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題名 勞動逃漏稅、失業率與經濟成長
Tax Evasion of Labor Incomes, Unemployment Rate, and Economic Growth作者 俞秋詠
Yu, Chau Wing貢獻者 洪福聲
Hung, Fu Sheng
俞秋詠
Yu, Chau Wing關鍵詞 逃漏稅
失業率
經濟成長日期 2016 上傳時間 1-Jul-2016 15:25:22 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文結合勞動市場資訊不對稱與逃漏稅行為於一模型中，將勞動市場資訊不對稱現象設立為模型的第一階段，而模型的第二階段則設定為勞動者逃漏稅之決定，再以倒推法先後得出最適逃漏稅比例與均衡失業率。接著，我們將分別以資訊不對稱、金融發展程度等變數檢視逃漏稅與失業率如何與經濟成長產生連結；另外，更將透過比較靜態分析，探討在各外生變數變動下，如何影響經濟體系之稅率、失業率與經濟成長率。據本研究的數值模擬以及比較靜態分析結果發現，金融發展程度越好的國家，低能力勞動者會產生較大的意願至廠商就業，而在均衡分離型就業契約下，失業率必須上升，以驅使低能力勞動者無法進入廠商就業，最後，帶來經濟成長率的上升；反之對於金融發展程度較差國家而言，此時低能力勞動者沒有意願至廠商就業，帶來了失業率下降與經濟成長率下降的現象。 參考文獻 中文文獻:[ 1 ] 黃仁德及羅時萬(2000)，《現代經濟成長理論》，華泰文化出版。[ 2 ] 李建強(2003)，「金融發展、經濟成長與資本所得稅」，《國立中正大學國際經濟研究所博士論文》。英文文獻:[ 3 ] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative.Destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 2, 323–351.[ 4 ] Akerlof, G. 1970. “The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , 89, 488–500. [ 5 ] Allingham, M., and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.[ 6 ] Arnott, R. and J. E. Stiglitz (1991), “Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions:Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?,” American Economic Review,81, 179–190.[ 7 ] Azariadis, C. and B. D. Smith (1993), “Adverse selection in the overlapping generations model: the case of pure exchange,” Journal of Economic Theory, 60, 277-305. [ 8 ] Barro, R. J. (1990), “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S103–S125.[ 9 ] Beck, T., A. L. Chen, and A. U. Yue, (2014), “Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach,” Journal of Finance,69, 763-817.[ 10 ] Betts, C. and J. Bhattacharya (1998), “Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions,” Economic Theory, 12, 489-517.[ 11 ] Blackburn, K., N. Bose, and S. Capassom (2012), “Tax evasion, the Underground Economy and Financial Development,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83, 243– 253.[ 12 ]Caballe, J. and J. Panades (1997), “Tax Evasion and Economic Growth,” Public Finance, 52, 318–340. [ 13 ] Chen, B. L. (2003), “Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(2), 381-403.[ 14 ] Cowell, F. A., Gordon, J. P. F. (1988). Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public Good Provision. Journal of Public Economics, 36, 305-321.[ 15 ] Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2004), “Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 593-622.[ 16 ] Diamond, P. A. (1965), “National debt in a neoclassical growth model,”American Economic Review, 55, 1126-1150.[ 17 ] Domar, Evsey D. (1946), “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment. Author(s): Evsey D. Domar. Source: Econometrica, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1946), pp. 137-147.[ 18 ] Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 417-458.[ 19 ] Fu, J. (1996), “The effects of asymmetric information on economic growth,”Southern Economic Journal, 63, 312-26.[ 20 ] Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009), “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(7), 855-866.[ 21 ] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991), “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,” MIT Press, Cambridge. [ 22 ] Harrod, Roy F. (1939), “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, 49(March): 14–33.[ 23 ] Hung, F. S. and W. R. Liao (2007), “Self-financing, Asymmetric Information,and Government Spending in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model,” Taiwan Economic Review, 35, 249-284.[ 24 ] Hung, F. S. and C. C. Lee (2010), “Asymmetric Information, Government Fiscal Policies, and Financial Development,” Economic Development Quarterly.[ 25 ] Hung, F. S. (2015), “Tax Evasion, Financial Dualism, and Economic Growth,”Academia Economic Papers, 43:2, 175-213.[ 26 ] Kolm, S.-C. (1973), “A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 2,209[ 27 ] Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”Journal of Monetary. Economics 22，p.3-42. 20.[ 28 ] Romer, P. M. (1986), “Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(5), 1002-1037.[ 29 ] Romer, P. M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), s71-s102.[ 30 ] Rebelo, S. (1991), "Long Run Policy Analysis and the Long Run Growth",Journal of Policy Economy, 99, pp.500-521. [ 31 ] Slemrod, J. (2006), “Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalization,and Privacy in 21st Century Tax Policy,” Fiscal Studies, 27, 1–15.[ 32 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (1987), “The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89, 25–34.[ 33 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002), “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,” Handbook of Public Economics, 3, 1423–1470.[ 34 ]Spence, A. M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,87, 355–374.[ 35 ] Spence, A. M. (1974), “ Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes,” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.[ 36 ] Stokey, N.L. (1991), “ Human capital, product quality, and growth, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.106(2), pp.587-616.[ 37 ] Taylor, L. (1983), “Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable Models for the Third World,” New York: Basic Books.[ 38 ] Tsiddon, D. (1992), “Moral hazard trap to growth,” International Economic Review, 33, 299-321. [ 39 ] Young, A. (1991), “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,” NBER Working Papers, 3577. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
103258041資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258041 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 洪福聲 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hung, Fu Sheng en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 俞秋詠 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yu, Chau Wing en_US dc.creator (作者) 俞秋詠 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Yu, Chau Wing en_US dc.date (日期) 2016 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2016 15:25:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2016 15:25:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2016 15:25:22 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103258041 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98650 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103258041 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文結合勞動市場資訊不對稱與逃漏稅行為於一模型中，將勞動市場資訊不對稱現象設立為模型的第一階段，而模型的第二階段則設定為勞動者逃漏稅之決定，再以倒推法先後得出最適逃漏稅比例與均衡失業率。接著，我們將分別以資訊不對稱、金融發展程度等變數檢視逃漏稅與失業率如何與經濟成長產生連結；另外，更將透過比較靜態分析，探討在各外生變數變動下，如何影響經濟體系之稅率、失業率與經濟成長率。據本研究的數值模擬以及比較靜態分析結果發現，金融發展程度越好的國家，低能力勞動者會產生較大的意願至廠商就業，而在均衡分離型就業契約下，失業率必須上升，以驅使低能力勞動者無法進入廠商就業，最後，帶來經濟成長率的上升；反之對於金融發展程度較差國家而言，此時低能力勞動者沒有意願至廠商就業，帶來了失業率下降與經濟成長率下降的現象。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 4第一節 研究動機與目的 4第二節 研究方法與論文架構 5第一節 經濟成長模型的演變 6第二節 逃漏稅之相關文獻 8第三節 勞動市場資訊不對稱之相關文獻 9第三章 基本模型 11第一節 逃漏稅之決定 12第二節 勞動市場與分離型就業契約之設定 20第三節 逃漏稅、政府稽查與經濟成長 25第四章 數值分析 28第一節 特定資訊不對稱程度與各變數的分析 28第二節 比較靜態分析 33第五章 結論 42參考文獻 44附錄一 48附錄二 49附錄三 50 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1186104 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258041 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 逃漏稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 失業率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟成長 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 勞動逃漏稅、失業率與經濟成長 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Tax Evasion of Labor Incomes, Unemployment Rate, and Economic Growth en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文文獻:[ 1 ] 黃仁德及羅時萬(2000)，《現代經濟成長理論》，華泰文化出版。[ 2 ] 李建強(2003)，「金融發展、經濟成長與資本所得稅」，《國立中正大學國際經濟研究所博士論文》。英文文獻:[ 3 ] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative.Destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 2, 323–351.[ 4 ] Akerlof, G. 1970. “The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , 89, 488–500. [ 5 ] Allingham, M., and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.[ 6 ] Arnott, R. and J. E. Stiglitz (1991), “Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions:Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?,” American Economic Review,81, 179–190.[ 7 ] Azariadis, C. and B. D. Smith (1993), “Adverse selection in the overlapping generations model: the case of pure exchange,” Journal of Economic Theory, 60, 277-305. [ 8 ] Barro, R. J. (1990), “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S103–S125.[ 9 ] Beck, T., A. L. Chen, and A. U. Yue, (2014), “Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach,” Journal of Finance,69, 763-817.[ 10 ] Betts, C. and J. Bhattacharya (1998), “Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions,” Economic Theory, 12, 489-517.[ 11 ] Blackburn, K., N. Bose, and S. Capassom (2012), “Tax evasion, the Underground Economy and Financial Development,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83, 243– 253.[ 12 ]Caballe, J. and J. Panades (1997), “Tax Evasion and Economic Growth,” Public Finance, 52, 318–340. [ 13 ] Chen, B. L. (2003), “Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(2), 381-403.[ 14 ] Cowell, F. A., Gordon, J. P. F. (1988). Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public Good Provision. Journal of Public Economics, 36, 305-321.[ 15 ] Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2004), “Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 593-622.[ 16 ] Diamond, P. A. (1965), “National debt in a neoclassical growth model,”American Economic Review, 55, 1126-1150.[ 17 ] Domar, Evsey D. (1946), “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment. Author(s): Evsey D. Domar. Source: Econometrica, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1946), pp. 137-147.[ 18 ] Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 417-458.[ 19 ] Fu, J. (1996), “The effects of asymmetric information on economic growth,”Southern Economic Journal, 63, 312-26.[ 20 ] Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009), “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(7), 855-866.[ 21 ] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991), “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,” MIT Press, Cambridge. [ 22 ] Harrod, Roy F. (1939), “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, 49(March): 14–33.[ 23 ] Hung, F. S. and W. R. Liao (2007), “Self-financing, Asymmetric Information,and Government Spending in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model,” Taiwan Economic Review, 35, 249-284.[ 24 ] Hung, F. S. and C. C. Lee (2010), “Asymmetric Information, Government Fiscal Policies, and Financial Development,” Economic Development Quarterly.[ 25 ] Hung, F. S. (2015), “Tax Evasion, Financial Dualism, and Economic Growth,”Academia Economic Papers, 43:2, 175-213.[ 26 ] Kolm, S.-C. (1973), “A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 2,209[ 27 ] Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”Journal of Monetary. Economics 22，p.3-42. 20.[ 28 ] Romer, P. M. (1986), “Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(5), 1002-1037.[ 29 ] Romer, P. M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), s71-s102.[ 30 ] Rebelo, S. (1991), "Long Run Policy Analysis and the Long Run Growth",Journal of Policy Economy, 99, pp.500-521. [ 31 ] Slemrod, J. (2006), “Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalization,and Privacy in 21st Century Tax Policy,” Fiscal Studies, 27, 1–15.[ 32 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (1987), “The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89, 25–34.[ 33 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002), “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,” Handbook of Public Economics, 3, 1423–1470.[ 34 ]Spence, A. M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,87, 355–374.[ 35 ] Spence, A. M. (1974), “ Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes,” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.[ 36 ] Stokey, N.L. (1991), “ Human capital, product quality, and growth, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.106(2), pp.587-616.[ 37 ] Taylor, L. (1983), “Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable Models for the Third World,” New York: Basic Books.[ 38 ] Tsiddon, D. (1992), “Moral hazard trap to growth,” International Economic Review, 33, 299-321. [ 39 ] Young, A. (1991), “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,” NBER Working Papers, 3577. zh_TW
