學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 從監理動機探析我國保險業之盈餘管理行為 作者 李世欽 貢獻者 王儷玲<br>李怡宗
李世欽關鍵詞 盈餘管理
保險監理
清償能力
裁量性應計數字
solvency
regulations
earnings management
discretionary accruals日期 2002 上傳時間 10-May-2016 15:55:34 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。 在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。
This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.參考文獻 王脩斐，1996，盈餘管理偵測模型之評估，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。江朝國，1999，保險法基礎理論(三版)，台北市：瑞興圖書股份有限公司。林嬋娟、洪櫻芬與薛敏正，1997，財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究，管理學報，第十四卷，第一期：15-38頁。金成隆、林修葳與張永芳，1999，強制性財務預測誤差與盈餘管理關係：20%門檻限制影響之研究，中國財務學刊，第七卷，第一期：59-93頁。連靜仙，1993，新上市公司盈餘管理之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。陳家齊，1997，我國新上市公司實質盈餘管理之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。陳遠哲、鄭純農，1995，保險會計選集（初版），台北市：致遠管理顧問股份有限公司。黃惠君，1995，公司上市前後盈餘操縱與上市後營運績效及盈餘操縱動機之關聯性研究，國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。鄭丁旺、康榮寶、李建然、金城隆與劉正田，1992，上市承銷價與盈餘管理，第四屆會計理論與實務研討會。蘇慧芬，1992，新上市公司上市前後年度盈餘窗飾之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。鄒政下，1999，保險會計理論與實務（三版），台北市：鄒政下。Aharony, J., C. J. Lin, and M. P. Loeb. 1993. Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choice, and Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research 10 (Fall): 61-81.Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. 1995. Managing Financial Reports of Commercial Banks: The Influence of Taxes, Regulatory Capital, and Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 33 (Autumn): 231-261.Beaver, W. H. and M. F. McNichols. 1998. The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers. Review of Accounting Studies 3: 73-95.Beneish, M. D. 1997. Detecting GAAP Violation: Implication for Assessing Earning Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16: 271-309.Bernard, V. L. and D. J. Skinner. 1996. What Motivates Managers’ Choice of Discretionary Accruals? Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 313-325.DeAngelo, L. E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61 (July): 400-420.Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70: 193-226.Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (Spring): 1-36.DeFond, M. and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt Covenant Violation and the Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January): 145-176.Friedlan, J. 1994. Accounting Choices by Issuers of Initial Public Offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research 11: 1-31.Gaver, J. J. and J. S. Paterson. 1999. Managing Insurance Company Financial Statements to Meet Regulatory and Tax Reporting Goals. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (Summer): 207-241.Grace, E. V. 1990. Property-Liability Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance 57 (March): 28-46.Guay, W. P., S. P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1996. A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accruals Models. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 83-105.Healy, P. M. 1985. The Impact of Bonus Schemes on the Selection of Accounting Principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 85-107.Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standards Setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (December): 365-383.Jeter, D. C. and L. Shivakumar. 1999. Cross-Sectional Estimation of Abnormal Accruals Using Quarterly and Annual Data: Effectiveness in Detecting Event-Specific Earnings Management. Accounting and Business Research 29: 299-319.Jones, J. 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigation. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn): 193-228.Kaplan, R. S. 1985. Comments on Paul Healy: Evidence on the Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Procedure and Accrual Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 109-113.McNichols, M. and G. P. Wilson. 1988. Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 1-31.Moyer, S. E. 1990. Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial Banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (July): 123-154.Nelson, K. 2000. Rate Regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers. The Accounting Review 75 (January): 115-138.Petroni, K. R. 1992. Optimistic Reporting in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (December): 485-508.Subramanyam, K. R. 1996. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 249-281.Tech, S. H., T. J. Wong, and G. R. Rao. 1998. Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3: 175-208.Thomas, J. and X. Zhang. 2000. Identifying Unexpected Accruals: A Comparison of Current Approaches. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19: 347-376.Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild. 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choice, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 61-91.Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ). 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2010000461 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 王儷玲<br>李怡宗 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李世欽 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 李世欽 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2002 en_US dc.date.accessioned 10-May-2016 15:55:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 10-May-2016 15:55:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-May-2016 15:55:34 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) A2010000461 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95913 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。 在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 摘要-----IABSTRACT-----II目錄-----III圖表目次-----V第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的-----1 第二節 研究問題-----5第二章 文獻探討 第一節 盈餘管理動機之研究-----7 第二節 裁量性應計項目衡量方法-----15 第三節 保險會計理論與實務-----22 第四節 保險公司盈餘管理之研究-----32第三章 研究方法 第一節 研究假說-----36 第二節 研究設計-----39 第三節 變數衡量-----43 第四節 資料來源與樣本選取-----49第四章 實證結果與分析 第一節 敘述性統計-----52 第二節 監理動機與盈餘管理關聯性分析-----59 第三節 敏感性分析-----71第五章 結論與建議 第一節 實證結果彙總與結論-----74 第二節 研究限制與建議-----76參考文獻-----81附錄一 本研究相關保險法民國90年7月增修後新舊條文對照表-----85圖表目次圖2-1 本研究文獻探討架構-----7圖2-2 責任準備金之提存-----25圖2-3 GAAP與SAP在資產負債表所產生的影響-----30圖4-1 產險業85-89年DA與NI/At-1中位數折線圖-----56圖4-2 壽險業85-89年DA與NI/At-1中位數折線圖-----56圖4-3 產險業85-89年DIST1次數分配圖-----57圖4-4 壽險業85-89年DIST1次數分配圖-----57圖4-5 產險業85-89年DIST2次數分配圖-----58圖4-6 壽險業85-89年DIST2次數分配圖-----58圖4-7 產險業85-89年DIST3次數分配圖-----58圖4-8 壽險業85-89年DIST3次數分配圖-----58圖4-9 產險業85-89年DA、DCA與NI/At-1中位數折線圖-----67圖4-10 壽險業85-89年DA、DCA與NI/At-1中位數折線圖-----68表2-1 一般公認會計原則與監理會計原則之比較-----29表3-1 樣本篩選過程-----50表3-2 85-89年產、壽險樣本公司分布情形-----51表4-1 Modified Jones模型參數估計之敘述性統計-----53表4-2 變數敘述性統計-----54表4-3 產險業Pearson Correlation Coefficient-----60表4-4 壽險業Pearson Correlation Coefficient-----61表4-5 VIF值表-----62表4-6 產險業盈餘管理程度（裁量性應計數字）與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果-----63表4-7 壽險業盈餘管理程度（裁量性應計數字）與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果-----65表4-8 產險業盈餘管理程度（流動裁量性應計數字）與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果-----69表4-9 壽險業盈餘管理程度（流動裁量性應計數字）與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果-----70表4-10 產險業盈餘管理程度與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果（DeAngelo模型）-----72表4-11 壽險業盈餘管理程度與監理門檻距離之迴歸結果（DeAngelo模型）-----73 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2010000461 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 保險監理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 清償能力 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 裁量性應計數字 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) solvency en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) regulations en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) earnings management en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) discretionary accruals en_US dc.title (題名) 從監理動機探析我國保險業之盈餘管理行為 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王脩斐，1996，盈餘管理偵測模型之評估，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。江朝國，1999，保險法基礎理論(三版)，台北市：瑞興圖書股份有限公司。林嬋娟、洪櫻芬與薛敏正，1997，財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究，管理學報，第十四卷，第一期：15-38頁。金成隆、林修葳與張永芳，1999，強制性財務預測誤差與盈餘管理關係：20%門檻限制影響之研究，中國財務學刊，第七卷，第一期：59-93頁。連靜仙，1993，新上市公司盈餘管理之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。陳家齊，1997，我國新上市公司實質盈餘管理之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。陳遠哲、鄭純農，1995，保險會計選集（初版），台北市：致遠管理顧問股份有限公司。黃惠君，1995，公司上市前後盈餘操縱與上市後營運績效及盈餘操縱動機之關聯性研究，國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。鄭丁旺、康榮寶、李建然、金城隆與劉正田，1992，上市承銷價與盈餘管理，第四屆會計理論與實務研討會。蘇慧芬，1992，新上市公司上市前後年度盈餘窗飾之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。鄒政下，1999，保險會計理論與實務（三版），台北市：鄒政下。Aharony, J., C. J. Lin, and M. P. Loeb. 1993. Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choice, and Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research 10 (Fall): 61-81.Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. 1995. Managing Financial Reports of Commercial Banks: The Influence of Taxes, Regulatory Capital, and Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 33 (Autumn): 231-261.Beaver, W. H. and M. F. McNichols. 1998. The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers. Review of Accounting Studies 3: 73-95.Beneish, M. D. 1997. Detecting GAAP Violation: Implication for Assessing Earning Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16: 271-309.Bernard, V. L. and D. J. Skinner. 1996. What Motivates Managers’ Choice of Discretionary Accruals? Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 313-325.DeAngelo, L. E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61 (July): 400-420.Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70: 193-226.Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (Spring): 1-36.DeFond, M. and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt Covenant Violation and the Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January): 145-176.Friedlan, J. 1994. Accounting Choices by Issuers of Initial Public Offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research 11: 1-31.Gaver, J. J. and J. S. Paterson. 1999. Managing Insurance Company Financial Statements to Meet Regulatory and Tax Reporting Goals. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (Summer): 207-241.Grace, E. V. 1990. Property-Liability Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance 57 (March): 28-46.Guay, W. P., S. P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1996. A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accruals Models. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 83-105.Healy, P. M. 1985. The Impact of Bonus Schemes on the Selection of Accounting Principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 85-107.Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standards Setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (December): 365-383.Jeter, D. C. and L. Shivakumar. 1999. Cross-Sectional Estimation of Abnormal Accruals Using Quarterly and Annual Data: Effectiveness in Detecting Event-Specific Earnings Management. Accounting and Business Research 29: 299-319.Jones, J. 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigation. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn): 193-228.Kaplan, R. S. 1985. Comments on Paul Healy: Evidence on the Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Procedure and Accrual Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 109-113.McNichols, M. and G. P. Wilson. 1988. Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 1-31.Moyer, S. E. 1990. Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial Banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (July): 123-154.Nelson, K. 2000. Rate Regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers. The Accounting Review 75 (January): 115-138.Petroni, K. R. 1992. Optimistic Reporting in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (December): 485-508.Subramanyam, K. R. 1996. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 249-281.Tech, S. H., T. J. Wong, and G. R. Rao. 1998. Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3: 175-208.Thomas, J. and X. Zhang. 2000. Identifying Unexpected Accruals: A Comparison of Current Approaches. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19: 347-376.Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild. 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choice, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 61-91.Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ). zh_TW
