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題名 企業CEO之權力型態與融資偏好關聯性之研究-以上市公司為例
CEO Power Type and Preference on Financing Instruments-Evidences from Listed Companies in Taiwan
作者 鍾依玲
貢獻者 張清福
鍾依玲
關鍵詞 CEO權力
融資決策
CEO Power
Financing Strategy
日期 2016
上傳時間 11-Jul-2016 16:54:14 (UTC+8)
摘要 在企業中擔任領導者的CEO，對於公司決策之執行具有重大影響力，對於擁有不同權力型態之CEO，在公司面臨外部資金需求時，是否因其自身的條件因素，而影響其作出不同的融資決策。本研究之CEO權力乃參考Finkelstein(1992)與Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia(2002)之定義，將CEO權力分類為專家知識權力、聲望權力、結構權力與所有權權力四種型態，以2006至2015年的台灣上市公司為樣本，探討CEO之權力型態如何影響公司外部融資偏好。研究結果顯示，具備不同權力之CEO會因其權力指標不同而作出不同的融資決策，高聲望權力與高所有權之CEO傾向權益融資為主，高專家知識權力與高結構權力的CEO則選擇優先採取負債融資之方式。
CEO plays a key role in forming a variety of business strategies. This study investigates the relation between CEO power type and preference on financing instruments when company needs external funds.
Based on Finkelstein(1992), Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia’s(2002), the CEO power is classified as four types: expert knowledge power, reputation power, structure power and ownership power. In addressing how CEO power type influences her/his preference on financing instruments, this sample consists of all listed companies in Taiwan for the period for 2006 to 2015.
The empirical result indicated that CEO power type does matter in choosing financing instrument. CEO with high reputation power or high ownership power prefers equity financing while those with high expert knowledge power or high structure power prefer liability financing.
參考文獻 王俊元，2010，高階文官在決策過程扮演的角色之研究，考銓研究報告，考
試院，臺北。
牛建波，2013，高管權力研究的評述與基本框架構建，公司治理，2，頁1-
29。
林秀鳳與李建然，2008，管理特質對企業績效之影響，中山管理評論，第16
卷，第4 期，頁703-742。
吳昆皇，1995，上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營績效之關聯性研究，
國立臺灣大學商學研究所未出版碩士論文。
吳建頤，1999，董事會規模對公司價值的影響，國立中正大學財務金融研究
所碩士論文。
洪世馨，2003，設立外部董事與企業經營績效之關係，國立成功大學會計學
研究所碩士論文。
張明峰，1991，股權結構對公司績效影響之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研
究所未出版碩士論文。
曾江洪、何鵬，2004，從格拉索事件看CEO 權力對CEO 薪酬的影響，經濟
管理，15，頁58-61。
劉韻僖，2006，臺灣高科技產業高階經營團隊及董事會權力與組織績效關係
之研究，交大管理學報，26(1)，頁173-200。
劉韻僖、林玟廷，2010，CEO 權力與薪酬關係之實證研究－代理和資源依
賴觀點，中原企管評論，8(1)，頁35-60。
韓立岩、李慧，2009，CEO權力與財務危機—中國上市公司的經驗證據，金
融研究，343(1)，頁179-193。
Adams, R. B., H. Almeida and D. Ferreira. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18(4): 1403-1432.
Baskin, J. 1989. An empirical in investigation of the pecking order hypothesis.
Financial management 18: 26-35.
Bhagat, S. and B. S. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27: 231-273.
Chatterjee, A. and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. It’s all about me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52(3): 351-386.
Daily, C. M. and J. L. Johnson. 1997. Sources of CEO power and firm financial performance: A longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management 23 (20): 97-117.
Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, A. E. Ellstrand, and J. L. Johnson. 1998. Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance. Strategic Management Journal 19(3): 269-290.
Fama, E.F. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2): 288-307.
Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325.
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement and Validation. Academy of Management Journal 35(5): 505-538.
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick. 1990. Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly 35(3): 484-503.
Frank, M. Z. and V. K. Goyal. 2003. Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 67: 217-248.
Fuerst and Kang. 2000. Corporate governance, expected operating performance and pricing. Working paper. Yale School of Management. New Haven.
Geletkanycz, M. A. and D. C. Hambrick. 1997. The External Ties of Top Executives: Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(4): 654-681.
Grabke-Rundell, A. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2002. Power as a Determinant of Executive Compensation. Human Resource Management Review 12: 3-23.
Haleblian, J. and S. Finkelstein. 1993. Top management team size, CEO dominance and firm performance: The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion. Academy of Management Journal 36(4): 844-863.
Haynes, K.T. and A. Hillman. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal 31(11): 1145-1163.
Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick. 1997. Explaining The Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1):103-127.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(3): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. and R. Ruback. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76(2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48(3): 831-880.
Kramer, R. M. 1999. Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions. Annual Review of Psychology 50: 569-598.
Lemmon, M. L. and K. V. Lins. 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial 58(4): 1445-1468.
Mangel, R. and H. Singh. 1993. Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporations. Accounting and Business Research 23: 339-350.
Meyer J. W. and B. Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure As Myth And Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363.
Milbourn, T.T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68(2): 233–262.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 799-819.
Myers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39: 575-592.
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics. 13: 187-221.
Pfeffer, J. and G.R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row, New York.
Pfeffer, J. 1992. Managing with Power. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Shen, W. and A. A. Cannella. 2002. Power Dynamics Within Top Management and Their Impacts on CEO Dismissal Followed by Inside Succession. Academy of Management Journal 45(6): 1195-1206.
Shyam-Sunder, L. and S. C. Myers. 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 219-244.
Ting, H.I. 2013. CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan. Journal of Business Research 66: 2466-2472.
Weisbach, M. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353022
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353022
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張清福zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鍾依玲zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 鍾依玲zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2016 16:54:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jul-2016 16:54:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2016 16:54:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103353022en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/98839-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103353022zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在企業中擔任領導者的CEO，對於公司決策之執行具有重大影響力，對於擁有不同權力型態之CEO，在公司面臨外部資金需求時，是否因其自身的條件因素，而影響其作出不同的融資決策。本研究之CEO權力乃參考Finkelstein(1992)與Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia(2002)之定義，將CEO權力分類為專家知識權力、聲望權力、結構權力與所有權權力四種型態，以2006至2015年的台灣上市公司為樣本，探討CEO之權力型態如何影響公司外部融資偏好。研究結果顯示，具備不同權力之CEO會因其權力指標不同而作出不同的融資決策，高聲望權力與高所有權之CEO傾向權益融資為主，高專家知識權力與高結構權力的CEO則選擇優先採取負債融資之方式。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) CEO plays a key role in forming a variety of business strategies. This study investigates the relation between CEO power type and preference on financing instruments when company needs external funds.
Based on Finkelstein(1992), Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia’s(2002), the CEO power is classified as four types: expert knowledge power, reputation power, structure power and ownership power. In addressing how CEO power type influences her/his preference on financing instruments, this sample consists of all listed companies in Taiwan for the period for 2006 to 2015.
The empirical result indicated that CEO power type does matter in choosing financing instrument. CEO with high reputation power or high ownership power prefers equity financing while those with high expert knowledge power or high structure power prefer liability financing.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 CEO權力 5
一. 資源依賴理論 6
二. 代理成本理論 7
三. 外部董事 8
第二節 融資順位理論 11
第三章 研究方法及資料 12
第一節 研究假說 12
第二節 實證模型 15
第三節 變數說明 17
一. 應變數 17
二. 自變數 17
三. 控制變數 19
第四章 實證結果 22
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 22
第二節 敘述統計量 22
第三節 相關性分析 25
第四節 迴歸分析 31
第五章 研究結論與建議 40
第一節 研究結論 40
第二節 研究限制與建議 42
參考文獻 43		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353022en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO權力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 融資決策zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO Poweren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financing Strategyen_US
dc.title (題名) 企業CEO之權力型態與融資偏好關聯性之研究-以上市公司為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) CEO Power Type and Preference on Financing Instruments-Evidences from Listed Companies in Taiwanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王俊元，2010，高階文官在決策過程扮演的角色之研究，考銓研究報告，考
試院，臺北。
牛建波，2013，高管權力研究的評述與基本框架構建，公司治理，2，頁1-
29。
林秀鳳與李建然，2008，管理特質對企業績效之影響，中山管理評論，第16
卷，第4 期，頁703-742。
吳昆皇，1995，上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營績效之關聯性研究，
國立臺灣大學商學研究所未出版碩士論文。
吳建頤，1999，董事會規模對公司價值的影響，國立中正大學財務金融研究
所碩士論文。
洪世馨，2003，設立外部董事與企業經營績效之關係，國立成功大學會計學
研究所碩士論文。
張明峰，1991，股權結構對公司績效影響之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研
究所未出版碩士論文。
曾江洪、何鵬，2004，從格拉索事件看CEO 權力對CEO 薪酬的影響，經濟
管理，15，頁58-61。
劉韻僖，2006，臺灣高科技產業高階經營團隊及董事會權力與組織績效關係
之研究，交大管理學報，26(1)，頁173-200。
劉韻僖、林玟廷，2010，CEO 權力與薪酬關係之實證研究－代理和資源依
賴觀點，中原企管評論，8(1)，頁35-60。
韓立岩、李慧，2009，CEO權力與財務危機—中國上市公司的經驗證據，金
融研究，343(1)，頁179-193。
Adams, R. B., H. Almeida and D. Ferreira. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18(4): 1403-1432.
Baskin, J. 1989. An empirical in investigation of the pecking order hypothesis.
Financial management 18: 26-35.
Bhagat, S. and B. S. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27: 231-273.
Chatterjee, A. and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. It’s all about me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52(3): 351-386.
Daily, C. M. and J. L. Johnson. 1997. Sources of CEO power and firm financial performance: A longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management 23 (20): 97-117.
Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, A. E. Ellstrand, and J. L. Johnson. 1998. Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance. Strategic Management Journal 19(3): 269-290.
Fama, E.F. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2): 288-307.
Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325.
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement and Validation. Academy of Management Journal 35(5): 505-538.
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick. 1990. Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly 35(3): 484-503.
Frank, M. Z. and V. K. Goyal. 2003. Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 67: 217-248.
Fuerst and Kang. 2000. Corporate governance, expected operating performance and pricing. Working paper. Yale School of Management. New Haven.
Geletkanycz, M. A. and D. C. Hambrick. 1997. The External Ties of Top Executives: Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(4): 654-681.
Grabke-Rundell, A. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2002. Power as a Determinant of Executive Compensation. Human Resource Management Review 12: 3-23.
Haleblian, J. and S. Finkelstein. 1993. Top management team size, CEO dominance and firm performance: The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion. Academy of Management Journal 36(4): 844-863.
Haynes, K.T. and A. Hillman. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal 31(11): 1145-1163.
Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick. 1997. Explaining The Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1):103-127.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(3): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. and R. Ruback. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76(2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48(3): 831-880.
Kramer, R. M. 1999. Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions. Annual Review of Psychology 50: 569-598.
Lemmon, M. L. and K. V. Lins. 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial 58(4): 1445-1468.
Mangel, R. and H. Singh. 1993. Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporations. Accounting and Business Research 23: 339-350.
Meyer J. W. and B. Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure As Myth And Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363.
Milbourn, T.T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68(2): 233–262.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 799-819.
Myers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39: 575-592.
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics. 13: 187-221.
Pfeffer, J. and G.R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row, New York.
Pfeffer, J. 1992. Managing with Power. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Shen, W. and A. A. Cannella. 2002. Power Dynamics Within Top Management and Their Impacts on CEO Dismissal Followed by Inside Succession. Academy of Management Journal 45(6): 1195-1206.
Shyam-Sunder, L. and S. C. Myers. 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 219-244.
Ting, H.I. 2013. CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan. Journal of Business Research 66: 2466-2472.
Weisbach, M. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.		zh_TW