1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. Publications
  3. College of Commerce
  4. Theses
  5. Item

Publications-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

NCCU Library

Citation Infomation

Related Publications in TAIR

題名 囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為分析
作者 謝慧美
貢獻者 周德宇
謝慧美
日期 1997
上傳時間 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8)
摘要 吾人日常生活中常遭遇類似囚犯兩難的問題，如返還遺失物、幫助陌生人、遵守規則，以及慈善捐贈等。傳統囚犯兩難賽局下的Nash均衡是雙方皆不合作，然而日常生活中實不乏合作的例子存在，因此有必要對PD賽局加以研究。
     本文利用演化方法，加入C類型與D類型於Guttman(1996)的模型中分析，試圖探討囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為變化。本文除了使Guttman的模型更為一般化之外，將使傳統文獻發展更為完整。
     本模型在單方不確定下存在兩種人，甲（R）是理性人，乙（MR）試可能理性人。甲懷疑乙可能是理性人、機械式TFT、C或D類型。研究結果發現：在混合策略的PBE中，對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前一階段而言，R不會採行非合作策略；對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前兩階段而言，MR不會採行非合作策略。當雙方交手次數增加時，非合作階段數維持不變，亦即，合作階段數隨交手機會增加而提高。最後透過比較靜態分析得知，當甲認為乙是C類型的可能性增加時，他可能提前或延後preempt策略以探索乙的類型。若甲認定乙是TFT類型的機率較小，使得preempt的策略報償大於和乙同時由C轉變為D的策略報償時，他會提前preempt以剝削乙。而當甲認定乙是TFT類型的主觀機率增加時，他會延後preempt以避免遭受乙的懲罰，故此時合作的機會增加。
     單方不確定性的結果可以一般化至雙方不確定的情況。
參考文獻 1. Andreoni, J. (1988), "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large
     Economy: The Limits of Altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Vol.
     35, pp. 57-73.
     2. _____ ( 1989), "Giving with Impure Altruism: Application to
     Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, Vo1.
     97, pp. 1447-58.
     3. (1990), "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public
     Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," Economy Journal, Vol. 100,
     pp.464-77.
     4. Axelrod, R. (1980), "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner` Dilemma,"
     Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, pp. 379-403.
     5. ____ (1981), "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,"
     American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, pp. 306-18.
     6. ____ (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York Basic
     Books.
     7. Becker, G. S. (1974), "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of
     Political Economy, Vol. 82, pp. 1063-93.
     8. Bergstrom, T. , L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), "On the Private
     Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 29, pp.
     25-49.
     9. Coase, R. H. (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
     Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 386-405.
     10. Conlisk, J. (1980), "Costly Optimizers Versus Cheap Imitators,"
     Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 275-
     93.
     11. Guttman, 1. M. (1996), "Rational Actor, Tit-for-tat Types, and the
     Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economy Behavior and
     Organization, Vol. 29, pp. 27-56.
     12. Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton
     University Press. Princeton, New Jersey.
     13. Hirshleifer, J. and 1. C. , Martinez Coll (1988), "What Strategies Can
     Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?" Journal of
     Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, pp. 367-98.
     14. Hobbes,T. (1651), Leviathan. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge,
     New York.
     15. Konrad, K. A. (1994),"The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private
     and Pub1ic Provision of Public Goods," Economica, Vol. 61, pp. 79-62.
     16. Krep, D. M. , P. Mi1grom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson, (1982), "Rational
     Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma," Journal of
     Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 245-52.
     17. Mailath, O. J. (1992), "Introduction: Symposiwn on Evolutionary
     Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, pp. 259-77.
     18. Mueller, D. C. (1986), "Rational Egoism Versus Adaptive Egoism as
     Fundational Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior,"
     Public Choice, Vol. 51, pp. 3-23.
     19. (1989), Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press.
     Cambridge.
     20. Myerson, R. B. (1991), Game Theory---Analysis of Conflict.
     Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London,
     England.
     21. Nachbar, 1. H. (1992), "Evolution in the Finite1y Repeated Prisoners`
     Dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior anti Organization, Vol. 19,
     pp. 307-91.
     22. Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University
     Press. Harvard.
     23. Posnett, 1. and T. Sandler, (1991), "The Private Provision of Public
     Goods: A perspective on Neutrality," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol.
     19, pp. 22-42.
     24. Scafri, A. ]. (1992), "Rational Conjectures Equilibriain the Private
     Provision of Public Goods," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.2,
     pp.139-51.
     25. Stark, O. (1993), "Nonmarket Transfers and Altruism," European
     Economic Review, Vo1. 37, pp. 1413-24.
     26. Suden, R.(1985), "Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions
     to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Doesn`t Work,"
     Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 117-24.
     27. Warr, P. G. (1982), "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private
     Charity," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 131-38.
     28. _____ (1983), "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is
     lndependent of the Distribution of Income," Economics Letters, Vol.
     13, pp. 207-11.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU7082012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 周德宇zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝慧美zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 謝慧美zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1997en_US
dc.date.accessioned 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G91NCCU7082012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96314-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 吾人日常生活中常遭遇類似囚犯兩難的問題，如返還遺失物、幫助陌生人、遵守規則，以及慈善捐贈等。傳統囚犯兩難賽局下的Nash均衡是雙方皆不合作，然而日常生活中實不乏合作的例子存在，因此有必要對PD賽局加以研究。
     本文利用演化方法，加入C類型與D類型於Guttman(1996)的模型中分析，試圖探討囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為變化。本文除了使Guttman的模型更為一般化之外，將使傳統文獻發展更為完整。
     本模型在單方不確定下存在兩種人，甲（R）是理性人，乙（MR）試可能理性人。甲懷疑乙可能是理性人、機械式TFT、C或D類型。研究結果發現：在混合策略的PBE中，對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前一階段而言，R不會採行非合作策略；對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前兩階段而言，MR不會採行非合作策略。當雙方交手次數增加時，非合作階段數維持不變，亦即，合作階段數隨交手機會增加而提高。最後透過比較靜態分析得知，當甲認為乙是C類型的可能性增加時，他可能提前或延後preempt策略以探索乙的類型。若甲認定乙是TFT類型的機率較小，使得preempt的策略報償大於和乙同時由C轉變為D的策略報償時，他會提前preempt以剝削乙。而當甲認定乙是TFT類型的主觀機率增加時，他會延後preempt以避免遭受乙的懲罰，故此時合作的機會增加。
     單方不確定性的結果可以一般化至雙方不確定的情況。		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 導論..........1
     第一節 囚犯兩難與公共財的關係..........1
     第二節 囚犯兩難賽局的結果..........3
     第三節 演化方法與囚犯兩難..........5
     第四節 演化模型的運用..........8
     第二章 合作演化模型..........11
     第一節 基本模型的建立..........11
     第二節 單方不確定下的行為分析..........12
     第三節 比較靜態分析..........26
     第三章 雙方不確定下的行為分析..........34
     第一節 緒論..........34
     第二節 模型的建立..........34
     第四章 結論與建議..........40
     第一節 結論..........40
     第二節 建議..........43
     詮釋..........45
     參考文獻..........48		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU7082012en_US
dc.title (題名) 囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為分析zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Andreoni, J. (1988), "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large
     Economy: The Limits of Altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Vol.
     35, pp. 57-73.
     2. _____ ( 1989), "Giving with Impure Altruism: Application to
     Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, Vo1.
     97, pp. 1447-58.
     3. (1990), "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public
     Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," Economy Journal, Vol. 100,
     pp.464-77.
     4. Axelrod, R. (1980), "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner` Dilemma,"
     Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, pp. 379-403.
     5. ____ (1981), "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,"
     American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, pp. 306-18.
     6. ____ (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York Basic
     Books.
     7. Becker, G. S. (1974), "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of
     Political Economy, Vol. 82, pp. 1063-93.
     8. Bergstrom, T. , L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), "On the Private
     Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 29, pp.
     25-49.
     9. Coase, R. H. (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
     Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 386-405.
     10. Conlisk, J. (1980), "Costly Optimizers Versus Cheap Imitators,"
     Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 275-
     93.
     11. Guttman, 1. M. (1996), "Rational Actor, Tit-for-tat Types, and the
     Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economy Behavior and
     Organization, Vol. 29, pp. 27-56.
     12. Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton
     University Press. Princeton, New Jersey.
     13. Hirshleifer, J. and 1. C. , Martinez Coll (1988), "What Strategies Can
     Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?" Journal of
     Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, pp. 367-98.
     14. Hobbes,T. (1651), Leviathan. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge,
     New York.
     15. Konrad, K. A. (1994),"The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private
     and Pub1ic Provision of Public Goods," Economica, Vol. 61, pp. 79-62.
     16. Krep, D. M. , P. Mi1grom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson, (1982), "Rational
     Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma," Journal of
     Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 245-52.
     17. Mailath, O. J. (1992), "Introduction: Symposiwn on Evolutionary
     Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, pp. 259-77.
     18. Mueller, D. C. (1986), "Rational Egoism Versus Adaptive Egoism as
     Fundational Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior,"
     Public Choice, Vol. 51, pp. 3-23.
     19. (1989), Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press.
     Cambridge.
     20. Myerson, R. B. (1991), Game Theory---Analysis of Conflict.
     Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London,
     England.
     21. Nachbar, 1. H. (1992), "Evolution in the Finite1y Repeated Prisoners`
     Dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior anti Organization, Vol. 19,
     pp. 307-91.
     22. Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University
     Press. Harvard.
     23. Posnett, 1. and T. Sandler, (1991), "The Private Provision of Public
     Goods: A perspective on Neutrality," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol.
     19, pp. 22-42.
     24. Scafri, A. ]. (1992), "Rational Conjectures Equilibriain the Private
     Provision of Public Goods," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.2,
     pp.139-51.
     25. Stark, O. (1993), "Nonmarket Transfers and Altruism," European
     Economic Review, Vo1. 37, pp. 1413-24.
     26. Suden, R.(1985), "Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions
     to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Doesn`t Work,"
     Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 117-24.
     27. Warr, P. G. (1982), "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private
     Charity," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 131-38.
     28. _____ (1983), "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is
     lndependent of the Distribution of Income," Economics Letters, Vol.
     13, pp. 207-11.		zh_TW