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題名 敵意併購下採取防禦措施對主併公司股東利益之影響
The Effects of Shareholders’ Value of Acquiring Companies on Hostile Takeover Defenses作者 鄭亦珺
Cheng, I Chun貢獻者 許崇源
Hsu, Chung Yuan
鄭亦珺
Cheng, I Chun關鍵詞 敵意併購
反併購防禦措施
股東財富
贏家詛咒
Hostile Takeover
Anti-takeover Defenses
Shareholders’ Wealth
Winner’s Curse日期 2016 上傳時間 1-Jul-2016 14:56:01 (UTC+8) 摘要 循著時光的隧道，自二十世紀初以來，全球企業併購的熱潮方興未艾，時至今日「併購」已為一般人所熟知，併購的型態更演變出多種樣貌。本文以敵意併購為基調，蒐集全球2000年至2015年樣本，研究結果顯示，敵意併購之宣告對主併公司股東短期有不利之影響，若目標公司採取防禦策略時，對主併公司股東而言亦不利。故如果一公司欲發動敵意併購時，需考量目標公司是否有防禦措施的設置，惟此結果未達顯著水準。此外本研究亦針對敵意併購下主併公司股東的異常報酬，探討影響股東異常報酬的原因，實證結果得知，併購溢價越高，對於主併公司股東顯著不利，驗證「贏家的詛咒」理論，亦即併購溢價越多，將使得主併公司持股人的財富移轉至目標公司身上，對主併方股東有不利之影響。
The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one.參考文獻 沈中華、李建然，2000，事件研究法—財務與會計實證研究必備一版，華泰文化事業公司。林芊芊，2008，敵意併購目標公司經營效率之研究，政治大學會計研究所學位論文。陳安琳、湯惠雯與許銘峻，2000，企業購併對主併公司股東財富的影響，亞太管理評論，第5卷第2期(6月)：171-182。陳修賢，2008，後波特時代的企業優勢，哈佛商業評鑑全球繁體中文版，2008年9月號：66-69。陳赫榮，2015，商譽會計處理方法與併購宣告對股價累積異常報酬影響之關聯性，臺灣大學會計學研究所學位論文。許守銘，2007，從公司治理觀點論敵意併購及其防禦方式之法律問題研究－以台灣、新加坡及香港相關法令為中心，政治大學法學院碩士在職專班學位論文。黃愉涵，2012，敵意併購下目標公司是否採取防禦措施對主併公司併購前後經營績效之影響，中興大學會計學研究所學位論文。黃日燦、游明德，2015，2015海外併購白皮書，資誠聯合會計師事務所、普華國際財務顧問股份有限公司。楊佳璋、張子，2001，經營權爭霸: 企業敵意購併攻防戰，商周出版。鄭勝旭，2007，企業公開收購與一般併購宣告對股東財富影響之比較，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士班學位論文。劉彥皇，2007，公司敵意併購防禦措施之研究，中原大學財經法律研究所學位論文。劉連煜，2007，現代公司法增訂二版，新學林出版社。謝明瑞，2008，贏家詛咒，國政評論，財團法人國家政策基金會。Bainbridge, S. M. 2002. Corporation law and economics. Foundation Press.Bebchuk, L. A., J. C. Coates IV, and G. Subramanian. 2002. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence and policy. Stanford Law Review 54 (May): 887-951.Bradley, M. 1987. Gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between target and acquiring firms, Working paper, University of Michigan.Capen, E. C., R. V. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell. 1971. Competitive bidding in high-risk situations. Journal of petroleum technology 23 (June): 641-653.Choi, A. 2004. Golden parachute as a compensation-shifting mechanism. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (April): 170-191.Coffee, J. C. 1984. Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer`s Role in Corporate Governance. Columbia Law Review 84 (January): 1145-1296.Demidova, E. 2007. Hostile takeovers and defenses against them in Russia. Problems of Economic Transition 50 (September): 44-60.Franks, J., R. Harris, and S. Titman. 1991. The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring firms. Journal of Financial economics 29 (March): 81-96.Harris, E. G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. The Rand Journal of Economics 21 (Winter): 614-625.Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (http://imaa-institute.org/).Jarrell, G. A., J. A. Brickley, and J. M. Netter. 1988. The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (Winter): 49-68.Jenkinson T. and C. Mayer. 1994. Hostile Takeovers: Defense, Attack and Corporate Governance. London: McGraw-Hill.Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (May): 323-329.Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback, 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial economics 11 (April): 5-50.Linn, S. C., and J. J. McConnell. 1983. An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices. Journal of financial economics 11 (April): 361-399.Lipton, M. 2002. Pills, polls, and professors redux. The University of Chicago Law Review 69 (Summer): 1037-1065.Mahoney, J. M., and J. T. Mahoney. 1993. An empirical investigation of the effect of corporate charter antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal 14 (January): 17-31.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, edited by Alan J Auerbach. University of Chicago Press: 101-136.Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of financial economics 52 (April): 3-46.Patell, J. M. 1976. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: Empirical test. Journal of accounting research 14 (Autumn): 246-276.Pearce, J. A., and R. B. Robinson. 2004. Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth. Business Horizons 47 (February): 15-24.Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of business 59 (April): 197-216.Ruback, R. S. 1987. An overview of takeover defenses. In Mergers and acquisitions: 49-68. University of Chicago Press.Schoenberg, R., and D. Thornton. 2006. The impact of bid defences in hostile acquisitions. European Management Journal 24 (April): 142-150.Shleifer, A., and L. H. Summers. 1988. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach. University of Chicago Press: 33-68.Sokolyk, T. 2011. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (June): 612-627.Weston, J. F. 2001. Mergers & Acquisitions. USA: McGraw-Hill Professional Book Group.Zarin, S., and E. Yang. 2011. Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and defense strategies against them. Bachelor thesis, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg.Zibart, D. A. 1985. Control of beta reliability in studies of abnormal return magnitudes: A methodological note. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (Autumn): 920-926. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353029資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353029 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 許崇源 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hsu, Chung Yuan en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鄭亦珺 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Cheng, I Chun en_US dc.creator (作者) 鄭亦珺 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Cheng, I Chun en_US dc.date (日期) 2016 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2016 14:56:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2016 14:56:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2016 14:56:01 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103353029 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98545 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103353029 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 循著時光的隧道，自二十世紀初以來，全球企業併購的熱潮方興未艾，時至今日「併購」已為一般人所熟知，併購的型態更演變出多種樣貌。本文以敵意併購為基調，蒐集全球2000年至2015年樣本，研究結果顯示，敵意併購之宣告對主併公司股東短期有不利之影響，若目標公司採取防禦策略時，對主併公司股東而言亦不利。故如果一公司欲發動敵意併購時，需考量目標公司是否有防禦措施的設置，惟此結果未達顯著水準。此外本研究亦針對敵意併購下主併公司股東的異常報酬，探討影響股東異常報酬的原因，實證結果得知，併購溢價越高，對於主併公司股東顯著不利，驗證「贏家的詛咒」理論，亦即併購溢價越多，將使得主併公司持股人的財富移轉至目標公司身上，對主併方股東有不利之影響。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究目的與問題 3第三節 研究架構與流程 3一、 研究架構 3二、 研究流程 4第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 6第一節 企業併購之概述與種類 6一、 企業併購之概述 6二、 企業併購之種類 7第二節 敵意併購之基本概念 8第三節 敵意併購之動機與財富移轉 8一、 敵意併購之動機 9二、 敵意併購之財富移轉 10第四節 敵意併購與防禦措施 12一、 採行防禦措施之理由 12二、 防禦措施之類型 13三、 防禦措施之效果 20四、 防禦措施對股東利益之影響 21第五節 假說發展 22一、 敵意併購宣告對主併公司股東利益之影響 22二、 目標公司採取防禦措施對主併公司股東利益之影響 22三、 敵意併購下影響主併公司股東利益之其他因素 23第三章 研究設計 24第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 24第二節 研究方法 24一、 事件研究法 24二、 線性迴歸模型 29第三節 研究假設 30第四章 實證結果分析 32第一節 敘述性統計分析 32一、 樣本之敘述性統計 32二、 異常報酬之敘述性統計 40三、 線性迴歸之敘述性統計 41第二節 實證結果分析 44一、 異常報酬 44二、 線性迴歸模型 47第五章 結論與建議 50第一節 結論 50第二節 研究限制與建議 51附錄一 全球敵意併購樣本詳細資料(2000年~2015年) 52參考文獻 75 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353029 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 敵意併購 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反併購防禦措施 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東財富 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 贏家詛咒 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Hostile Takeover en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Anti-takeover Defenses en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholders’ Wealth en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Winner’s Curse en_US dc.title (題名) 敵意併購下採取防禦措施對主併公司股東利益之影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Effects of Shareholders’ Value of Acquiring Companies on Hostile Takeover Defenses en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 沈中華、李建然，2000，事件研究法—財務與會計實證研究必備一版，華泰文化事業公司。林芊芊，2008，敵意併購目標公司經營效率之研究，政治大學會計研究所學位論文。陳安琳、湯惠雯與許銘峻，2000，企業購併對主併公司股東財富的影響，亞太管理評論，第5卷第2期(6月)：171-182。陳修賢，2008，後波特時代的企業優勢，哈佛商業評鑑全球繁體中文版，2008年9月號：66-69。陳赫榮，2015，商譽會計處理方法與併購宣告對股價累積異常報酬影響之關聯性，臺灣大學會計學研究所學位論文。許守銘，2007，從公司治理觀點論敵意併購及其防禦方式之法律問題研究－以台灣、新加坡及香港相關法令為中心，政治大學法學院碩士在職專班學位論文。黃愉涵，2012，敵意併購下目標公司是否採取防禦措施對主併公司併購前後經營績效之影響，中興大學會計學研究所學位論文。黃日燦、游明德，2015，2015海外併購白皮書，資誠聯合會計師事務所、普華國際財務顧問股份有限公司。楊佳璋、張子，2001，經營權爭霸: 企業敵意購併攻防戰，商周出版。鄭勝旭，2007，企業公開收購與一般併購宣告對股東財富影響之比較，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士班學位論文。劉彥皇，2007，公司敵意併購防禦措施之研究，中原大學財經法律研究所學位論文。劉連煜，2007，現代公司法增訂二版，新學林出版社。謝明瑞，2008，贏家詛咒，國政評論，財團法人國家政策基金會。Bainbridge, S. M. 2002. Corporation law and economics. Foundation Press.Bebchuk, L. A., J. C. Coates IV, and G. Subramanian. 2002. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence and policy. Stanford Law Review 54 (May): 887-951.Bradley, M. 1987. Gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between target and acquiring firms, Working paper, University of Michigan.Capen, E. C., R. V. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell. 1971. Competitive bidding in high-risk situations. Journal of petroleum technology 23 (June): 641-653.Choi, A. 2004. Golden parachute as a compensation-shifting mechanism. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (April): 170-191.Coffee, J. C. 1984. Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer`s Role in Corporate Governance. Columbia Law Review 84 (January): 1145-1296.Demidova, E. 2007. Hostile takeovers and defenses against them in Russia. Problems of Economic Transition 50 (September): 44-60.Franks, J., R. Harris, and S. Titman. 1991. The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring firms. Journal of Financial economics 29 (March): 81-96.Harris, E. G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. The Rand Journal of Economics 21 (Winter): 614-625.Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (http://imaa-institute.org/).Jarrell, G. A., J. A. Brickley, and J. M. Netter. 1988. The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (Winter): 49-68.Jenkinson T. and C. Mayer. 1994. Hostile Takeovers: Defense, Attack and Corporate Governance. London: McGraw-Hill.Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (May): 323-329.Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback, 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial economics 11 (April): 5-50.Linn, S. C., and J. J. McConnell. 1983. An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices. Journal of financial economics 11 (April): 361-399.Lipton, M. 2002. Pills, polls, and professors redux. The University of Chicago Law Review 69 (Summer): 1037-1065.Mahoney, J. M., and J. T. Mahoney. 1993. An empirical investigation of the effect of corporate charter antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal 14 (January): 17-31.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, edited by Alan J Auerbach. University of Chicago Press: 101-136.Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of financial economics 52 (April): 3-46.Patell, J. M. 1976. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: Empirical test. Journal of accounting research 14 (Autumn): 246-276.Pearce, J. A., and R. B. Robinson. 2004. Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth. Business Horizons 47 (February): 15-24.Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of business 59 (April): 197-216.Ruback, R. S. 1987. An overview of takeover defenses. In Mergers and acquisitions: 49-68. University of Chicago Press.Schoenberg, R., and D. Thornton. 2006. The impact of bid defences in hostile acquisitions. European Management Journal 24 (April): 142-150.Shleifer, A., and L. H. Summers. 1988. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach. University of Chicago Press: 33-68.Sokolyk, T. 2011. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (June): 612-627.Weston, J. F. 2001. Mergers & Acquisitions. USA: McGraw-Hill Professional Book Group.Zarin, S., and E. Yang. 2011. Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and defense strategies against them. Bachelor thesis, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg.Zibart, D. A. 1985. Control of beta reliability in studies of abnormal return magnitudes: A methodological note. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (Autumn): 920-926. zh_TW
