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題名 競租.管制.隱蔽性賦稅 : 理論與實證 作者 鄭宗松 貢獻者 徐偉初
鄭宗松日期 1991 上傳時間 4-May-2016 17:14:34 (UTC+8) 摘要 自1920 年代發展的"福利經濟學"認為政府的經濟角色只是在市場失靈( market failure) 時介入，進行經濟管制、補貼等公共政策，以達到社會福利的極大化，政府並不帶任何政治色彩；但事實上，假如政府是中性的工具，都將違反"理性經濟人"的假設；J.E. Alt 和K.A. Chry-Stal ( 1983 pp.28-3U )指出政府的經濟功能包括:生產性、汲取性和保護性的功能。另外， D.Easton 認為“政治是社會價值權威的分配"，準此，欲研究政府的公共政策必須考慮政治一一經濟的互動佳，因此本文擬從公共選擇的架構一一先將政治市揚的主要成員(1) 官僚政治(2) 民意代表(立法者) (3) 利益團體定位清楚以探討管制政策的形成及影響，分析政 參考文獻 (一)、中文部份1 吳美芬：「課稅與健康資訊對菸酒消費需求之影響」，工技學院工程技術研究所碩論文，7 9 年1 2月。2 陳佳文：「我國菸酒專賣政策及專賣制度之研究」，政大財政研究所碩士論文， 7 5 年6 月。3 .曾巨威，陳麗玟：「菸酒課稅問題之研究」，財政部賦改會編印，7 8 年6 月。4 .劉錦堆：「獨佔的福利損失一我國台灣地區資料的驗証」，東吳大學經濟研究所碩士論文， 77 年6 月5 .楊仁生譯：「利益團体」，R. H. Salisburg in F.I. Greenstein & N.W.Polsby 主編：非政府的政治學，幼獅文化事業公司編譯， 7 1年1 2 月。6 .彭懷恩譯：「官僚政治」，M. V. Nadel & F.E. Rourke in F.I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby 主編：政府制度與程序，幼獅文化事業公司編譯， 7 1 年1 2 月。7 .黃世鑫，宋秀玲，李新仁；「我國國民賦稅負擔之估計」，財政部賦改會編印7 8 年6 月。8. 蕭全政：「政治與經濟的整合」，桂冠圖書公司出版民國77 年。(二) .英文部份<1> Appelbaum, E.& E. Katz, "Seeking rents by setting rents: The political economy of rent seeking", The Economic Journal 97,1987, pp.685-699.<2> Anam. M.& E. Katz, "Rent seeking and second best economics" ,Public Choice 59,1988, pp.215-224.<3> Bhagwati, J.N. ,"Lobbying and welfare", Journal of Public Econol1ics 14,1980,pp.355-363.<4> Brock, W.A.& S.P. Magee, "The invisible foot and the waste of nations: redistrbution and economics growth." in: Colander, D.C. (Eds.) ,Neoclassical Poltical Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger,1984,pp.177-186.<5> Buchanan, J.M. "Rent seeking and profit seeking", in: J.M. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock(Eds.) :Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A & M University Press, Collage Station,1980,pp.3-15.<6> Buchanan, J.M. ,R. Tollison ,G. Tullock (Eds.) :Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Satiet..y , ,Texas A & M University Press, Collage 3tation,1980.<7> Corcoran, W.J., "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking" ,Public Choice 43,1984,pp.89-94.<8> Corcoran, W.J.& G.V. Karels, "Rent-seeking behaviorin the long run", Public Choice 46,1985,pp.227-246.< 9 > Cowlin g , K . & D. C . Mueller, " The social costs of monopoly power", The Economic Journal 88,I978,pp.727-748.<10> Crain, W.M.& R.D. Tollison, "Regulators as an interest group", in Buchanan, J.I. &R.D. Tollison(Eds.),The Theory of Public Choice-II, University of Michigan,I984,pp.287-304.<11> Crew, M.A.& C.K. Rowley, "Toward a public theory of monopoly regulation", Public Choice 57,1988,pp.49-57.<12> Cullis, J.G. ,Microeconomics and the Public Economy: A Defence of Leviathan, New York: Basil Blackwell,I987.<13> Downs, A. ,An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row,1957.<14> Fabella R.V., "Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tollock activities "Public Choice 62,1989, pp.287-293 .<15 > Goel, R. K. & P. D. Rich, "On the economic incentives for taking bribes", Public Choice 51,1989, pp.269-275.<16> Gray, C.S.," Toward a Conceptual Framework for Macroeconomic Evaluation of Public Enterprise Performance in Mixed Economies", in IMF, Public Enterprise in Mixed fconomies,Washington,D.C.,1984,pp.46-75.<17> Higgis, R.S.& R.D. Tollison, "Life among the triangles and trapezoids: notes on the theory of rent-seeking", in Rowley, C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.) : The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston,1988,pp.147-157.<18> Hillrnan, A.L.& E. Katz, "Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers", Journal of Public Economics 34,1987,pp. 129-142.<19> Johnston, J. ,Econometric Methods, New Delhi; HcGraw-Hill,1984 .<20> Kaempfer, W.H.& T.D. Willett, "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tarrifs versus quotas", Public Choice 63,pp.79-86.<21> Kreuger, A.O. "The polical economy of rent seeking society", American Economic Review 64,1974,pp.281-303 .<22> Lui, F.T. "An equlibrium queuing model of bribery", Journal of Politial Economy 93,1985,pp.760-781.<23> Mbaku,J.& C.Paul, "Political instability in Africa: A rent seeking approach", Public Choice 63,1989,pp.63-72.<24> McCormick, R.E.& R.D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation and the Economy, Boston: Masrtinus Nijhoff,1981.<25> Olson, M. ,The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965.<26> Olson,M. ,.T. he Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press,1982.<27 > Orzechowski, W. "Economic models of bureaucracy: survey, extensions, and evidence" in T.E. Borcherding, (Eds.),Budgets & Bureaucrates: The Sources of Government Growth, Duke University Press,1977,pp.229-59.<28 > Peltzman, S. ,"Toward a more general theory` of regulation", Journal of Law and Economics 20,1976,pp.322-340.<29> Posner, R.A. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation", Journal of Politial Economy 83,1975,pp.807-827.<30> Prest, A.R. , "Implicit Taxes, "in Hanusch, H. ,K.w. Roskamp and J. Wiseman (eds.) ,Public Sector and Political Economy Today, Stuttgart, New York, 1985,pp. 157-170.<31 > Rogerson, W.P. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation: A game-theoretic analysis" ,in Rowley , C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.) :The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers:Boston,1988, pp. 65-80.<32> Rowley, C.K.& R. Elgin," Government and its bureaucracy: a bilateral bargaining versus a principal-agent approach", in Rowley, C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.):The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston,1988, pp.267-290.<33 > Tollison, R.D., "Rent seeking: A survey ",Kyklos 35,1982,pp.575-602.<34> Williamson, O .. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Chicago.1967.貳.統計資料1 .「台灣地區菸酒事業統計年報」，台灣省菸酒公賣局，民國78 年。2. 「賦稅統計年報，財政部統計處編印」，民國7 9 年。3. 「中華民國重要施政統計」，行政院主計處編印，民國7 9 年。4 .「中華民國台灣地區社會指標統計」，行政院主計處編印，民國77年。5. 「國民所得年刊」，行政院主計處編印，民國78 年。6. 「財政統計年報」，財政部設計處編印，民國78 年。 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002006200 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 徐偉初 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鄭宗松 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 鄭宗松 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 1991 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-May-2016 17:14:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-May-2016 17:14:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-May-2016 17:14:34 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) B2002006200 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90954 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 自1920 年代發展的"福利經濟學"認為政府的經濟角色只是在市場失靈( market failure) 時介入，進行經濟管制、補貼等公共政策，以達到社會福利的極大化，政府並不帶任何政治色彩；但事實上，假如政府是中性的工具，都將違反"理性經濟人"的假設；J.E. Alt 和K.A. Chry-Stal ( 1983 pp.28-3U )指出政府的經濟功能包括:生產性、汲取性和保護性的功能。另外， D.Easton 認為“政治是社會價值權威的分配"，準此，欲研究政府的公共政策必須考慮政治一一經濟的互動佳，因此本文擬從公共選擇的架構一一先將政治市揚的主要成員(1) 官僚政治(2) 民意代表(立法者) (3) 利益團體定位清楚以探討管制政策的形成及影響，分析政 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論圖表目次第一節 研究動機與目的第二節 研究方法及大綱第二章 本文架構：公共選擇觀點第一節 官僚政治和政府第二節 公共選擇下的利益團体理論第三節 立法者在公共選擇下扮演的角色第三章 管制理論之文獻回顧第一節 管制的「公共利益」理論第二節 管制的「掠奪理論」第三節 管制的「競租理論」第四章 競租理論(Rent-Seeking Theory) 實証分析：台灣地區公務人員賄賂之研究第一節 「賄賂行為」、「移轉支付」與「隱蔽性賦稅」第二節 公務人員「賄賂行為」之實証研究第五章 管制的社會成本-隱蔽性賦稅(Implicit Taxes) 台灣地區的實証分析第一節 隱蔽性賦稅的衡量及其影響第二節 隱蔽性賦稅的實証估計--以煙酒市場為例第六章 結論:解除管制的可能第一節 結論第二節 解除管制的可能壹、參考書目(一) .中文部份(二) .英文部份貳、統計資料 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002006200 en_US dc.title (題名) 競租.管制.隱蔽性賦稅 : 理論與實證 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (一)、中文部份1 吳美芬：「課稅與健康資訊對菸酒消費需求之影響」，工技學院工程技術研究所碩論文，7 9 年1 2月。2 陳佳文：「我國菸酒專賣政策及專賣制度之研究」，政大財政研究所碩士論文， 7 5 年6 月。3 .曾巨威，陳麗玟：「菸酒課稅問題之研究」，財政部賦改會編印，7 8 年6 月。4 .劉錦堆：「獨佔的福利損失一我國台灣地區資料的驗証」，東吳大學經濟研究所碩士論文， 77 年6 月5 .楊仁生譯：「利益團体」，R. H. Salisburg in F.I. Greenstein & N.W.Polsby 主編：非政府的政治學，幼獅文化事業公司編譯， 7 1年1 2 月。6 .彭懷恩譯：「官僚政治」，M. V. Nadel & F.E. Rourke in F.I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby 主編：政府制度與程序，幼獅文化事業公司編譯， 7 1 年1 2 月。7 .黃世鑫，宋秀玲，李新仁；「我國國民賦稅負擔之估計」，財政部賦改會編印7 8 年6 月。8. 蕭全政：「政治與經濟的整合」，桂冠圖書公司出版民國77 年。(二) .英文部份<1> Appelbaum, E.& E. Katz, "Seeking rents by setting rents: The political economy of rent seeking", The Economic Journal 97,1987, pp.685-699.<2> Anam. M.& E. Katz, "Rent seeking and second best economics" ,Public Choice 59,1988, pp.215-224.<3> Bhagwati, J.N. ,"Lobbying and welfare", Journal of Public Econol1ics 14,1980,pp.355-363.<4> Brock, W.A.& S.P. Magee, "The invisible foot and the waste of nations: redistrbution and economics growth." in: Colander, D.C. (Eds.) ,Neoclassical Poltical Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger,1984,pp.177-186.<5> Buchanan, J.M. "Rent seeking and profit seeking", in: J.M. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock(Eds.) :Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A & M University Press, Collage Station,1980,pp.3-15.<6> Buchanan, J.M. ,R. Tollison ,G. Tullock (Eds.) :Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Satiet..y , ,Texas A & M University Press, Collage 3tation,1980.<7> Corcoran, W.J., "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking" ,Public Choice 43,1984,pp.89-94.<8> Corcoran, W.J.& G.V. Karels, "Rent-seeking behaviorin the long run", Public Choice 46,1985,pp.227-246.< 9 > Cowlin g , K . & D. C . Mueller, " The social costs of monopoly power", The Economic Journal 88,I978,pp.727-748.<10> Crain, W.M.& R.D. Tollison, "Regulators as an interest group", in Buchanan, J.I. &R.D. Tollison(Eds.),The Theory of Public Choice-II, University of Michigan,I984,pp.287-304.<11> Crew, M.A.& C.K. Rowley, "Toward a public theory of monopoly regulation", Public Choice 57,1988,pp.49-57.<12> Cullis, J.G. ,Microeconomics and the Public Economy: A Defence of Leviathan, New York: Basil Blackwell,I987.<13> Downs, A. ,An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row,1957.<14> Fabella R.V., "Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tollock activities "Public Choice 62,1989, pp.287-293 .<15 > Goel, R. K. & P. D. Rich, "On the economic incentives for taking bribes", Public Choice 51,1989, pp.269-275.<16> Gray, C.S.," Toward a Conceptual Framework for Macroeconomic Evaluation of Public Enterprise Performance in Mixed Economies", in IMF, Public Enterprise in Mixed fconomies,Washington,D.C.,1984,pp.46-75.<17> Higgis, R.S.& R.D. Tollison, "Life among the triangles and trapezoids: notes on the theory of rent-seeking", in Rowley, C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.) : The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston,1988,pp.147-157.<18> Hillrnan, A.L.& E. Katz, "Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers", Journal of Public Economics 34,1987,pp. 129-142.<19> Johnston, J. ,Econometric Methods, New Delhi; HcGraw-Hill,1984 .<20> Kaempfer, W.H.& T.D. Willett, "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tarrifs versus quotas", Public Choice 63,pp.79-86.<21> Kreuger, A.O. "The polical economy of rent seeking society", American Economic Review 64,1974,pp.281-303 .<22> Lui, F.T. "An equlibrium queuing model of bribery", Journal of Politial Economy 93,1985,pp.760-781.<23> Mbaku,J.& C.Paul, "Political instability in Africa: A rent seeking approach", Public Choice 63,1989,pp.63-72.<24> McCormick, R.E.& R.D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation and the Economy, Boston: Masrtinus Nijhoff,1981.<25> Olson, M. ,The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965.<26> Olson,M. ,.T. he Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press,1982.<27 > Orzechowski, W. "Economic models of bureaucracy: survey, extensions, and evidence" in T.E. Borcherding, (Eds.),Budgets & Bureaucrates: The Sources of Government Growth, Duke University Press,1977,pp.229-59.<28 > Peltzman, S. ,"Toward a more general theory` of regulation", Journal of Law and Economics 20,1976,pp.322-340.<29> Posner, R.A. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation", Journal of Politial Economy 83,1975,pp.807-827.<30> Prest, A.R. , "Implicit Taxes, "in Hanusch, H. ,K.w. Roskamp and J. Wiseman (eds.) ,Public Sector and Political Economy Today, Stuttgart, New York, 1985,pp. 157-170.<31 > Rogerson, W.P. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation: A game-theoretic analysis" ,in Rowley , C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.) :The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers:Boston,1988, pp. 65-80.<32> Rowley, C.K.& R. Elgin," Government and its bureaucracy: a bilateral bargaining versus a principal-agent approach", in Rowley, C.K. ,R.D. Tollison,& G. Tullock(Eds.):The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston,1988, pp.267-290.<33 > Tollison, R.D., "Rent seeking: A survey ",Kyklos 35,1982,pp.575-602.<34> Williamson, O .. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Chicago.1967.貳.統計資料1 .「台灣地區菸酒事業統計年報」，台灣省菸酒公賣局，民國78 年。2. 「賦稅統計年報，財政部統計處編印」，民國7 9 年。3. 「中華民國重要施政統計」，行政院主計處編印，民國7 9 年。4 .「中華民國台灣地區社會指標統計」，行政院主計處編印，民國77年。5. 「國民所得年刊」，行政院主計處編印，民國78 年。6. 「財政統計年報」，財政部設計處編印，民國78 年。 zh_TW
