, PP. 77 -87.
     29. Higgins, R., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1985), "Free entry and efficient rent-seeking ", Public Choice 46, PP. 247-258.
     30. Hillman, A. L. and Katz, E. (1984), "Risk-averse rent-seekers and the social cost of monopoly power", Economic Journal 94,PP. 104 -110.
     31.Kreuger, A. O. (1974), "the political economy of the rent-seeking society, "American Economic Review 64, PP. 291 - 303.
     32. Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1975), "The independent judiciary in an interest -group perspective", Journal of Law and Economics 66, PP. 875~901.
     33. Leibenstein, H. (1966), "Allocative efficiency VS. X-efficiency", American Economic Review 66, pp. 392 ~ 415.
     34. Magee, S. P. and Brock, W. A. (1983), " A model of politics,tariffs and rent-seeking in general equilibrium", in B. Weisbrod and H. Hughes, ed., The Problems of Developed Countries and the International Economy, Vol. 3, London: MacMillan, PP. 497~523.
     35. McCormick , R. E., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1984)"The disinterest in deregulation", American Economic Review 74, PP. 1075~ 1079.
     36. Mccormick, r. E. and Tollison, R. D. (1981), Politicians, Legislation and the Economy, Boston: Masrtinus Nijhoff.
     37. Mckenzie, R. B. (1988), "The relative restrictiveness of tariffs and quotas: a reinterpretation from a rent-seeking perspective,Public Choice PP. 85~90.
     38. Mundell, R. A. (1962), Review of L. H. Janssen, "Free trade,protection and customs unions ", American Economic Review 52, PP. 622.
     39. North, D. C. (1987), "Rent-seeking and the new institutional economies", in C. K. Rowley , ed., Democracy and Public Choice Basil Black well, PP. 163~ 167.
     40. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press.
     41. Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven and London:Yale University Press.
     42. Peltzman, S. (1976), "Toward a more general theory of regulation", Journal of Law and Economics 19, PP. 211~240.
     43. Pincus, J. J (1975), "Pressure groups and the pattern of tariffs",Journal of Political Economy 83, PP. 757 ~778.
     44. Posner, R. A. (1975), "The social costs of monopoly and regulation", Journal of Political Economy 83, PP. 807~827.
     45. Rogerson, W. P. (1982), "The social costs of monopoly and regulation": a game-theoretic analysis", Bell Journal of Economics 13, PP. 391 ~401.
     46. Rowley, C. K. and Tollison R. D. (1986), "Rent-seeking and trade protection", in H. Hauser, ed., Protectionism and structural Adjustment Verlag Ruegger, PP. 141 ~ 166.
     47. Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D. and Tullock, G. (1988)(eds.),The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     48. Stigler, H. J. (1971), "The theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, PP. 3~21,Reprinted in G. J. Stigler, The Citizen and the state, Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1975, PP. 115 ~136.
     49.Stigler, G. J. (1976), "the sizes of Legislatures", Journal of Legal Studies 5, PP. 17 ~ 34.
     50. Tollison, R. D. (1982), "Rent seeking: a survey", Kyklos 35, PP.575~602.
     51. Tollison, R. D. (1987), "Is the theory of rent-seeking here to stay?", in C. K. Rowley, ed., Democracy and Public Choice,Basil blackwell, PP. 143~ 157.
     52. Tullock, G. (1967), "The welfare costs of tariffs , monopolies,and theft" , Western Economic Journal 5, PP. 224 ~ 232.
     53. Tullock, G. (1975), "Competing for aid", Public Choice XXI, PP.41 ~52.
     54. Tullock, G. (1980 a), "Efficient rent-seeking ", in J. M. Buchanan,R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A & M University Press, PP. 97 ~ 112.
     55. Tullock, G. (1980 b), "Rent-seeking as a negative-sum game", in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station:Texas A & M University Press, PP. 16~ 36.
     56. Tullock, G, (1988), "Rents and rent-seeking", in C. K. Rowley,R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston: Kluwer Acadamic Publisher, PP. 51 ~62.		zh_TW