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題名 最適能源稅率、稅收用途及其3E效果的關聯分析
Linkage between Energy Tax Rate,Tax Revenue Disposals and 3E Effects
作者 章秀秀
貢獻者 黃宗煌
章秀秀
關鍵詞 能源稅率
稅收用途
3E效果
日期 2010
上傳時間 9-May-2016 15:16:35 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文擬建構一包含家計部門、能源供應商以及政府三部門之模型，以理論模型與模擬分析來探討最適能源稅率之訂定以及課徵能源稅對其他經濟變數之間的關聯性。
在模型設定上，本文有別於傳統文獻直接將能源消費放入效用函數中，而是以能源服務作為家計單位效用函數之影響變數，並透過家計單位之生產函數，結合能源與能源設備特徵，以生產能源服務，以此來建構家計單位之最適化模型。在政府決策方面，以享受能源服務之總成本最小，受限於政府預算平衡以及市場均衡之下，推導出最適能源稅率。
至於模擬分析部份，則是透過設計五種不同情境，除了基準情境不課徵能源稅外、另設計四種課徵能源稅的情境，並配合四種不同稅收用途，以內生求解方式，分別模擬出各情境下之最適能源稅率，以及其對能源、省能設備需求、二氧化碳排放及其他經濟變數的影響。再以不同之二氧化碳排放環境損害係數，作敏感度分析。
最後，透過不同政策優先之社會權數，就3E效果，包括能源、環境、經濟三方面影響，來比較各情境下所模擬出的總和結果，以加權計分方式，得出最適能源稅政策之配套措施，並配合我國現行能源相關稅費，歸納分析出政府未來開徵能源稅所應採行之政策工具及整合方向。
經過本文研究發現，訂定最適能源稅率之影響因素，除了傳統文獻所強調的環境損害成本應將之內部化以外，尚包括對能源服務支出的影響、對能源市場所產生的扭曲，以及對稅收的影響等。其中能源設備特徵需求之變動在訂定能源稅率時，扮演非常重要的角色。能源設備特徵需求之變動同時會影響能源服務單位成本與能源服務需求，為最適能源稅率之減項，甚至在環境損害成本中亦受到能源設備特徵變動，改變其設備之二氧化碳排放係數，使得環境損害成本降低，亦為最適能源稅率之減項。根據本模擬結果顯示，課能源稅使得能源價格上漲，能源設備特徵需求提高，勞動供給微幅增加，能源需求、二氧化碳排放量下降，家計所得、社會總成本、總稅收增加。表示課徵能源稅對降低能源需求，鼓勵消費者多選購節能產品，有相當明顯之效果。此外，當環境損害係數愈高，二氧化碳排放係數愈高之能源，其能源稅率應愈高。最後，本文利用不同之社會權數組合，得出課徵能源稅同時降低勞動稅，並將稅收投入環保支出所產生之3E效果相較其他政策配套為佳。而在推動綠色租稅改革之際，除了能源稅率訂定之合理化外，仍應作相關整合，包括油氣類產品之貨物稅應廢止，以避免重複課稅；並在訂定能源稅率時，將徵收空氣污染防制費所產生二氧化碳排放減量的效果一併考慮。
This thesis intends to construct a model which includes 3 sectors of household, energy supplier and government to derive the optimal energy tax rate and analyze the correlation between energy tax and the economic variations.
Households combine energy and energy equipment characteristics to generate the energy service. This research uses energy service as variables of household utility function and designs a energy service production function of household. This is different from traditional literature which use energy productions directly as variables of household utility function.
The theoretical model derives the optimal energy tax rate by minimize the cost for energy services subject to government budget balance and market equilibrium conditions. And five different scenarios including the base, tax added, green tax reform, tariff reduction, as well as total emission control, with four disposals of tax revenue are designed for the simulation to solve the energy tax rate and the other variables endogenously. In addition, the environmental damage coefficient of carbon dioxide emissions is used for the sensitivity analysis. Eventually, this study weighted the simulated results to devise the optimal policy package by the social weights of policy priorities. The social weights is given according to 3E effects including energy, environmental and economic impact.
The findings of this research are summarized as followed: (1)the factors for setting the optimal energy tax rate, in addition to the marginal environmental damage as the traditional literature emphasized and, it should also include the changes of the expenditures for energy services, distortion in energy markets, as well as the impacts to tax revenue including labor tax and tariff. (2) The simulation results show that the energy tax increases the energy price, demand of energy-saving products, labor supply, household income, total social costs, total tax revenues and decreases energy demand and carbon dioxide emission. (3) The higher the environmental damage coefficient of carbon dioxide emissions, the energy tax rates should be higher. (4) Green tax reform with the disposal of the tax revenue on environment protection generate the best 3E results comparing with the other policy package. (5) The excise tax of oil and gas products should be abolished, in order to avoid double taxed; and the Air Pollution Control Fee resulting the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions should be taken into account in determining the energy tax rate.
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Guertin, C., S. C. Kumbhakar, and A. K. Duraiappah (2003), “Determining Demand for Energy Services: Investigating income-driven behaviors”, International Institute for Sustainable Development, State University of New York , Binghamton.
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Parry, I. W. H., R. C. William, III, and L. H. Goulder (1999), “When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 37, 52-84.
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Rapanos, V. T. and M. T. Polemis (2005), “Energy demand and environmental taxes: the case of Greece”, Energy Policy, 33, 1781-1788.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
財政學系
90255505
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0902555051
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 黃宗煌zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 章秀秀zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 章秀秀zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 9-May-2016 15:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-May-2016 15:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-May-2016 15:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0902555051en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95152-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90255505zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文擬建構一包含家計部門、能源供應商以及政府三部門之模型，以理論模型與模擬分析來探討最適能源稅率之訂定以及課徵能源稅對其他經濟變數之間的關聯性。
在模型設定上，本文有別於傳統文獻直接將能源消費放入效用函數中，而是以能源服務作為家計單位效用函數之影響變數，並透過家計單位之生產函數，結合能源與能源設備特徵，以生產能源服務，以此來建構家計單位之最適化模型。在政府決策方面，以享受能源服務之總成本最小，受限於政府預算平衡以及市場均衡之下，推導出最適能源稅率。
至於模擬分析部份，則是透過設計五種不同情境，除了基準情境不課徵能源稅外、另設計四種課徵能源稅的情境，並配合四種不同稅收用途，以內生求解方式，分別模擬出各情境下之最適能源稅率，以及其對能源、省能設備需求、二氧化碳排放及其他經濟變數的影響。再以不同之二氧化碳排放環境損害係數，作敏感度分析。
最後，透過不同政策優先之社會權數，就3E效果，包括能源、環境、經濟三方面影響，來比較各情境下所模擬出的總和結果，以加權計分方式，得出最適能源稅政策之配套措施，並配合我國現行能源相關稅費，歸納分析出政府未來開徵能源稅所應採行之政策工具及整合方向。
經過本文研究發現，訂定最適能源稅率之影響因素，除了傳統文獻所強調的環境損害成本應將之內部化以外，尚包括對能源服務支出的影響、對能源市場所產生的扭曲，以及對稅收的影響等。其中能源設備特徵需求之變動在訂定能源稅率時，扮演非常重要的角色。能源設備特徵需求之變動同時會影響能源服務單位成本與能源服務需求，為最適能源稅率之減項，甚至在環境損害成本中亦受到能源設備特徵變動，改變其設備之二氧化碳排放係數，使得環境損害成本降低，亦為最適能源稅率之減項。根據本模擬結果顯示，課能源稅使得能源價格上漲，能源設備特徵需求提高，勞動供給微幅增加，能源需求、二氧化碳排放量下降，家計所得、社會總成本、總稅收增加。表示課徵能源稅對降低能源需求，鼓勵消費者多選購節能產品，有相當明顯之效果。此外，當環境損害係數愈高，二氧化碳排放係數愈高之能源，其能源稅率應愈高。最後，本文利用不同之社會權數組合，得出課徵能源稅同時降低勞動稅，並將稅收投入環保支出所產生之3E效果相較其他政策配套為佳。而在推動綠色租稅改革之際，除了能源稅率訂定之合理化外，仍應作相關整合，包括油氣類產品之貨物稅應廢止，以避免重複課稅；並在訂定能源稅率時，將徵收空氣污染防制費所產生二氧化碳排放減量的效果一併考慮。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis intends to construct a model which includes 3 sectors of household, energy supplier and government to derive the optimal energy tax rate and analyze the correlation between energy tax and the economic variations.
Households combine energy and energy equipment characteristics to generate the energy service. This research uses energy service as variables of household utility function and designs a energy service production function of household. This is different from traditional literature which use energy productions directly as variables of household utility function.
The theoretical model derives the optimal energy tax rate by minimize the cost for energy services subject to government budget balance and market equilibrium conditions. And five different scenarios including the base, tax added, green tax reform, tariff reduction, as well as total emission control, with four disposals of tax revenue are designed for the simulation to solve the energy tax rate and the other variables endogenously. In addition, the environmental damage coefficient of carbon dioxide emissions is used for the sensitivity analysis. Eventually, this study weighted the simulated results to devise the optimal policy package by the social weights of policy priorities. The social weights is given according to 3E effects including energy, environmental and economic impact.
The findings of this research are summarized as followed: (1)the factors for setting the optimal energy tax rate, in addition to the marginal environmental damage as the traditional literature emphasized and, it should also include the changes of the expenditures for energy services, distortion in energy markets, as well as the impacts to tax revenue including labor tax and tariff. (2) The simulation results show that the energy tax increases the energy price, demand of energy-saving products, labor supply, household income, total social costs, total tax revenues and decreases energy demand and carbon dioxide emission. (3) The higher the environmental damage coefficient of carbon dioxide emissions, the energy tax rates should be higher. (4) Green tax reform with the disposal of the tax revenue on environment protection generate the best 3E results comparing with the other policy package. (5) The excise tax of oil and gas products should be abolished, in order to avoid double taxed; and the Air Pollution Control Fee resulting the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions should be taken into account in determining the energy tax rate.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 目 錄 iv
表 例 vii
圖 例 viii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機與目的 1
1.2 研究範圍與方法 3
1.3 本文架構 5
第二章 文獻回顧 6
2.1 能源與能源服務需求 6
2.2 最適環境稅率 8
2.3 能源稅之模擬分析 20
2.4 本章結語 33
第三章 最適能源稅之理論模型 43
3.1 理論架構 43
3.2 基本設定 46
3.3 家計部門最適化 48
3.4 能源供應商最適化 51
3.5 最適能源稅率 52
3.6 本章結語 58
第四章 最適能源稅之模擬分析 59
4.1 基準情境設計 59
4.2 模擬情境說明 66
4.3 情境模擬分析 68
4.4 敏感度分析 84
第五章 我國開徵能源稅之政策考量 95
5.1 我國現行能源相關稅費 95
5.2 3E效果評比 108
5.3 政策意涵 111
第六章 結論與建議 113
參考文獻 116
附錄2-1：Guertin et al. (2003) 模型 120
附錄2-2：Kratena and Wüger (2004) 模型之相關設定 121
附錄2-3：Fullerton (1997) 的模型推導過程 124
附錄2-4：寡占市場(雙佔模型)最適環境稅之推導 125
附錄2-5：Kim(2002) 模型推導 126
附錄2-6：Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) 模型推導 127
附錄2-7：賴育邦、王嘉惠（2004）模型推導 129
附錄2-8：陳明真立委2007年提出能源稅條例草案稅率版本 130
附錄3-1：家計單位第一階段求解 131
附錄3-2：能源與設備特徵需求之比較靜態分析 132
附錄3-3：能源服務單位成本之比較靜態分析 133
附錄3-4：家計單位第二階段求解 134
附錄3-5：能源服務之比較靜態分析 136
附錄3-6：能源供應商要素需求 138
附錄3-7：要素需求之比較靜態分析 139
附錄3-8：最適能源稅率之推導 140
附錄4-1：家計部門能源服務單位成本極小化 142
附錄4-2：設備特徵需求與單位能源服務之能源需求比較靜態分析 143
附錄4-3：家計部門效用極大化 144
附錄4-4：能源供應商利潤極大化 145
附錄4-5：能源供應商要素投入之比較靜態分析 146		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0902555051en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 能源稅率zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 稅收用途zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 3E效果zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 最適能源稅率、稅收用途及其3E效果的關聯分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Linkage between Energy Tax Rate,Tax Revenue Disposals and 3E Effectsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
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