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題名 策略貿易的公共經濟分析論文集
Two Essays on Strategic Trade Policies: A Public Economic Perspectives作者 蘇柏翰
Su, Bo-Han貢獻者 翁堃嵐
K. L. Glen Ueng
蘇柏翰
Su, Bo-Han關鍵詞 貿易政策
租稅扭曲日期 2002 上傳時間 6-May-2016 14:59:59 (UTC+8) 摘要 1980年代興起的新貿易理論 (New Trade Theory), 或是策略貿易理論 (Strategic Trade Theory) 強調國與國之間的策略互動行為, 並為政府干預貿易政策提供了強有力的理論依據。一、最適出口政策本文認為政府對於廠商的出口補貼會透過政府的預算限制式對其他部門造成租稅扭曲, 蓋因進行補貼或課稅與否, 均應有適足稅源以挹注之。在檢視了 Cournot 競爭與 Bertrand 競爭的市場結構之後, 發現邊際關稅收入亦是影響出口政策的重要因素之一。倘若邊際關稅收入為正數, 則提高出口部門的稅率有助於提高稅收, 同時可抵減自其他部門所應課徵的租稅, 並減少於該部門造成之租稅扭曲, 故本文結論傾向於提高出口稅率, 故將較 Brander and Spencer (1985) 與 Eaton and Grossman (1986) 原始提議的補貼率低, 甚至反轉出口政策方向為出口課稅; 反之, 若邊際關稅收入為負數, 則傾向於降低出口稅率。此外, 當邊際關稅收入為零時, 本文之結論則與原始模型無異。二、 最適進口政策本文檢視在多家外國廠商與多家本國廠商於本國市場進行 Cournot 競爭時, 政府考量進口政策對其他部門造成的租稅扭曲效果, 並求取最適進口政策與關稅稅率訂定問題。提高進口關稅稅率若能增加關稅收入, 便能減輕其他部門的租稅扭曲, 則最適進口關稅應較未考慮外溢至其他部門的租稅扭曲效果時為高; 反之, 若邊際關稅收入低於零, 則此時之最適進口關稅應降低。而當提高稅率對關稅收入無影響時, 本文之結論則與傳統模型無異。JEL 分類：F12、H21 參考文獻 林燕淑、邱俊榮、黃鴻 (2000), “收入相同下關稅與配額之均等性分析”, 《經濟論文叢刊》, 28(3), 267–286。林燕淑、黃鴻 (1998), “最適出口補貼與空間競爭", 《經濟論文》, 26(1), 1–18。翁永和、劉碧珍 (1998), “關稅結構欲進口政策", 《經濟論文叢刊》, 26(1), 1–18。楊雅博、吳世傑、黃鴻 (2002), “規模報酬與最適貿易政策”, 《經濟論文》, 30(1), 1–27。Auerbach, A. J. (1985), “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation”, in Handbook of Public Economics, edited by A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Amsterdam: North Holland, 61–128.Bhattacharjea, A. (1995), “Strategic Tariffs and Endogenous Market Structures: Trade and Industrial Policies under Imperfect Competition”, Journal of Development Economics, 47, 287–312.Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1981), “Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 14(3), 371–389.Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry”, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.Browning, E. K. (1987), “On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, American Economic Review, 77(1), 11–23.Dasgupta, P. S and J. E. Stiglitz (1974), “Benefit-Cost Analysis and Trade Policies”, Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), 1–33.De Meza, D. (1986), “Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 19(2), 347–350.Diamond, P. A. and D. L. McFadden (1974), “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in Public Finance”, Journal of Public Economics, 95(2), 357–364.Diamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirrlees (1971), “Optimal Taxation and Public Production 1: Production Efficiency and 2: Tax Rules”, American Economic Review, 61, 8–27 and 261–278.Dixit, A. K. (1988), “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly”, European Economic Review, 32, 55–68.Eaton, J. and G. M. Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383–406.Feldstein, M. (1997), “How Big Should Government Be?”, National Tax Journal, 50(2), 197–213.Freebairn, J. (1995), “Reconsidering the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, Economic Record, 71(213), 121–131.Fullerton, D. (1991), “Reconciling Recent Estimates of Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, American Economic Review, 81(1), 302–308.Gaudet, G. and S. W. Salant (1991), “Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes”, American Economic Review, 81(3), 658–665.Harberger, A. C. (1964), “Taxation, Resource Allocation, andWelfare”, in The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue System, edited by J. F. Due, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 25–80.Horstmann, I. and J. Markusen (1986), “Up Your Average Cost Curve: Inefficient Entry and New Protectionism”, Journal of International Economics, 20(3), 225–249.Ishikawa, J. and K. D. Lee (1997), “Backfiring Tariff in Vertically Related Markets”, Journal of International Economics, 42(3), 395–423.Ishikawa, J. and B. J. Spencer (1999), “Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Product”, Journal of International Economics, 48(2), 199–232.Krugman, P. R. (1994), Pedding Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations, New York: W. W. Norton.Krugman, P. R. (1996), Pop Internationalism, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Krugman, P. R. and A. Smith (1994), Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Meltzer, A. and S. F. Richard (1981), “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914–927.Metcalf, G. E. and NBER (2003), “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: Pigou, Taxation and Pollution”, Journal of Public Economics, 87(2), 313–322.Mohring, J. A. (1971), “Alternative Welfare Gain and Loss Measures”, Western Economic Journal, 9, 349–368.Myles, G. D. (1995), Public Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press.Neary, J. P. (1994), “Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?”, Journal of International Economics, 37, 197–218.Ng, Y. K. (1980), “Optimal Corrective Taxes or Subsidies when Revenue Raising Imposes an Excess Burden”, American Economic Review, 70(4), 744–751.Ng, Y. K. (2000), Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy: With a Case for Higher Public Spending, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.Ramsey, F. P. (1927), “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, Economic Journal, 37, 47–61.Spencer, B. J. and R. W. Jones (1991), “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy”, Review of Economic Studies, 58(1), 153–170.Spencer, B. J. and R. W. Jones (1992), “Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets”, Journal of International Economics, 32(1), 31–55.Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Tullock, G. (1967), “Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”, Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
90255005資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255005 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor K. L. Glen Ueng en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蘇柏翰 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Su, Bo-Han en_US dc.creator (作者) 蘇柏翰 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Su, Bo-Han en_US dc.date (日期) 2002 en_US dc.date.accessioned 6-May-2016 14:59:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 6-May-2016 14:59:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-May-2016 14:59:59 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0090255005 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/94125 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 90255005 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 1980年代興起的新貿易理論 (New Trade Theory), 或是策略貿易理論 (Strategic Trade Theory) 強調國與國之間的策略互動行為, 並為政府干預貿易政策提供了強有力的理論依據。一、最適出口政策本文認為政府對於廠商的出口補貼會透過政府的預算限制式對其他部門造成租稅扭曲, 蓋因進行補貼或課稅與否, 均應有適足稅源以挹注之。在檢視了 Cournot 競爭與 Bertrand 競爭的市場結構之後, 發現邊際關稅收入亦是影響出口政策的重要因素之一。倘若邊際關稅收入為正數, 則提高出口部門的稅率有助於提高稅收, 同時可抵減自其他部門所應課徵的租稅, 並減少於該部門造成之租稅扭曲, 故本文結論傾向於提高出口稅率, 故將較 Brander and Spencer (1985) 與 Eaton and Grossman (1986) 原始提議的補貼率低, 甚至反轉出口政策方向為出口課稅; 反之, 若邊際關稅收入為負數, 則傾向於降低出口稅率。此外, 當邊際關稅收入為零時, 本文之結論則與原始模型無異。二、 最適進口政策本文檢視在多家外國廠商與多家本國廠商於本國市場進行 Cournot 競爭時, 政府考量進口政策對其他部門造成的租稅扭曲效果, 並求取最適進口政策與關稅稅率訂定問題。提高進口關稅稅率若能增加關稅收入, 便能減輕其他部門的租稅扭曲, 則最適進口關稅應較未考慮外溢至其他部門的租稅扭曲效果時為高; 反之, 若邊際關稅收入低於零, 則此時之最適進口關稅應降低。而當提高稅率對關稅收入無影響時, 本文之結論則與傳統模型無異。JEL 分類：F12、H21 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 謝辭 iii論文摘要 ivI 第一部份：最適出口政策 11 前言 22 文獻回顧 42.1 策略貿易 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 超額負擔 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 模型3.1 Cournot 模型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93.1.1 廠商之最適決策 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93.1.2 政府課稅與扭曲函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113.1.3 政府最適決策與扭曲函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133.2 Bertrand 模型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193.2.1 廠商之最適決策 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193.2.2 政府最適決策與扭曲函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203.3 小結 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 結論 25II 第二部分：最適進口政策 285 前言 296 文獻回顧 307 模型 327.1 商品市場均衡 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327.2 比較靜態分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337.3 政府最適決策 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347.3.1 政府課稅與扭曲函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347.3.2 社會福利函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 結論 38參考文獻 39 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255005 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅扭曲 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 策略貿易的公共經濟分析論文集 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Two Essays on Strategic Trade Policies: A Public Economic Perspectives en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林燕淑、邱俊榮、黃鴻 (2000), “收入相同下關稅與配額之均等性分析”, 《經濟論文叢刊》, 28(3), 267–286。林燕淑、黃鴻 (1998), “最適出口補貼與空間競爭", 《經濟論文》, 26(1), 1–18。翁永和、劉碧珍 (1998), “關稅結構欲進口政策", 《經濟論文叢刊》, 26(1), 1–18。楊雅博、吳世傑、黃鴻 (2002), “規模報酬與最適貿易政策”, 《經濟論文》, 30(1), 1–27。Auerbach, A. J. (1985), “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation”, in Handbook of Public Economics, edited by A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Amsterdam: North Holland, 61–128.Bhattacharjea, A. (1995), “Strategic Tariffs and Endogenous Market Structures: Trade and Industrial Policies under Imperfect Competition”, Journal of Development Economics, 47, 287–312.Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1981), “Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 14(3), 371–389.Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry”, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.Browning, E. K. (1987), “On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, American Economic Review, 77(1), 11–23.Dasgupta, P. S and J. E. Stiglitz (1974), “Benefit-Cost Analysis and Trade Policies”, Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), 1–33.De Meza, D. (1986), “Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 19(2), 347–350.Diamond, P. A. and D. L. McFadden (1974), “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in Public Finance”, Journal of Public Economics, 95(2), 357–364.Diamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirrlees (1971), “Optimal Taxation and Public Production 1: Production Efficiency and 2: Tax Rules”, American Economic Review, 61, 8–27 and 261–278.Dixit, A. K. (1988), “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly”, European Economic Review, 32, 55–68.Eaton, J. and G. M. Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383–406.Feldstein, M. (1997), “How Big Should Government Be?”, National Tax Journal, 50(2), 197–213.Freebairn, J. (1995), “Reconsidering the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, Economic Record, 71(213), 121–131.Fullerton, D. (1991), “Reconciling Recent Estimates of Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”, American Economic Review, 81(1), 302–308.Gaudet, G. and S. W. Salant (1991), “Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes”, American Economic Review, 81(3), 658–665.Harberger, A. C. (1964), “Taxation, Resource Allocation, andWelfare”, in The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue System, edited by J. F. Due, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 25–80.Horstmann, I. and J. Markusen (1986), “Up Your Average Cost Curve: Inefficient Entry and New Protectionism”, Journal of International Economics, 20(3), 225–249.Ishikawa, J. and K. D. Lee (1997), “Backfiring Tariff in Vertically Related Markets”, Journal of International Economics, 42(3), 395–423.Ishikawa, J. and B. J. Spencer (1999), “Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Product”, Journal of International Economics, 48(2), 199–232.Krugman, P. R. (1994), Pedding Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations, New York: W. W. Norton.Krugman, P. R. (1996), Pop Internationalism, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Krugman, P. R. and A. Smith (1994), Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Meltzer, A. and S. F. Richard (1981), “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914–927.Metcalf, G. E. and NBER (2003), “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: Pigou, Taxation and Pollution”, Journal of Public Economics, 87(2), 313–322.Mohring, J. A. (1971), “Alternative Welfare Gain and Loss Measures”, Western Economic Journal, 9, 349–368.Myles, G. D. (1995), Public Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press.Neary, J. P. (1994), “Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?”, Journal of International Economics, 37, 197–218.Ng, Y. K. (1980), “Optimal Corrective Taxes or Subsidies when Revenue Raising Imposes an Excess Burden”, American Economic Review, 70(4), 744–751.Ng, Y. K. (2000), Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy: With a Case for Higher Public Spending, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.Ramsey, F. P. (1927), “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, Economic Journal, 37, 47–61.Spencer, B. J. and R. W. Jones (1991), “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy”, Review of Economic Studies, 58(1), 153–170.Spencer, B. J. and R. W. Jones (1992), “Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets”, Journal of International Economics, 32(1), 31–55.Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Tullock, G. (1967), “Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”, Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232. zh_TW
