| dc.creator (作者) | Kim, Woosang | |
| dc.date (日期) | 1996-05 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 21-Sep-2016 13:43:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 21-Sep-2016 13:43:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 21-Sep-2016 13:43:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102112 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In this paper I have introduced two simple extensive-form games and conducted the Poisson regression analysis to investigate the important factors that might influence Sino-South Korean relations. One of the most interesting questions examined in the paper is the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) behavior toward South Korea in case of any change in South Korea-Taiwan relations. The findings of the analysis have indicated that any incremental change in South Korea-Taiwan relations will not influence the PRC’s behavior toward South Korea as long as South Korea maintains friendly relations with the PRC. This study suggests that South Korea should maintain the highest possible unofficial relations with Taiwan as long as it does not violate the “one China” principle.Strategically speaking, South Korean policies toward China or Taiwan should not be based on Being’s verbal expressions or threats but on how Beijing has actually responded to similar situations. That is, it is most important for South Korea to investigate where the PRC actually stands or how the PRC has responded to other nations which have attempted to improve relations with Taiwan. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1297999 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Issues & Studies,32(5),24-39 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | South Korean strategies;event count;diplomatic bargaining game;cooperation and conflict | |
| dc.title (題名) | The Diplomatic Triangle of South Korea, China, and Taiwan | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
