dc.creator (作者) | Xia, Ming | |
dc.date (日期) | 1996-04 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 21-Sep-2016 11:48:14 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 21-Sep-2016 11:48:14 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 21-Sep-2016 11:48:14 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102107 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article examines three cases of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1990s: the PRC’S most-favored-nation (MFN) status, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and the PRC’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)/World Trade Organization (WTO). The key question is: How to explain the different outcomes in these three most similar cases? These variables are crucial to my explanation: (1) conflicts over conceptual framework; (2) the degree of congruence (or conflict) between U.S. demands and Chinese internal agenda and policy priorities; and (3) existence or nonexistence of support coalitions on both sides. Based on variations of these three factors in each case, this article’s conclusion is that from a U.S. policy perspective, consensus over the conceptual framework between the PRC and the United States makes agreement possible, but only successful coalition-building by the United States will turn this possibility into a reality. | |
dc.format.extent | 2551920 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | Issues & Studies,32(4),60-88 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | international relations;negotiation;U.S. and PRC | |
dc.title (題名) | U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations | |
dc.type (資料類型) | article | |