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題名 多國籍企業之最適汙染稅
The Optimal Taxation on Pollution under Multinational Enterprise作者 余斯婷
Yu, Shih Ting貢獻者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu Bong
余斯婷
Yu, Shih Ting關鍵詞 多國籍企業
汙染稅稅率
資本流動
生產外部性
獨占
Multinational enterprise
Pollution tax
Capital mobility
Externality
Monopoly日期 2016 上傳時間 2-Aug-2016 15:57:53 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文以 Barnett (1980) 一文為基礎，採用第三地市場以納入廠商型態為多國籍企業 (multinational enterprise) 的模型。本文旨在分析當兩國政府面對獨占廠商的生產不效率及製造過程中汙染排放引發的生產外部性時，如何制定最適汙染稅稅率。並比較經濟開放後資本要素可自由於兩國間移動，最適汙染稅稅率會如何變化。本研究發現政府課稅將受三種效果影響：消費者剩餘效果 (consumer surplus effect)、利潤移轉效果 (profit-shifting effect)、汙染控制效果 (pollution control effect)。不論在封閉經濟體系或開放經濟體系下，當消費者剩餘效果大於利潤移轉效果時，政府會將最適汙染稅率制定低於皮古稅 (Pigouvian tax)，以補貼獨占廠商增加產量以提高社會福利；若利潤移轉效果大於消費者剩餘效果時，最適汙染稅稅率將高於皮古稅，以藉由汙染稅獲取更多的企業利潤。當經濟開放後資本可於兩國間自由移動，除原先稅率對產量的直接效果(direct effect) 外，稅率亦會透過資本間接影響產量，為間接效果 (indirect effect)。間接效果將使產量對於稅率的變動較不敏感，因此為吸引具流動性的資本要素進入當地投資，政府會將汙染稅稅率調高以獲取更多企業利潤。
Based on the setting of Barnett (1980), the thesis develops a model to analyze the optimal pollution tax on multinational enterprises with negative externalities. Governments have only one policy variable: the pollution tax. Each government levies the pollution tax on the output of multinational enterprises, and the tax revenues are returned to the residents in a lump sum manner. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the optimal taxation on the multinational enterprise with externalities and mobile capital flow.The thesis obtains several results: First, no matter in the case of closed economy or open economy, the second-best optimal pollution tax may be less or greater than the marginal pollution damage. It may be lower because the consumer surplus effect dominates the profit-shifting effect, so the government chooses a lower tax rate to stimulate production and to increase social welfare.Second, when the capital can freely move between countries, the governments will levy a tax rate higher than that of a closed economy. Doing so can attract the flow of capital so that government can get more profit.參考文獻 Barnett, A. H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American Economic Review 70, 1037–1041.Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,” Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–328.Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.Bovenberg, A. L. and de Mooij R. A. (1994), “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation, ” American Economic Review, 84(4), 1085–1089.Buchanan, J. M. (1969), “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure,” American Economic Review, 59,174–177.Farmer, R. and Richman, B.M. (1966), International Business: An Operational Theory. R.D. Irwin: Homewood, IL.Hoel, M. (1997), “Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(2), 241–259.Misiolek, W. S. (1980), “Effluent Taxation in Monopoly Markets,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 7, 103–107.Oates, W. E. and Schwab, R. E. (1988), “Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing,” Journal of Public Economics, 35. 333–354.Oates, W. E. and Strassman, N. D. (1984), “Effluent Fees and Market Structure,” Journal of Public Economics, 24, 29–46.Pigou, A. C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, MaxMilan, London.Porter, M. E. (1991), “America’s Green Strategy,” Scientific American, 264, 168.Rauscher, M. (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229–244.Robinson, R. D. (1984), Internationalization of Business: An Introduction. Chicago: The Dryden Press.Rosenzweig, P. M. and Singh, J. V. (1991), “Organizational Environments and the Multinational Enterprise, ” Academy of Management Review, 16, 340–361.Spulber, D. F. (1985), “Effluent Regulation and Long-Run Optimality,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 12, 103–116.Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economics, 64, 416–424.Woods, N. D. (2006), “Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87(1), 174–189. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
103255010資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255010 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Yu Bong en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 余斯婷 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yu, Shih Ting en_US dc.creator (作者) 余斯婷 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Yu, Shih Ting en_US dc.date (日期) 2016 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2016 15:57:53 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Aug-2016 15:57:53 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2016 15:57:53 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103255010 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99536 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103255010 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以 Barnett (1980) 一文為基礎，採用第三地市場以納入廠商型態為多國籍企業 (multinational enterprise) 的模型。本文旨在分析當兩國政府面對獨占廠商的生產不效率及製造過程中汙染排放引發的生產外部性時，如何制定最適汙染稅稅率。並比較經濟開放後資本要素可自由於兩國間移動，最適汙染稅稅率會如何變化。本研究發現政府課稅將受三種效果影響：消費者剩餘效果 (consumer surplus effect)、利潤移轉效果 (profit-shifting effect)、汙染控制效果 (pollution control effect)。不論在封閉經濟體系或開放經濟體系下，當消費者剩餘效果大於利潤移轉效果時，政府會將最適汙染稅率制定低於皮古稅 (Pigouvian tax)，以補貼獨占廠商增加產量以提高社會福利；若利潤移轉效果大於消費者剩餘效果時，最適汙染稅稅率將高於皮古稅，以藉由汙染稅獲取更多的企業利潤。當經濟開放後資本可於兩國間自由移動，除原先稅率對產量的直接效果(direct effect) 外，稅率亦會透過資本間接影響產量，為間接效果 (indirect effect)。間接效果將使產量對於稅率的變動較不敏感，因此為吸引具流動性的資本要素進入當地投資，政府會將汙染稅稅率調高以獲取更多企業利潤。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Based on the setting of Barnett (1980), the thesis develops a model to analyze the optimal pollution tax on multinational enterprises with negative externalities. Governments have only one policy variable: the pollution tax. Each government levies the pollution tax on the output of multinational enterprises, and the tax revenues are returned to the residents in a lump sum manner. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the optimal taxation on the multinational enterprise with externalities and mobile capital flow.The thesis obtains several results: First, no matter in the case of closed economy or open economy, the second-best optimal pollution tax may be less or greater than the marginal pollution damage. It may be lower because the consumer surplus effect dominates the profit-shifting effect, so the government chooses a lower tax rate to stimulate production and to increase social welfare.Second, when the capital can freely move between countries, the governments will levy a tax rate higher than that of a closed economy. Doing so can attract the flow of capital so that government can get more profit. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與背景 1第二節 研究方法 2第三節 本文架構 2第二章 文獻回顧 3第一節 廠商型態為不完全競爭下之最適汙染稅 3第二節 租稅競爭、資本流動性與環境政策 4第三節 綜合整理 5第三章 模型設定 6第一節 經濟環境 6第二節 廠商行為 6第三節 封閉經濟體系 (Closed Economy) 7第四節 開放經濟體系 (Open Economy) 9第四章 均衡結果之比較 13第一節 與皮古稅 (Pigouvian tax) 之差異 13第二節 比較封閉與開放經濟體系下之結果 14第五章 結論 17附錄 19參考文獻 21 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1052616 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255010 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 多國籍企業 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 汙染稅稅率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資本流動 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 生產外部性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨占 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Multinational enterprise en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pollution tax en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Capital mobility en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Externality en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Monopoly en_US dc.title (題名) 多國籍企業之最適汙染稅 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Optimal Taxation on Pollution under Multinational Enterprise en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Barnett, A. H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American Economic Review 70, 1037–1041.Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,” Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325–328.Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.Bovenberg, A. L. and de Mooij R. A. (1994), “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation, ” American Economic Review, 84(4), 1085–1089.Buchanan, J. M. (1969), “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure,” American Economic Review, 59,174–177.Farmer, R. and Richman, B.M. (1966), International Business: An Operational Theory. R.D. Irwin: Homewood, IL.Hoel, M. (1997), “Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(2), 241–259.Misiolek, W. S. (1980), “Effluent Taxation in Monopoly Markets,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 7, 103–107.Oates, W. E. and Schwab, R. E. (1988), “Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing,” Journal of Public Economics, 35. 333–354.Oates, W. E. and Strassman, N. D. (1984), “Effluent Fees and Market Structure,” Journal of Public Economics, 24, 29–46.Pigou, A. C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, MaxMilan, London.Porter, M. E. (1991), “America’s Green Strategy,” Scientific American, 264, 168.Rauscher, M. (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229–244.Robinson, R. D. (1984), Internationalization of Business: An Introduction. Chicago: The Dryden Press.Rosenzweig, P. M. and Singh, J. V. (1991), “Organizational Environments and the Multinational Enterprise, ” Academy of Management Review, 16, 340–361.Spulber, D. F. (1985), “Effluent Regulation and Long-Run Optimality,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 12, 103–116.Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economics, 64, 416–424.Woods, N. D. (2006), “Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87(1), 174–189. zh_TW
