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題名 我國上市公司股權集中度,薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究
A Study on the Relationship Among Top Executive Compensation Scheme, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance for Listed Companies in Taiwan
作者 吳政穎
Wu, Cheng-Ying
貢獻者 陳隆麒<br>張春雄
Chneg, Long-Chie<br>Chang, Chun-Shyong
吳政穎
Wu, Cheng-Ying
關鍵詞 代理問題
股權結構
高階主管薪酬計畫
經營績效
Agency
Ownership structure
Top executive compensation scheme
Firm performance
日期 1999
上傳時間 10-May-2016 18:52:45 (UTC+8)
摘要 高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。
In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms`` top executive with firms``stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses.
參考文獻 一、中文部份
王春源，個體經濟學分析，台北：自印，民85。
台灣證券交易所編印，上市證券概況，台北：自印，民88。
成嘉玲、魏江霖、秦瑞生等譯，計量經濟理論，台北：幼獅，民77。
江毓潔，從代理理論的觀點探討股權結構與公司多角化的關係，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文，民87。
周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏，家族企業聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷，民國85：115-139。
林燈煤，股權結構、投資與公司價值之關係－以台灣上市公司為例，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文，民88。
林穎芬，民營企業最高主管報償與公司績效之研究，國立中山大學企研所碩士論文，民78。
林穎芬，台灣上市公司控管機制之研究－探討家族與非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的控管效果，國立中山大學企研所博士論文，民88。
侍台誠，董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究─兼論法人董事的影響，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文，民83。
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張明峰，股權結構對公司績效影響之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文，民80。
張峻萍，公司監理與經營績效之關係，國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文，民87。
張訓華，股權結構、董事會組成與企業財務績效，東吳大學管理研究所碩士論文，民80。
黃旭輝，公司成長機會對經理人持股報償與董事監察人組成影響之研究，國立政治大學企研所博士論文，民86。
楊俊中，股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文，民國87年6月。
楊蕉霙，股權結構與公司價值間關係之研究，國立中山大學企研所碩士論文，民78。
楊淑華，代理理論觀點探究上市公司股權集中度與經營績效及市場評價的關係，淡江大學金融所碩士論文，民81。
蔡俊杰，台灣上市公司董事會結構之研究，國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文，民國84年4月。
蔡揚宗，董監事持股比例與經營績關係之研究，會計論文集，台北：五南，民80。
簡上智，家族企業上市後股權結構變動對企業經營績效影響之研究，國立成功大學企業研究所碩士論文，民國85年6月。
詹珍禎，高階主管誘因契約之建立與管理上之應用，國立中山大學企研所碩士論文，民72。
詹珍禎，資訊不對稱時主管認股模式之建立－極優法，管理科學學報，第3卷，民75：11-22。
鄭為庠，高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究，國立政治大學企研所碩士論文，民81。
謝永生，認購權證，台北：財訊出版社，民86。
戴淵明，公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究－台灣地區上市公司之實證分析，國立中興大學企研所碩士論文，民75。
蕭黎明，台灣上市公司最高主管之報償、持股比例與公司績效的關係，國立台灣大學財務金融所碩士論文，民82。
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCW0442012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳隆麒<br>張春雄zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chneg, Long-Chie<br>Chang, Chun-Shyongen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳政穎zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wu, Cheng-Yingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 吳政穎zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Cheng-Yingen_US
dc.date (日期) 1999en_US
dc.date.accessioned 10-May-2016 18:52:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 10-May-2016 18:52:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-May-2016 18:52:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G91NCCW0442012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96271-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 企業管理學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms`` top executive with firms``stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章緒論..........1
第一節研究動機與目的..........1
第二節研究範圍與限制..........7
第三節研究流程與輪文架構..........10
第貳章文獻探討與個案分析..........13
第一節代理問題..........14
第二節公司股權結構與經營績效的關係..........23
第三節經營績效與高階主管薪酬結構的關係..........31
第四節薪酬設計..........37
第五節個案訪談分析..........44
第參章研究設計..........52
第一節模式建立與結論..........53
第二節理論架構與研究假說..........63
第三節資料來源與樣本選取..........72
第四節變數操作性定義..........75
第五節問卷設計..........79
第六節實證分析方法..........81
第肆章實證結果分析....................89
第一節高階主管薪酬的描述..........90
第二節高階主管薪酬設計問卷調查結果分析..........114
第三節高階主管薪酬資料透明度的說明..........131
第四節高階主管薪酬實證結果說明..........140
第伍章結論與建議..........179
第一節研究成果與理論涵義..........180
第二節建議..........184
參考文獻..........191
附錄一模式證明..........201
附錄二問卷設計..........203		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCW0442012en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股權結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高階主管薪酬計畫zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經營績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Agencyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ownership structureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Top executive compensation schemeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Firm performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 我國上市公司股權集中度,薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A Study on the Relationship Among Top Executive Compensation Scheme, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance for Listed Companies in Taiwanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部份
王春源，個體經濟學分析，台北：自印，民85。
台灣證券交易所編印，上市證券概況，台北：自印，民88。
成嘉玲、魏江霖、秦瑞生等譯，計量經濟理論，台北：幼獅，民77。
江毓潔，從代理理論的觀點探討股權結構與公司多角化的關係，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文，民87。
周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏，家族企業聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷，民國85：115-139。
林燈煤，股權結構、投資與公司價值之關係－以台灣上市公司為例，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文，民88。
林穎芬，民營企業最高主管報償與公司績效之研究，國立中山大學企研所碩士論文，民78。
林穎芬，台灣上市公司控管機制之研究－探討家族與非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的控管效果，國立中山大學企研所博士論文，民88。
侍台誠，董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究─兼論法人董事的影響，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文，民83。
邱毅、張訓華，股權結構、董事會組成與企業財務績效，台北市銀月刊，第22卷，民80：11-32。
辜秋屏，高階主管酬勞與公司經營績效之實證研究，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文，民86。
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