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題名 公司治理對盈餘的監督與評價角色影響之研究 作者 蔡孟娟 貢獻者 戚務君
蔡孟娟關鍵詞 評價功能
監督功能
董監持股
Valuation earnings sensitives
Compensation earnings sensitives
stock ownership by directors and supervisors日期 2008 上傳時間 9-May-2016 11:28:50 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究探討盈餘反應係數 (盈餘之評價功能) 與盈餘酬勞反應係數 (盈餘之監督功能) 相對大小與公司治理之關聯性。實證結果發現,公司規模越大與董監持股越高的公司,會計盈餘的評價角色重於其監督的角色。相反的,當資訊不對稱以及席次偏離倍數越大時,公司的會計盈餘之評價功能越弱。
Earnings have two important roles, valuation and stewardship.The relative importance valuation and stewardship has not been examined closely by existed studies.The purpose of this study is to fill this gap. My findings show that larger firm size and greater amount ofstock held by the board increase the relative importance of the valuationrole of earnings. In contrast, more severe information asymmetry and largercontrol deviation increase the relative importance of the stewardship roleof accounting.參考文獻 方俊儒、張瑞當、曾玉琦, 2007, 核心代理問題與盈餘管理 : 董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討,管理學報, 第 24 卷第 1 期 : 17-39。林穎芬、 劉維琪, 2003, 從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度, 管理學報, 第 20 卷第 2 期 : 365-395。林淑惠、 胡星陽, 2003, 上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構, 經濟論文, 第 31 卷第 2 期 : 171-206。洪玉舜、 王泰昌,會計績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之相對重要性分析─探討公司與市場特性之影響,2003 會計理論與實務研討會論文集,光碟版。洪玉舜、 王泰昌, 2005, 績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性,證券市場發展季刊,第 17 卷第 2 期 : 35-100。洪玉舜、 王泰昌, 2008, 績效衡量指標在總經理股票誘因薪酬之相對重要性分析,會計評論,第 46 卷 : 1-29。施念恕, 1996, 會計盈餘、股價與高階主管薪酬之相關性研究, 國立中興大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。許文彥、劉淑芬,2006, 我國企業經理人薪酬與經營風險之關係, 風險管理學報, 第 8 卷第 1 期 : 35-47。陳明圓、 張家萍, 2006, 高階經理人薪酬變動之決定因素, 經濟叢刊論文, 第 34 卷第 3 期 : 285-316。辜秋萍,1997, 台灣企業高階主管主管薪酬與公司績效之研究, 國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。曾玉潔, 2000, 我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實證研究, 國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。蔡柳卿、 楊朝旭, 2004, 會計盈餘之監督與評價角色關聯性之研究 : 台灣實證結果,風險管理學報,第 6 卷第 2 期 : 119-154。蔡柳卿, 2006, 相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬 : 論產業競爭程度之影響,管理評論,第 25 卷第 1 期 : 69-94。蔡柳卿, 2007, 依會計盈餘時效性設計高階主管薪酬契約 : 董事會所扮演的角色,會計評論,第 44 期 : 61-94。Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient systemsof public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-WhartonPapers on Financial services, 4t h Annual Conference.Ball, R., and P. Brown. 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting incomenumbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 159-177.Banker, G., M. Gibbs, and B. Holmstrom. 1994. The wage policy of a firm.Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(April): 921-955.Banker, R.D., and S. M. Datar. 1989. Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregationof signals for performance measures. Working Paper, School ofManagement. The University of Texas.Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property.McMillian, New York, N.Y.Bushman, R., E. Engel, and A. Smith. 2006. An analysis of the relation betweenthe stewardship and valuation roles of earnings. Journal of AccountingResearch 44 (March) : 53-83.Colley, J. L., J. L. Doyle, W. Stettinius, and G. Logan. 2003. Corporate governance.NY:McGraw-Hill.Collins D. W., Maydew, E. L., and Weiss, I. S. 1997. Changes in the valuerelevanceof earnings and book values over the past forty years. Journalof Accounting and Economics 24 (1) : 39-67.Core, J., and W. Guay. 2002. The other side of the trade-off : The impact ofrisk on executive compensation : A revised comment. Working paper,Wharton School, University of Pennsylyania.Easley, D., R. Engle, M. O’Hara, and L. Wu. 2001. Time-varying arrival rates ofinformed and uninformed trades. WUSTL Economics,Working Paper.Easton, P., and M. Zmijewski. 1989. Cross-sectional variation in stock marketresponse to accounting earnings announcements. Journal of Accountingand Economics 11 : 117-141.Francis, J., and Schipper, K. 1999. Have financial statements lost their relevance?Journal of Accounting Research 37(2) : 319-352.Holmstom, B., and P, Milgrom. 1991. Multi-task principle-agent analysis: Incentivecontracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics& Organization 7, Special Issue : 24-52.Ittner, C., D. Larcker, and M. Rajan. 1997. The choice of performance measuresin annual bonus contracts.The Accounting Review 72 : 231-255.Jenson, M. andW.Meckling. 1976. The theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,agency costs and owner structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.Kaplan, S. N. 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance : a comparisonof Japan and the United States. The Journal of Political Economy102(June) : 510-546.Lamber, R. and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting andmarket measures of performance in execution compensation contracts.Journal of Accounting Research 25, Supplement : 95-125.Paul. J. 1992. On the efficiency of stock-based compensation. Review of FinancialStudies 5 : 471-502.Sloan, R. G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journalof Accounting and Economics 16 : 55-100.Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal ofFinance 52 : 737-783.Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of thedetermination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53 : 112-134. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
95353025資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353025 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 戚務君 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡孟娟 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 蔡孟娟 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2008 en_US dc.date.accessioned 9-May-2016 11:28:50 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 9-May-2016 11:28:50 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-May-2016 11:28:50 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0095353025 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/94688 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 95353025 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討盈餘反應係數 (盈餘之評價功能) 與盈餘酬勞反應係數 (盈餘之監督功能) 相對大小與公司治理之關聯性。實證結果發現,公司規模越大與董監持股越高的公司,會計盈餘的評價角色重於其監督的角色。相反的,當資訊不對稱以及席次偏離倍數越大時,公司的會計盈餘之評價功能越弱。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Earnings have two important roles, valuation and stewardship.The relative importance valuation and stewardship has not been examined closely by existed studies.The purpose of this study is to fill this gap. My findings show that larger firm size and greater amount ofstock held by the board increase the relative importance of the valuationrole of earnings. In contrast, more severe information asymmetry and largercontrol deviation increase the relative importance of the stewardship roleof accounting. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論......1第一節 研究動機與目的......1第二節 研究問題......5第三節 論文架構......6第二章 文獻探討......7第一節 盈餘之評價功能......7第二節 盈餘之監督功能......9第三節 監督與評價角色關聯性......11第四節 公司治理之股權結構......12第三章 研究設計與方法......15第一節 研究假說......15第二節 研究變數之設計......21第三節 研究期間、樣本與資料來源......25第四節 實證模型與研究方法......26第四章 實證結果分析......31第一節 樣本描述......31第二節 第一階段_個別公司之評價功能和監督功能......33第三節 第一階段_評價功能和監督功能間之關係......37第四節 第二階段_配對分析......41第五章 建議與結論......51第一節 研究結論......51第二節 研究限制......53第三節 未來建議......53附錄......54參考文獻......58 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353025 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 評價功能 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 監督功能 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董監持股 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Valuation earnings sensitives en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Compensation earnings sensitives en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) stock ownership by directors and supervisors en_US dc.title (題名) 公司治理對盈餘的監督與評價角色影響之研究 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 方俊儒、張瑞當、曾玉琦, 2007, 核心代理問題與盈餘管理 : 董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討,管理學報, 第 24 卷第 1 期 : 17-39。林穎芬、 劉維琪, 2003, 從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度, 管理學報, 第 20 卷第 2 期 : 365-395。林淑惠、 胡星陽, 2003, 上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構, 經濟論文, 第 31 卷第 2 期 : 171-206。洪玉舜、 王泰昌,會計績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之相對重要性分析─探討公司與市場特性之影響,2003 會計理論與實務研討會論文集,光碟版。洪玉舜、 王泰昌, 2005, 績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性,證券市場發展季刊,第 17 卷第 2 期 : 35-100。洪玉舜、 王泰昌, 2008, 績效衡量指標在總經理股票誘因薪酬之相對重要性分析,會計評論,第 46 卷 : 1-29。施念恕, 1996, 會計盈餘、股價與高階主管薪酬之相關性研究, 國立中興大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。許文彥、劉淑芬,2006, 我國企業經理人薪酬與經營風險之關係, 風險管理學報, 第 8 卷第 1 期 : 35-47。陳明圓、 張家萍, 2006, 高階經理人薪酬變動之決定因素, 經濟叢刊論文, 第 34 卷第 3 期 : 285-316。辜秋萍,1997, 台灣企業高階主管主管薪酬與公司績效之研究, 國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。曾玉潔, 2000, 我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實證研究, 國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。蔡柳卿、 楊朝旭, 2004, 會計盈餘之監督與評價角色關聯性之研究 : 台灣實證結果,風險管理學報,第 6 卷第 2 期 : 119-154。蔡柳卿, 2006, 相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬 : 論產業競爭程度之影響,管理評論,第 25 卷第 1 期 : 69-94。蔡柳卿, 2007, 依會計盈餘時效性設計高階主管薪酬契約 : 董事會所扮演的角色,會計評論,第 44 期 : 61-94。Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient systemsof public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-WhartonPapers on Financial services, 4t h Annual Conference.Ball, R., and P. Brown. 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting incomenumbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 159-177.Banker, G., M. Gibbs, and B. Holmstrom. 1994. The wage policy of a firm.Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(April): 921-955.Banker, R.D., and S. M. Datar. 1989. Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregationof signals for performance measures. Working Paper, School ofManagement. The University of Texas.Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property.McMillian, New York, N.Y.Bushman, R., E. Engel, and A. Smith. 2006. An analysis of the relation betweenthe stewardship and valuation roles of earnings. Journal of AccountingResearch 44 (March) : 53-83.Colley, J. L., J. L. Doyle, W. Stettinius, and G. Logan. 2003. Corporate governance.NY:McGraw-Hill.Collins D. W., Maydew, E. L., and Weiss, I. S. 1997. Changes in the valuerelevanceof earnings and book values over the past forty years. Journalof Accounting and Economics 24 (1) : 39-67.Core, J., and W. Guay. 2002. The other side of the trade-off : The impact ofrisk on executive compensation : A revised comment. Working paper,Wharton School, University of Pennsylyania.Easley, D., R. Engle, M. O’Hara, and L. Wu. 2001. Time-varying arrival rates ofinformed and uninformed trades. WUSTL Economics,Working Paper.Easton, P., and M. Zmijewski. 1989. Cross-sectional variation in stock marketresponse to accounting earnings announcements. Journal of Accountingand Economics 11 : 117-141.Francis, J., and Schipper, K. 1999. Have financial statements lost their relevance?Journal of Accounting Research 37(2) : 319-352.Holmstom, B., and P, Milgrom. 1991. Multi-task principle-agent analysis: Incentivecontracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics& Organization 7, Special Issue : 24-52.Ittner, C., D. Larcker, and M. Rajan. 1997. The choice of performance measuresin annual bonus contracts.The Accounting Review 72 : 231-255.Jenson, M. andW.Meckling. 1976. The theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,agency costs and owner structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.Kaplan, S. N. 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance : a comparisonof Japan and the United States. The Journal of Political Economy102(June) : 510-546.Lamber, R. and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting andmarket measures of performance in execution compensation contracts.Journal of Accounting Research 25, Supplement : 95-125.Paul. J. 1992. On the efficiency of stock-based compensation. Review of FinancialStudies 5 : 471-502.Sloan, R. G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journalof Accounting and Economics 16 : 55-100.Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal ofFinance 52 : 737-783.Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of thedetermination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53 : 112-134. zh_TW
