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題名 利潤稅中立性，廠商逃漏稅決策與租稅天堂
On the Neutrality of Profit Taxes and Tax Compliance in the Presence of Tax Haven
作者 施淙仁
貢獻者 翁堃嵐
施淙仁
關鍵詞 中立性
可分性
逃漏稅決策
海外避稅
租稅天堂
內生市場
neutrality
separability
tax evasion
tax haven
endogenous market
日期 2016
上傳時間 20-Jul-2016 16:54:40 (UTC+8)
摘要 在現有探討逃漏稅的文獻當中，大多將焦點著重在廠商的生產和逃漏稅決策這二項變數的可分性以及利潤稅是否具有中立性的問題，然而通常都以封閉的經濟體為基礎，忽略了國際化浪潮下，廠商的跨國避稅行為。當跨國廠商可以選擇將利潤移轉到租稅天堂規避稅負時，則傳統文獻所獲得的結果就可能無法成立，換言之，廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策就可能不具可分性，利潤稅也可能不再符合中立性。有鑒於此，本論文乃以Wang and Conant (1988) 以及Yaniv (1995) 的結論為基準，利用Dixit (1984) 、Salant (1984) 以及Georke and Runkel (2006) 的設定建立了一個包含租稅天堂 (Tax Haven) 的多家廠商逃漏稅模型，分別在市場結構為外生和內生的狀況下，探討廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策間的可分性以及利潤稅的中立性的問題。研究顯示：當市場結構為外生時且存在租稅天堂時，廠商的生產決策和逃漏決策仍然具有可分性，但利潤稅中立性不存在。再者，當市場結構內生化時，不管租稅天堂存在與否，可分性依舊成立，但利潤稅中性則不成立。
In most of research of tax evasion, the main concern is focused on the separability between the evasion strategy and the production strategy and the neutrality of profit tax. However, the models are usually based on the closed economy instead of the strategy of tax evasion in multinationals in the open economy. When the firms can choose to evade profit tax in the tax haven, the conventional results of the neutrality of profit tax and separability of production and tax evasion may not hold. Therefore, this paper is based on the results of Wang and Conant (1988) and Yaniv (1995). We use the setting of Dixit (1984), Salant (1984) and Georke and Runkel (2006), modeling a multi-firm tax evasion model with tax haven. With different market structure which is endogenous or exogenous may lead to different result. The conclusion shows that when the market structure is exogenous and with tax haven, the separability exists while the neutrality doesn’t. Moreover, when the market structure is endogenous, whether the tax haven exists, separability still hold but the neutrality doesn’t.
參考文獻 郭虹瑩與翁堃嵐 (2007)，「公司稅、租稅逃漏與最適出口貿易政策」，《經濟論文》，35(1)，33–54。
     Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338.
     Baldwin, R. and T.Okubo (2009), “Tax Reform, Delocation, and Heterogeneous Firms.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111, 741–764.
     Brander, J. A. and Spencer, B. J. (1985) , “Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.
     Davies, R. B. and C. Eckel (2010), “Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2, 77–102.
     Desai, M. A., C. F. Foley and J. R. Hines (2006), “The Demand for Tax Haven Operations.” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 513–531.
     Dixit, A. (1984), “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries”, Economic Journal, 94, 1–16.
     Elitzur, R. and J. Mintz (1996), “Transfer Pricing Rules and Corporate Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics, 60, 401–422.
     Goerke, L. and M. Runkel (2006), “Profit Tax Evasion under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure,” National Tax Journal, 59(4), 851–857.
     Hong, Q. and M. Smart (2010), “In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct Investment.” European Economic Review, 54, 82–95.
     Krautheim, S. and T. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), “Heterogeneous Firms, ‘Profit Shifting’ FDI and International Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 122–133.
     Kreutzer, D. and D. R. Lee (1986), “On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits,” National Tax Journal, 39, 241–243.
     Lee, K. (1998), “Tax Evasion, Monopoly and Non-neutral Profit Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 51, 333–338.
     Marelli, M (1984), “On Indirect Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 25, 181–196.
     Panteghini, P.M. (2000), “Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility,” Public Finance Review, 28(3), 199–209.
     Salant, S. (1984), “Export Subsidies as Instruments of Economic and Foreign Policies,” mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
     Slemrod, Joel and J. D. Wilson (2009), “Tax competition with parasitic tax havens, ” Journal of Public Economics, 93(11-12), 1261–1270.
     Virmani, A (1989), “Indirect Tax Evasion and Production Efficiency,” Journal of Public Economics, 39(2), 223–37.
     Wang, L. F. S. and J. L. Conant (1988), “Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decision of the Uncertain Monopolist,” National Tax Journal, 41, 579–582.
     Wilson, J. D. (1986), “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296–315.
     Yaniv, G. (1995), “A Note on the Tax-Evading Firm,” National Tax Journal, 68, 113–120.
     Zodrow, G. R. and P. Mieszkowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356–370.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
103255006
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255006
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 施淙仁zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 施淙仁zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned 20-Jul-2016 16:54:40 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-Jul-2016 16:54:40 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Jul-2016 16:54:40 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103255006en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99319-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103255006zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在現有探討逃漏稅的文獻當中，大多將焦點著重在廠商的生產和逃漏稅決策這二項變數的可分性以及利潤稅是否具有中立性的問題，然而通常都以封閉的經濟體為基礎，忽略了國際化浪潮下，廠商的跨國避稅行為。當跨國廠商可以選擇將利潤移轉到租稅天堂規避稅負時，則傳統文獻所獲得的結果就可能無法成立，換言之，廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策就可能不具可分性，利潤稅也可能不再符合中立性。有鑒於此，本論文乃以Wang and Conant (1988) 以及Yaniv (1995) 的結論為基準，利用Dixit (1984) 、Salant (1984) 以及Georke and Runkel (2006) 的設定建立了一個包含租稅天堂 (Tax Haven) 的多家廠商逃漏稅模型，分別在市場結構為外生和內生的狀況下，探討廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策間的可分性以及利潤稅的中立性的問題。研究顯示：當市場結構為外生時且存在租稅天堂時，廠商的生產決策和逃漏決策仍然具有可分性，但利潤稅中立性不存在。再者，當市場結構內生化時，不管租稅天堂存在與否，可分性依舊成立，但利潤稅中性則不成立。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In most of research of tax evasion, the main concern is focused on the separability between the evasion strategy and the production strategy and the neutrality of profit tax. However, the models are usually based on the closed economy instead of the strategy of tax evasion in multinationals in the open economy. When the firms can choose to evade profit tax in the tax haven, the conventional results of the neutrality of profit tax and separability of production and tax evasion may not hold. Therefore, this paper is based on the results of Wang and Conant (1988) and Yaniv (1995). We use the setting of Dixit (1984), Salant (1984) and Georke and Runkel (2006), modeling a multi-firm tax evasion model with tax haven. With different market structure which is endogenous or exogenous may lead to different result. The conclusion shows that when the market structure is exogenous and with tax haven, the separability exists while the neutrality doesn’t. Moreover, when the market structure is endogenous, whether the tax haven exists, separability still hold but the neutrality doesn’t.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 謝辭...................................................i
     摘要..................................................ii
     英文摘要..............................................iii
     目錄..................................................iv
     第一章 緒論...........................................1
     第二章 文獻回顧........................................3
     第三章 多家廠商的模型設定...............................7
     第四章 市場結構為內生的模型............................12
     第五章 結論..........................................16
     參考文獻...............................................17		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255006en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中立性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 可分性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 逃漏稅決策zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 海外避稅zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅天堂zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內生市場zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) neutralityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) separabilityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax evasionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax havenen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) endogenous marketen_US
dc.title (題名) 利潤稅中立性，廠商逃漏稅決策與租稅天堂zh_TW
dc.title (題名) On the Neutrality of Profit Taxes and Tax Compliance in the Presence of Tax Havenen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 郭虹瑩與翁堃嵐 (2007)，「公司稅、租稅逃漏與最適出口貿易政策」，《經濟論文》，35(1)，33–54。
     Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338.
     Baldwin, R. and T.Okubo (2009), “Tax Reform, Delocation, and Heterogeneous Firms.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111, 741–764.
     Brander, J. A. and Spencer, B. J. (1985) , “Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83–100.
     Davies, R. B. and C. Eckel (2010), “Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2, 77–102.
     Desai, M. A., C. F. Foley and J. R. Hines (2006), “The Demand for Tax Haven Operations.” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 513–531.
     Dixit, A. (1984), “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries”, Economic Journal, 94, 1–16.
     Elitzur, R. and J. Mintz (1996), “Transfer Pricing Rules and Corporate Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics, 60, 401–422.
     Goerke, L. and M. Runkel (2006), “Profit Tax Evasion under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure,” National Tax Journal, 59(4), 851–857.
     Hong, Q. and M. Smart (2010), “In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct Investment.” European Economic Review, 54, 82–95.
     Krautheim, S. and T. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), “Heterogeneous Firms, ‘Profit Shifting’ FDI and International Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 122–133.
     Kreutzer, D. and D. R. Lee (1986), “On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits,” National Tax Journal, 39, 241–243.
     Lee, K. (1998), “Tax Evasion, Monopoly and Non-neutral Profit Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 51, 333–338.
     Marelli, M (1984), “On Indirect Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 25, 181–196.
     Panteghini, P.M. (2000), “Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility,” Public Finance Review, 28(3), 199–209.
     Salant, S. (1984), “Export Subsidies as Instruments of Economic and Foreign Policies,” mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
     Slemrod, Joel and J. D. Wilson (2009), “Tax competition with parasitic tax havens, ” Journal of Public Economics, 93(11-12), 1261–1270.
     Virmani, A (1989), “Indirect Tax Evasion and Production Efficiency,” Journal of Public Economics, 39(2), 223–37.
     Wang, L. F. S. and J. L. Conant (1988), “Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decision of the Uncertain Monopolist,” National Tax Journal, 41, 579–582.
     Wilson, J. D. (1986), “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296–315.
     Yaniv, G. (1995), “A Note on the Tax-Evading Firm,” National Tax Journal, 68, 113–120.
     Zodrow, G. R. and P. Mieszkowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356–370.		zh_TW