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題名 以股權結構觀點探討代理理論與創新投資之關聯性
The Effects of Ownership Structure on Innovation Investments: an Agency Perspective
作者 洪晏東
Hung, Yen Dong
貢獻者 張清福
洪晏東
Yen Dong Hung
關鍵詞 傳統代理問題
核心代理問題
股權集中
股權分散
研發支出
Type I agency problems
Type II agency problems
Concentration of ownership
Dispersed ownership
Research and development expenses
日期 2016
上傳時間 20-Jul-2016 16:41:26 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。
本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業，而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示，在股權分散情況下，傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中，董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下，核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。
此外，相較於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入，代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後，發現相對於股權集中之企業，若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知，在相對於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。
Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure.
The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments.
Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.
參考文獻 一、中文文獻部分
1.王祝三、莊雅雪與郭勁甫，2009，公司治理、投資與公司價值之關聯性，東吳經濟商學學報，第66期（9月）：69-114。
2.白素青，2003，影響研究發展支出之因素探討－以上市電子產業為例，國立雲林科技大學財務金融碩士班研究所未出版之碩士論文。
3.李馨蘋、鄭誌偉，2008，從管理者薪酬與機構法人持股之觀點看企業創新投資之影響因素，東吳經濟商學學報，第62期（9月）：47-68。
4.林宛瑩、汪瑞芝與游順合，2012，研發支出、內部董事與經營績效，會計審計論叢，第二卷，第1期：61-90。
5.林宛瑩、許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第二十八卷，第1期：269-312。
6.林郁翎、黃建華，2009，考慮公司治理之企業財務危機預警模型，東吳經濟商學學報，第64期（3月）：23-56。
7.林容竹、黃荃與杜玉振，2002，董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究－以臺灣上市公司為例，管理與系統，第九卷，第3期：345-368。
8.林慧珍，2003，公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及其績效之影響－研發密集產業之實證，國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
9.洪秀芬、陳貴端，2003，交叉持股對公司治理之影響，東海大學法學究第19期（12月）：211-250。
10.洪美蘭，1999，所有權結構、投資和公司價值之實證分析，國立高雄第一科技大學金融營運研究所未出版之碩士論文。
11.洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍，2005，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係—股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論，第十二卷，第3期：23-40。
12.陳美娥、羅吉台，2000，台灣上市公司交叉持股之經濟特徵與防範（上），會研究月刊，第181期（12月）：113-116。
13.陳美娥、羅吉台，2001，台灣上市公司交叉持股之經濟特徵與防範（下），會研究月刊，第182期（1月）：68-71。
14.董秋梅，1999，機構投資人對企業R&D活動之影響，國立交通大學經營管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
15.董廣平，1999，關係企業交叉持股之利害與因應，會計研究月刊，第159期（2月）：18-23。
16.廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期（9月）：117-160。
17.葉銀華，2016，公司治理：全球觀點、台灣體驗，台中：滄海書局股份有限公司。
18.賴鈺城、劉文正，2015，公司治理，台北：新陸書局股份有限公司。
二、外文文獻部分
1.Agrawal, A., and G. N. Mandelker. 1987. Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. Journal of Finance 42 (September): 823-837.
2.Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanism to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysts 31 (September): 377-397.
3.Almeida, H., and D. Wolfenzon. 2006. A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups. Journal of Finance 61 (May): 2637-2680.
4.Baysinger, B., and R. E. Hoskisson. 1990. The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. Academy of Management Review 15 (January): 72-87.
5.Baysinger, B. D., R. D. Kosnik, and T. A. Turk. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy. Academy of Management Journal 34 (March): 205-214.
6.Benjamin E. H., and M. S. Weisbach. 2003. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review 9 (August): 7-26.
7.Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
8.Boyd, B. K. 1994. Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal 15 (June): 335-344.
9.Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease., and C. W. Smith. 1988. Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (January): 267-291.
10.Byrd, J., and A. Hickman. 1992. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (October): 195-221.
11.Claessens, S., S. Djankov., J. Fan., and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112.
12.Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. 1994. Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: the Impact of Board Composition and Structure. Academy of Management Journal 37 (December): 1603-1617.
13.Eugene F. Fama. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-308.
14.Geiger, S. W., and L. H. Cashen. 2007. Organizational Size and CEO Compensation: The Moder-ating Effect of Diversification in Downscoping Organizations. Journal of Managerial Issues 19 (June): 233-252.
15.Hill, C. W. L., and Snell, S. A. 1988. External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries. Strategic Management Journal 9 (November): 577-590.
16.Jensen, M. C., and S. R. Rebuck. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
17.Jensen M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-360.
18.Kenser, I. F. 1987. Directors stock ownership and organizational performance: An investigation of Fortune 500 companies. Journal of Management 13 (September): 499-507.
19.Kosnik, R. D. 1987. Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance. Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (June): 163-185.
20.La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54 (April): 471-517.
21.McConnell, J., and Servaes, H. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (October): 595-612.
22.Mehran, H. 1995. Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Antitakeover Amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 38: 163-184.
23.Milgrom, P., and Robert, J. 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 355-379.
24.Mohd, M. A., Perry, L. G., and Rimbey, J. N. 1998. The Impact of Ownership Structure on Corporate Debt Policy: A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis. The Financial Review 33(August): 85-98.
25.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
26.Oswald, S. L., and Jahera, J. 1991. The Influence of Ownership on Performance: An Empirical Study. Strategic Management Journal 12(May): 321-326.
27.Patton, A., and J. C. Baker. 1987. Why Won`t Directors Rock the Boat? Harvard Business Review 65: 10-15.
28.Pound, J. 1988. Proxy Contest and the Efficiency of Shareholders Oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20(January-March): 237-265.
29.Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52(June): 737-783.
30.Steiner, T. L. 1996. A Reexamination of the Relationships between Ownership Structure, Firm Diversification, and Tobin’s Q. Journal of Business and Economics 35(Autumn): 39-48.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353102
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033531022
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張清福zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 洪晏東zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yen Dong Hungen_US
dc.creator (作者) 洪晏東zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hung, Yen Dongen_US
dc.date (日期) 2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned 20-Jul-2016 16:41:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-Jul-2016 16:41:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Jul-2016 16:41:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1033531022en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99309-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103353102zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。
本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業，而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示，在股權分散情況下，傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中，董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下，核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。
此外，相較於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入，代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後，發現相對於股權集中之企業，若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知，在相對於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure.
The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments.
Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1
　第一節 研究動機與目的 1
　第二節 研究問題 5
　第三節 研究流程 6
第貳章 文獻探討 8
　第一節 代理理論及其研究現況 8
　第二節 股權結構及其研究現況 18
第參章 研究設計 22
　第一節 研究架構 22
　第二節 研究假說 24
　第三節 實證模型 30
　第四節 研究變數衡量 34
　第五節 樣本選定及樣本選取方式 41
　第六節 統計分析方法 42
第肆章 實證結果與分析 43
　第一節 敘述性分析 43
　第二節 Pearson相關係數分析 48
　第三節 變異數膨脹因素法（VIF）分析 53
　第四節 迴歸分析 55
第伍章 研究結論與建議 59
　第一節 研究結論 59
　第二節 研究建議與限制 61
第陸章 參考文獻 62		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033531022en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 傳統代理問題zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 核心代理問題zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股權集中zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股權分散zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 研發支出zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Type I agency problemsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Type II agency problemsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Concentration of ownershipen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dispersed ownershipen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Research and development expensesen_US
dc.title (題名) 以股權結構觀點探討代理理論與創新投資之關聯性zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Effects of Ownership Structure on Innovation Investments: an Agency Perspectiveen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文文獻部分
1.王祝三、莊雅雪與郭勁甫，2009，公司治理、投資與公司價值之關聯性，東吳經濟商學學報，第66期（9月）：69-114。
2.白素青，2003，影響研究發展支出之因素探討－以上市電子產業為例，國立雲林科技大學財務金融碩士班研究所未出版之碩士論文。
3.李馨蘋、鄭誌偉，2008，從管理者薪酬與機構法人持股之觀點看企業創新投資之影響因素，東吳經濟商學學報，第62期（9月）：47-68。
4.林宛瑩、汪瑞芝與游順合，2012，研發支出、內部董事與經營績效，會計審計論叢，第二卷，第1期：61-90。
5.林宛瑩、許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第二十八卷，第1期：269-312。
6.林郁翎、黃建華，2009，考慮公司治理之企業財務危機預警模型，東吳經濟商學學報，第64期（3月）：23-56。
7.林容竹、黃荃與杜玉振，2002，董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究－以臺灣上市公司為例，管理與系統，第九卷，第3期：345-368。
8.林慧珍，2003，公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及其績效之影響－研發密集產業之實證，國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
9.洪秀芬、陳貴端，2003，交叉持股對公司治理之影響，東海大學法學究第19期（12月）：211-250。
10.洪美蘭，1999，所有權結構、投資和公司價值之實證分析，國立高雄第一科技大學金融營運研究所未出版之碩士論文。
11.洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍，2005，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係—股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論，第十二卷，第3期：23-40。
12.陳美娥、羅吉台，2000，台灣上市公司交叉持股之經濟特徵與防範（上），會研究月刊，第181期（12月）：113-116。
13.陳美娥、羅吉台，2001，台灣上市公司交叉持股之經濟特徵與防範（下），會研究月刊，第182期（1月）：68-71。
14.董秋梅，1999，機構投資人對企業R&D活動之影響，國立交通大學經營管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
15.董廣平，1999，關係企業交叉持股之利害與因應，會計研究月刊，第159期（2月）：18-23。
16.廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期（9月）：117-160。
17.葉銀華，2016，公司治理：全球觀點、台灣體驗，台中：滄海書局股份有限公司。
18.賴鈺城、劉文正，2015，公司治理，台北：新陸書局股份有限公司。
二、外文文獻部分
1.Agrawal, A., and G. N. Mandelker. 1987. Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. Journal of Finance 42 (September): 823-837.
2.Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanism to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysts 31 (September): 377-397.
3.Almeida, H., and D. Wolfenzon. 2006. A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups. Journal of Finance 61 (May): 2637-2680.
4.Baysinger, B., and R. E. Hoskisson. 1990. The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. Academy of Management Review 15 (January): 72-87.
5.Baysinger, B. D., R. D. Kosnik, and T. A. Turk. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy. Academy of Management Journal 34 (March): 205-214.
6.Benjamin E. H., and M. S. Weisbach. 2003. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review 9 (August): 7-26.
7.Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
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