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題名 囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為分析 作者 謝慧美 貢獻者 周德宇
謝慧美日期 1997 上傳時間 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8) 摘要 吾人日常生活中常遭遇類似囚犯兩難的問題，如返還遺失物、幫助陌生人、遵守規則，以及慈善捐贈等。傳統囚犯兩難賽局下的Nash均衡是雙方皆不合作，然而日常生活中實不乏合作的例子存在，因此有必要對PD賽局加以研究。 本文利用演化方法，加入C類型與D類型於Guttman(1996)的模型中分析，試圖探討囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為變化。本文除了使Guttman的模型更為一般化之外，將使傳統文獻發展更為完整。 本模型在單方不確定下存在兩種人，甲（R）是理性人，乙（MR）試可能理性人。甲懷疑乙可能是理性人、機械式TFT、C或D類型。研究結果發現：在混合策略的PBE中，對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前一階段而言，R不會採行非合作策略；對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前兩階段而言，MR不會採行非合作策略。當雙方交手次數增加時，非合作階段數維持不變，亦即，合作階段數隨交手機會增加而提高。最後透過比較靜態分析得知，當甲認為乙是C類型的可能性增加時，他可能提前或延後preempt策略以探索乙的類型。若甲認定乙是TFT類型的機率較小，使得preempt的策略報償大於和乙同時由C轉變為D的策略報償時，他會提前preempt以剝削乙。而當甲認定乙是TFT類型的主觀機率增加時，他會延後preempt以避免遭受乙的懲罰，故此時合作的機會增加。 單方不確定性的結果可以一般化至雙方不確定的情況。 參考文獻 1. Andreoni, J. (1988), "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 57-73. 2. _____ ( 1989), "Giving with Impure Altruism: Application to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, Vo1. 97, pp. 1447-58. 3. (1990), "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," Economy Journal, Vol. 100, pp.464-77. 4. Axelrod, R. (1980), "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner` Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, pp. 379-403. 5. ____ (1981), "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, pp. 306-18. 6. ____ (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York Basic Books. 7. Becker, G. S. (1974), "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, pp. 1063-93. 8. Bergstrom, T. , L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 25-49. 9. Coase, R. H. (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 386-405. 10. Conlisk, J. (1980), "Costly Optimizers Versus Cheap Imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 275- 93. 11. Guttman, 1. M. (1996), "Rational Actor, Tit-for-tat Types, and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economy Behavior and Organization, Vol. 29, pp. 27-56. 12. Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 13. Hirshleifer, J. and 1. C. , Martinez Coll (1988), "What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, pp. 367-98. 14. Hobbes,T. (1651), Leviathan. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York. 15. Konrad, K. A. (1994),"The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Pub1ic Provision of Public Goods," Economica, Vol. 61, pp. 79-62. 16. Krep, D. M. , P. Mi1grom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson, (1982), "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 245-52. 17. Mailath, O. J. (1992), "Introduction: Symposiwn on Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, pp. 259-77. 18. Mueller, D. C. (1986), "Rational Egoism Versus Adaptive Egoism as Fundational Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior," Public Choice, Vol. 51, pp. 3-23. 19. (1989), Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 20. Myerson, R. B. (1991), Game Theory---Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. 21. Nachbar, 1. H. (1992), "Evolution in the Finite1y Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior anti Organization, Vol. 19, pp. 307-91. 22. Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. Harvard. 23. Posnett, 1. and T. Sandler, (1991), "The Private Provision of Public Goods: A perspective on Neutrality," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 19, pp. 22-42. 24. Scafri, A. ]. (1992), "Rational Conjectures Equilibriain the Private Provision of Public Goods," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.2, pp.139-51. 25. Stark, O. (1993), "Nonmarket Transfers and Altruism," European Economic Review, Vo1. 37, pp. 1413-24. 26. Suden, R.(1985), "Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Doesn`t Work," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 117-24. 27. Warr, P. G. (1982), "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 131-38. 28. _____ (1983), "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is lndependent of the Distribution of Income," Economics Letters, Vol. 13, pp. 207-11. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU7082012 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 周德宇 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝慧美 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 謝慧美 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 1997 en_US dc.date.accessioned 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-May-2016 18:56:59 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G91NCCU7082012 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96314 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 吾人日常生活中常遭遇類似囚犯兩難的問題，如返還遺失物、幫助陌生人、遵守規則，以及慈善捐贈等。傳統囚犯兩難賽局下的Nash均衡是雙方皆不合作，然而日常生活中實不乏合作的例子存在，因此有必要對PD賽局加以研究。 本文利用演化方法，加入C類型與D類型於Guttman(1996)的模型中分析，試圖探討囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為變化。本文除了使Guttman的模型更為一般化之外，將使傳統文獻發展更為完整。 本模型在單方不確定下存在兩種人，甲（R）是理性人，乙（MR）試可能理性人。甲懷疑乙可能是理性人、機械式TFT、C或D類型。研究結果發現：在混合策略的PBE中，對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前一階段而言，R不會採行非合作策略；對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前兩階段而言，MR不會採行非合作策略。當雙方交手次數增加時，非合作階段數維持不變，亦即，合作階段數隨交手機會增加而提高。最後透過比較靜態分析得知，當甲認為乙是C類型的可能性增加時，他可能提前或延後preempt策略以探索乙的類型。若甲認定乙是TFT類型的機率較小，使得preempt的策略報償大於和乙同時由C轉變為D的策略報償時，他會提前preempt以剝削乙。而當甲認定乙是TFT類型的主觀機率增加時，他會延後preempt以避免遭受乙的懲罰，故此時合作的機會增加。 單方不確定性的結果可以一般化至雙方不確定的情況。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 導論..........1 第一節 囚犯兩難與公共財的關係..........1 第二節 囚犯兩難賽局的結果..........3 第三節 演化方法與囚犯兩難..........5 第四節 演化模型的運用..........8 第二章 合作演化模型..........11 第一節 基本模型的建立..........11 第二節 單方不確定下的行為分析..........12 第三節 比較靜態分析..........26 第三章 雙方不確定下的行為分析..........34 第一節 緒論..........34 第二節 模型的建立..........34 第四章 結論與建議..........40 第一節 結論..........40 第二節 建議..........43 詮釋..........45 參考文獻..........48 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU7082012 en_US dc.title (題名) 囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為分析 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Andreoni, J. (1988), "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 57-73. 2. _____ ( 1989), "Giving with Impure Altruism: Application to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, Vo1. 97, pp. 1447-58. 3. (1990), "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," Economy Journal, Vol. 100, pp.464-77. 4. Axelrod, R. (1980), "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner` Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, pp. 379-403. 5. ____ (1981), "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, pp. 306-18. 6. ____ (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York Basic Books. 7. Becker, G. S. (1974), "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, pp. 1063-93. 8. Bergstrom, T. , L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 25-49. 9. Coase, R. H. (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 386-405. 10. Conlisk, J. (1980), "Costly Optimizers Versus Cheap Imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 275- 93. 11. Guttman, 1. M. (1996), "Rational Actor, Tit-for-tat Types, and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economy Behavior and Organization, Vol. 29, pp. 27-56. 12. Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 13. Hirshleifer, J. and 1. C. , Martinez Coll (1988), "What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, pp. 367-98. 14. Hobbes,T. (1651), Leviathan. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York. 15. Konrad, K. A. (1994),"The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Pub1ic Provision of Public Goods," Economica, Vol. 61, pp. 79-62. 16. Krep, D. M. , P. Mi1grom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson, (1982), "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 245-52. 17. Mailath, O. J. (1992), "Introduction: Symposiwn on Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, pp. 259-77. 18. Mueller, D. C. (1986), "Rational Egoism Versus Adaptive Egoism as Fundational Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior," Public Choice, Vol. 51, pp. 3-23. 19. (1989), Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 20. Myerson, R. B. (1991), Game Theory---Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. 21. Nachbar, 1. H. (1992), "Evolution in the Finite1y Repeated Prisoners` Dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior anti Organization, Vol. 19, pp. 307-91. 22. Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. Harvard. 23. Posnett, 1. and T. Sandler, (1991), "The Private Provision of Public Goods: A perspective on Neutrality," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 19, pp. 22-42. 24. Scafri, A. ]. (1992), "Rational Conjectures Equilibriain the Private Provision of Public Goods," Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.2, pp.139-51. 25. Stark, O. (1993), "Nonmarket Transfers and Altruism," European Economic Review, Vo1. 37, pp. 1413-24. 26. Suden, R.(1985), "Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Doesn`t Work," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 117-24. 27. Warr, P. G. (1982), "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 131-38. 28. _____ (1983), "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is lndependent of the Distribution of Income," Economics Letters, Vol. 13, pp. 207-11. zh_TW
